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ABSTRACT
YANG SUN

CONCEPTUALIZING

COPYRIGHT

ENFORCEMENT

AND MANAGEMENT IN THE DIGITAL AGE THROUGH
TWO

MODELS:

THE

RIGHT-HOLDER-CENTRIC

MODEL AND COOPERATIVE MODEL

This dissertation focuses on the issues of copyright enforcement and
management. Especially, the research looks into how the digital technology
reshapes the general perceptions and landscape of the copyright system in
terms of online enforcement and management. Stepping into the digital age,
the interaction between copyright holders and other parties, including
online users and the ISPs, establishes two coexisting models—the rightholder-centric model and the cooperative model. Therefore, the
dissertation analyzes which model is more appropriate and efficient with
respect to online copyright enforcement and management.

As a matter of fact, the coexistences of two models provides copyright
holders and other parties with multiple options in terms of copyright
enforcement and management. Each model has distinctive features and
vi i

mechanism, and builds upon different perceptions and foundations. The
idea that one model can replace the other does not support the analysis in
this dissertation because each model covers strengths and weaknesses.
Consequently, each model should be the supplementary option to the other
according to specific circumstances. To sum up, the two models should
works as a general entity to promote the copyright enforcement and
management.
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Chapter I Introduction
A.

Overview

A complete circulation of copyright system includes two indispensable aspects:
the copyright enforcement and the copyright management. Despite the differe nce
underlying two aspects, copyright enforcement and copyright management jointly
work to ensure the normal operation of the copyright system.
On the one hand, copyright enforcement focuses on the protection of copyrighted
works as an ex post strategy against copyright infringement. In other words,
copyright enforcement enable copyright holders to force third parties to comply
with the copyright law and meanwhile restore the damages due to copyright
infringement.
Moreover, the copyright enables copyright holders to exclude third parties’
intervention and empowers them with limited monopoly. As a result, they obtain
substantial

benefits

through

the

exploitation

of copyrighted

works.

1

Consequently, copyright enforcement has long been the major reliance to
copyright holders with respect to the security of their interests under copyright
system.
On the other hand, copyright management concentrates on a different perspective:
the creation and licensing of copyrighted works. When a copyright holder creates
an intellectual work, one of his objectives is to license and distribute this work in

1

See generally Art. I §8 of US Constitution.
1

exchange for revenues. Hence, the creation and licensing of copyrighted works
essentially sustain the management of copyright through financial benefits.
Distinguished from copyright enforcement that emphasizes ex post measures, the
copyright management focuses on the framework to sustain the creation and
licensing of copyrighted works. Because copyright management is largely under
the discretion of copyright holders, they often refer to the most reliable and stable
approach to accomplish this object.
As a consequence, copyright enforcement become the most appropriate option to
the majority of copyright holders regarding the support of copyright manageme nt.
As a widely implemented approach, the underlying rationale is simple: efficie nt
copyright

enforcement

sustains

and ensures the operation of copyright

management through copyright law system. Furthermore, copyright scholars
argue that without the protection from copyright enforcement, copyright holders
may fail to continue their creation when they do not receive sufficient rewards as
incentives. 2
Under the circumstances, the interaction between copyright enforcement and
copyright management constitutes a mainstream mechanism under the copyright
system and establishes the first kind of model in our analysis—the right-holdercentric model.
On the other hand, digital technology brings about new landscape which
fundamentally distinguishes from the traditional perceptions of the copyright

2

CRAIG JOYCE ET AL ., COP YRIGHT LAW, §1.06 (9th ed. 2013).
2

system.
The revolutionary features of digital technology not only expands copyright
holders’ exclusive control on copyrighted works, but also give rise to new
challenges as well as opportunities. In addition to the strategies under the rightholder-centric model, the interaction between copyright holders and other parties,
including the ISPs and online users, breeds alternative strategies outside the rightholder-centric model. Under the circumstances, a new kind of model emerges in
our analysis regarding copyright enforcement and management—the cooperative
model.
The coexistences of two models provides copyright holders and other parties with
multiple options in terms of copyright enforcement and management in the digita l
age. Each model has distinctive features and mechanism, and builds upon
different perceptions and foundations.
The idea that one model can replace the other does not support the analysis in this
paper because each model covers strengths and weaknesses. To the contrary, each
model should be the supplementary option to the other according to specific
circumstances. In summary, the two models should works as a general entity to
promote the copyright enforcement and management.
To facilitate the analysis, this paper looks into copyright enforcement and
management by summarizing different strategies into two models—the rightholder-centric model and the cooperative model.
B.

The Two Models
3

Stepping into the digital age, new technology challenges the copyright system by
changing the landscape of copyright creation and distribution. Online users are
able to copy, modify, and share copyrighted works at minimal costs with the aid
of digital technology. 3 Under the circumstances, copyright enforcement and
copyright management encounter challenges and opportunities. On the one hand,
the online piracy become the major threat to copyright holders in the course of
copyright enforcement. On the other hand, online licensing enables copyright
holders to explore new markets and commercial opportunities.
For example, imagine Allen Brown who is a famous musician recently creates
three popular songs and receives high appraisal from both professiona l
commentators and music fans. Due to the success of these songs, several big
record labels seek for his licensing of his songs on the Internet.
Being inspired by the ambition to promote his music to a higher level, he
authorizes his songs to two recording companies for online licensing and
distribution. Two months later, however, Allen finds a website called “Great
Sharing” which distributes his songs without authorization and also provides a
P2P software named “Free-Ride” that facilitates the sharing of his songs among
online users.
This hypothetical scenario is highly common to every copyright holders in online
environment.
As a response to the threat, Allen acts like other copyright holders in the digita l

3

For a detailed analysis, see generally Chapter II Section A. 2.
4

age. They usually rely on the right-holder-centric model by adopting two general
strategies

to support their copyright

enforcement.

One is the private

implementation system through digital technology. The other is the copyright law
enforcement. Both strategies concentrates on the interests of copyright holders in
the course of copyright enforcement.
Right-holder-centric Model
The right-holder-centric model is as straightforward as its literal meaning. This
model focuses on copyright holders as the only center with respect to copyright
enforcement by emphasizing their interests at the expense of other parties’
interests.
The first strategy adopted by copyright holders, the private implementa tio n
system, relies on digital technology to enhance the control of copyrighted works.
Moreover, the private system is also reinforced by copyright legislation that
precludes the circumvention to the technology. As a result, copyright holders
enjoy twofold protection under right-holder-centric model.
By the same token, copyright law enforcement as the second strategy echoes the
nature of right-holder-centric

model as well. In general,

copyright

law

enforcement operates through the judicial system and primarily targets on
copyright

infringement by compensating copyright

holders and deterring

copyright piracy. Due to its decisive feature, copyright holders usually depends
on copyright law enforcement as the last resort to protect their copyrighted works.
Continuing our scenario, Allen decides to employ the right-holder-centric model
5

to enforce his copyright against the piracy. First of all, he hires a software
developer to design an encryption software on his songs to prevent unauthor ized
access. Moreover, he brings action against the website “Great Sharing”, the P2P
software “Free-Ride” and a number of online users who infringe his copyright
through the website and P2P software.
By implementing these two kinds of strategies under the right-holder-centr ic
model, Allen seeks to eliminate the piracy on his copyrighted songs and secure
his financial benefits through the licensing. The implementation, however, leads
to mixed results which is far from his expectation.
On the one hand, the encryption software indeed prevents unauthorized access to
his songs. Moreover, the lawsuits against the “Great Sharing” and “Free-Ride”
successfully shutdown the illegal website as well as the P2P software. Under the
circumstances, the right-holder-centric model works to achieve the objectives of
copyright enforcement.
On the other hand, the encryption technology and the lawsuits against individ ua l
online users give rise to unexpected side effects and undesirable results. For one,
the hacker groups keep on attacking the encryption software in order to decrypt
the technology. For another, ordinary users, including Allen’s fans, are annoyed
by both the technological restriction and the massive lawsuits. As a consequence,
Allen begin to reconsider his strategies regarding his copyright enforcement.
Despite the above hypothetical scenario, the right-holder-centric model in practice
leads to mixed results. For one, the anti-piracy effect is difficult to reach a clear
6

conclusion. Although copyright law enforcement effectively force several P2P
platforms shutdown and block access to illegal websites, the private system
through digital technology fails to protect copyrighted works due to the
technological weakness. 4
For another, the right-holder-centric model contains inherent defects—the
imbalance between copyright holders and other parties. For instance, the private
system through digital technology provides twofold protections to copyright
holders through technology as well as copyright law. This greatly limit the public
access and users’ experiences to copyrighted works. 5
Moreover, the statutory damages under copyright law enforcement sometimes are
disproportional to individual infringers.

6

The undesirable results do not

effectively convince them the importance of copyright enforcement, and triggers
misunderstanding and resistance from individual online users. In a word, the rightholder-centric model alone is incapable of supporting copyright enforcement in
the digital age, which in turn affects the copyright management.
Cooperative Model
As aforementioned, the right-holder-centric model is not the only model regarding
copyright enforcement. Rather, the cooperative model supports online copyright
enforcement as well.
Briefly speaking, the cooperative model establishes cooperative partnership

4
5
6

See generally Chapter II§C.1 ＆ Chapter III§C1.
See generally Chapter II§C.
See generally Chapter III§C2.
7

between copyright holders and other parties. Contrary to the right-holder-centr ic
model, the cooperative model takes the interests of other parties into consideratio n
so as to establish the cooperation. Specifically, the cooperative model includes
two tracks: one focuses on copyright enforcement and the other concentrates on
copyright management.
The first track concentrates on copyright enforcement. Specifically, it primar ily
aims at increasing the efficiency of online copyright enforcement based on the
cooperation.
One high-profile example is the graduated responses system that forges the
cooperation between copyright holders and Internet service providers (ISPs). The
graduated responses system requires ISPs to actively monitor their subscribers’
activities and cooperate with copyright holders to take actions against online
infringement. Because ISPs have the technological advantage in terms of online
regulation, they are generally in a better position to prevent online piracy than
copyright holders. By incorporating the advantage and establishing cooperation,
the cooperative partnership creates an alternative enforcement option to the rightholder-centric model.
Although the graduated response system is a prospective system under the
cooperative model, its practical experiences indicate it cannot replace the rightholder-centric model with respect to copyright enforcement in the short run. The
graduated responses system does not lead to a clear conclusion as to its general
effect on copyright piracy. Since the system has recently been introduced and
8

adopted, the statistics and evidences in this aspect are inadequate and sometimes
lead to opposing results
For example, the French HADOPI system reports its success in terms of curtailing
online piracy and changing online users’ behaviors, while the French governme nt
report indicates its failure to achieve the objectives. 7 Furthermore, despite the
graduated response system decreasing the illegal usage on P2P network, online
piracy still exist and switched to other platform. 8
On the other hand, the second track of the cooperative model emphasizes
copyright management. In other words, the cooperative model establishes an
alternative channel to supplement the creation and licensing of copyrighted works.
To begin with, copyright creation and licensing has long been monopolized by
copyright holders and the content industry. Due to growing demand from the
public, the investment in copyright creation and licensing gradually increase to a
large figure which demand substantial financial returns. Consequently, copyright
holders and relevant stakeholders generally rely on the right-holder-centric model
to sustain the creation and licensing of copyrighted works.
However, digital technology enables ordinary users to participate in the process
of copyright creation and licensing. Moreover, the Internet connection facilita tes
the distribution of copyrighted works with marginal costs. An author does not
need to rely on the copyright industry for the transaction or marketing. The
technological advance brings about the possibility of creation outside the
7
8

See generally Chapter IV§D1(b)＆(c) .
See generally Chapter IV§E1.
9

copyright industry. It also leads to the possibility of cooperation between
copyright holder and ordinary users.
A case in point is the open access program, including the open-source software
project and creative commons licenses. The focal point of the open access
program lies in the licensing mechanism. Simply put, the licensing mechanis m
allows a copyright holder to license his work outside the copyright system with
fewer restriction. 9 As a matter of fact, copyright holders under the licens ing
framework reduce the control on copyrighted works in exchange for the
cooperation from ordinary users. Because copyright creation builds upon
available resources, the flexible accessing by the open access program provides a
low threshold and an alternative route for copyright creation and licensing.
Analogous to the graduated responses system, the open access program is a
prospective system with respect to the creation and licensing of copyrighted works.
Nevertheless, it is far from ultimate success and cannot replace the mainstre a m
creation and licensing mechanism under the copyright system. Although the
cooperative model provides an alternative route to copyright creation and
licensing, this model currently is limited in terms of commercial distribution and
production. To be sure, the Android operating system is the successful example in
the area of software industry which can sustain commercial scale production and
distribution. 10 However, other successful examples such as Jonathan Coulton in

9
10

Open Access, WIKIP EDIA , available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_access (last visited 8/2/2014).
See generally Chapter V§D1(b).
10

music area is more like an exception and hardly reaches the commercial scale. 11
As a matter of fact, the right-holder-centric model generally is the major option to
professional creation and licensing of copyrighted works for commercia l
distribution and consumption. Large companies in copyright industry have
sufficient resources to sustain the marketing of copyrighted works. Moreover,
copyright industry often invest a lot to the discovering of new and talented
creators, especially in the music industry. Without the protection and support from
the right-holder-centric model, copyright industry is unlikely to maintain the
investment in their production and distribution, which eventually decrease
available copyrighted works.
Back to Allen’s case, the coexistence of two models provides him with two
options in terms of his copyright enforcement and management. Because the rightholder-centric model does not meet his expectation but triggers side effects, Allen
decides to opt into the cooperative model. Due to the different features and
mechanisms, Allen is able to avoid the side effects from the right-holder-centr ic
model.
However, the cooperative model is not flawless. Rather, neither the graduated
responses system nor the open access program displays the eligibility to be the
optimal model according to the practical experiences. Accordingly, it is unwise ly
to assume that the cooperative model alone can be the solution to Allen’s problem.
Under the circumstances, Allen seems to encounter a dilemma: choosing one

11

See generally Chapter V§D2(b).
11

model and denying the other, then bearing the side effects or undesirable results.
But is this really the case?
In fact, Allen does not need to choose one model at the expense of the other.
Instead, he can aim at specific problem by employing the most appropriate model.
If one model fail to accomplish the objective, Allen should be free to choose the
other one as long as the model eventually solve the problem. More importantly,
Allen is able to use two models simultaneously to solve his problem. The
combination of two models allow Allen to maximize the strengths of both models.
To sum up, neither the right-holder-centric model nor the cooperative model can
be the only option to copyright enforcement and copyright management. To the
contrary, the two models are the result of online copyright development and the
interaction between copyright holders and other parties. Because each model
include the strengths and weaknesses, the coexistence of two models enables
copyright holders to choose the appropriate one or rely on the combination of two
models according to the specific circumstances.
Generally, copyright holders should consider the cooperative model when the
adoption of right-holder-centric model lead to undesirable results or side effects,
and vice versa. Put another way, the existence of second model supplements the
incapability of the first model.
More importantly, the lesson from the coexistence of two models implies that
developing a supplementary alternative is better than relying on single mechanis m
to copyright enforcement and management.
12

Furthermore, the cooperative model brings about a prospective insight. That is,
transforming non-stakeholders to stakeholders is a new approach to increase the
efficiency of copyright enforcement and the wealth of copyrighted works.
For one, graduated responses system facilitate the enforcement to online piracy.
For another, the open access program opens an alternative route to copyright
creation

and licensing

outside traditional

copyright

system.

Being

the

stakeholders, the participation from ISPs and online users into the cooperative
model ensures the reciprocal benefits to copyright holders. The reciprocal benefits,
on the other hand, expand the scope of stakeholders and promote the idea of
cooperation.
C.

Framework of Dissertation

This dissertation is organized into seven chapters for analysis. Chapter I is the
introduction which illustrates the general thesis and relevant arguments of the
dissertation. This chapter also clarifies the entire structure of the dissertation.
Chapter II and chapter III address the analysis of right-holder-centric model. This
section contains two working examples of the right-holder-centric model: the
private implementation system through digital technology and the copyright law
enforcement. Because copyright holders employ the two strategies in the course
of copyright enforcement. The two chapters focus on the structure and practical
experiences with respect to two working examples.
Following the right-holder-centric model, chapter IV and chapter V introduce the
cooperative model for analysis. Contrary to the analysis of the right-holder-centr ic
13

model, these chapters emphasize the cooperation between copyright holders and
other parties by concentrating on two aspects. The first aspect is how the
graduated responses system forges the cooperative partnership between copyright
holders and ISPs in terms of online copyright enforcement.
The second aspect looks into the open access program and figures out how this
program contributes to the creation and licensing of copyrighted works through
cooperation.
Chapter VI serves as analytical section in the dissertation. This chapter primar ily
analyzes the right-holder-centric model and the cooperative model. The analys is
focuses on the structures, foundations, features and practical experiences of the
two models. Based on the analysis, this chapter concludes the implementation and
the interaction of the two models.
Based on the above chapters, chapter VII concludes the whole dissertation by
summarizing the right-holder-centric model and the cooperative model with
respect to copyright enforcement and management. The chapter reiterates the
general arguments of two models and make a final conclusion.

14

Chapter II Right-holder-centric Model: Copyright Private Implementation
through Digital Technology
Copyright holders have long been the center players under the copyright system
simply because they are the generally the only source of creative works. As a
consequence, the entire copyright system designs to serve the interests of
copyright holders and thus establish the right-holder-centric model as the
mainstream model in copyright realm.
The right-holder-centric model consists of two tracks: one is copyright law
enforcement in which copyright holders enforce their rights through judicia l
system. The other is that a copyright holder is able to employ digital technology
to control the access to creative works under a private implementation system.
The digital technology, simply put, enables copyright holders to control the access
to copyrighted works even after distribution. 1 Major content providers such as
Apple, Amazon, and Sony employ the technology to control not only copying, but
distribution, printing, and adapting of works. 2 From the perspective of copyright
holders, the digital technology provides an extra layer of security in addition to
the copyright law. 3
To the contrary, the enhanced level of control often leads to severe tension
between copyright holders and ordinary users, because the control adversely
affects users’ experience and breaks the balance under the copyright system.

1

Digital Rights M anagement, WIKIP EDIA , available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_rights_management
(last visited 9/11/2013).
2 Id.
3 See generally 17 U.S.C. §106.
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Additionally, digital technology is not flawless and the circumvention to digita l
technology frequently occurs. The legislation on anti-circumvention become a
second layer of protection to copyright holders. In international level, the WIPO
Internet Treaties (WCT) and Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) both
introduced the protection on technological measures and rights manageme nt
information. 4 In domestic area, the US, EU Community, and China respective ly
enacts statutes on regulating the circumventions of digital technology. 5
As a result, copyright holders enjoy a twofold protection upheld by digita l
technology as well as the law. The twofold protection, however, give rise to side
effects to online users and place them in an unfavorable position.
The first type of side effect is an observation from judicial interpretation in the
US jurisdiction with respect to the DMCA. The judicial cases in the US indicates
a trend that fair use exception is difficult to obtain when a violation of the DMCA
is at issue. The courts in the US are reluctant to grant fair use exception and further
admit the difficulty in establishing the fair use defense.
The second type of side effect concerning the user’s experience. For instance,
imagine Steven is a music fan who frequently purchases digital sound tracks from
an online music retailer. He usually store these digital music in his laptop and
portable device so that he can enjoy the music regardless time and place.
One day, however, the online music retailer announces that all music purchased

4

See Art. 11-2 of WCT; Art. 18-9 of WPPT.
See generally §1201-02 of DM CA; Art. 6-7 of EU Directive 2001/29/EC; Art. 4-5 of Regulation on Protection of
the Right to Network Dissemination of Information (RPRNDI).
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5

from their website must be play on their exclusive brand laptop and portable
devices without exception, and music already purchased by consumers cannot
play on other platforms anymore. Under the circumstances, what is the option to
Steven? Obviously, he has basically two choices. He has to either purchase the
exclusive brand laptop or portable device to continue his enjoyment on music, or
give up all the music he already purchased.
The twofold protection provided under the private implementation in fact break
the balance between copyright holders and ordinary users. Being the center under
the copyright system, copyright holders enjoy unprecedented control with the aid
of digital technology. However, the right-holder-centric model is not as reliable
and sustainable as expected. Because of the twofold protection, users react
negatively to the legitimate licensing of copyrighted works through digita l
technology.

They have to either accept the digital protected works with

undesirable users’ experience, or access the contents through illegal channel.
Neither one is a desirable result.
Moreover, industrial practice indicates that digital technology is not effective to
deter copyright piracy. Digital encryption is always vulnerable to talented hackers
and decryption technology.

The Internet transmission enables widespread

distribution of unencrypted digital contents.
Furthermore, successful online licensing is founded on the combination of
multiple business strategies rather than the digital restriction of copyrighted works.
Under the circumstances, the private implementation system lacks of justifica tio n
17

to maintain its operation.
To make the system sustainable and justifiable, copyright holders should make a
change to the current system. They should switch their stance from absolute
control to a more flexible and user-friendly approach under the system.
Fortunately, the voluntary pricing mechanism and endogenous mechanism echo
the shifting trend among certain copyright holders
A. The Foundation of twofold protection: Law & Technology
As aforementioned, copyright holders enjoy a two-fold protection under private
implementation through digital technology. Specifically, the protections are
legislation on anti-circumvention and the digital technology itself. The legisla tio n
of anti-circumvention have been an overwhelming trend in copyright legisla tio n
both on international and domestic level. In addition to international treaty,
domestic jurisdiction such as the US, the EU community, and China has passed
relevant legislation. As a consequence, the legislation become the first type of
foundation to uphold the private system.
In addition, copyright holders are good at employing the best available technology
to control the production and distribution of copyrighted works. So long as the
media technology is under control of copyright holders, they are able to force
online users to access contents under specialized licensing framework. The
situation remains the same regarding digital technology. The advance of digita l
technology enables copyright holders to expand their control over copyrighted
works. Under the circumstances, the digital technology becomes the second type
18

of foundation to copyright private implementation.
Integrating the law and technology into a whole, the private system provides
copyright

holders with a two-fold protection with respect to copyright

enforcement. This section specifically describes the two types of foundation in
sequence.
1. Legislation on Anti-circumvention
The call for legislative support is a long-term strategy by copyright holders to deal
with the impact by advanced technology. Similarly, digital technology is not an
exception. The legislation on anti-circumvention is a high-profile example.
Because the Internet is not subjected to the limitation of territory, the internatio na l
copyright community pays much attention to the problems on the circumventio n
of digital technology. Their efforts on anti-circumvention stipulate the legisla tio n
on International, regional and domestic level.
a) International Treaty
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is the major internatio na l
organization and a United Nations agency that “dedicates to the use of intellectua l
property as means of stimulating innovation and creativity.” 6 To establish an
appropriate legal mechanism in the digital age, the WIPO enacted two
international treaties in order to provide sufficient legal protection to copyright
holders: the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). Both treaties mention the protection of digita l

6

About WIPO, WIPO, available at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last visited 9/12/2013).
19

technology and provide specific provisions with respect to the anti-circumventio n.
Article 11 of WCT provides that “Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal
protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective
technological measures”.

7

Article 12 prevents any person “to remove or alter any

electronic rights management information without authority”, or “to distribute,
broadcast or communicate

copies of works…without

rights manageme nt

information without authorization.”8
Article 18 of WPPT similarly provides that “Contracting Parties shall provide
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumventio n
of effective technological measures used by performers or produces of
phonograms”.

9

Article 19 precludes any person “to remove or alter any

electronic rights management information without authority”, or “to distribute,
broadcast or communicate copies of fixed performances of phonograms…witho ut
rights management information without authorization”10
Both treaties provide general guidelines and standards to the legislation on anticircumvention. Because the texts in the treaties only require state members to
“provide

legal

protection

and

effective

legal

remedies

against

the

circumvention” 11 , each jurisdiction is able to enact the most appropriate statutes

7

See Art. 11 of WCT, WIPO, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=295166#P87_12240
(last visited 9/12/2013).
8 See Art. 12 of WCT, WIPO, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=295166#P87_12240
(last visited 9/12/2013).
9 See Art.18 of WPPT, WIPO, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=295578#P141_21174
(last visited 9.12/2013).
10 See Art.19 of WPPT, WIPO, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=295578#P141_21174
(last visited 9.12/2013).
11 Id.
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according to specific circumstances. As a matter of fact, the domestic or regional
legislation on anti-circumvention is the primary legal resource to protect digita l
copyrighted works.
b) Domestic & Regional legislation
1) US: DMCA §§1201
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), as the major response to digita l
technology in the US, governs the circumventions of digital technology as well as
the protection of DRM information. Section 1201(a) provides that “No person
shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title”, which governs the direct access facilitated by
circumvention.

12

Section 1201(b) further

prohibits

the violations

that

“manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof” 13 , which
governs any indirect facilitation to the circumvention.
Moreover, section 1201(c) emphasize that the anti-circumvention provision under
the DMCA should not affect the normal operation of copyright law regarding
“rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement…”14
Therefore, the anti-circumvention provisions under the DMCA govern the
circumvention

of digital

technology

on two aspects,

including

direct

circumvention and indirect facilitation to circumvention. Compared to the WIPO

12
13
14

17 U.S.C. §1201(a).
17 U.S.C. §1201(b).
17 U.S.C. §1201(c).
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treaties, the DMCA offers more comprehensive and specific regulation.
2) EU: Directive 2001/29/EC
In the European Community, anti-circumvention are regulated by the Directive
2001/29/EC on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related
Rights in the Information Society. 15 This Directive primarily concentrates on
digital technology. Meanwhile, the Directive aims to transpose internatio na l
obligation from WCT and WPPT into the EU Community Standard.
Article 6 and 7 respectively governs the circumvention of digital technology and
rights management information. Pursuant to Article 6(1) of Directive, EU
Member States shall provide “adequate legal protections”

against

“the

circumvention of any effective technological measures…”16 Article 6(2) further
obliges Member States to prohibit “the manufacture, import, distribution, sale,
rental, advertisement for sale or rental, or possession for commercial purposes of
devices, products, or components” that facilitate the circumvention directly or
indirectly. 17
Compared to the provisions under the DMCA, the EU Directive displays more
freedom and allow certain degree of autonomy among Member States on
implementation. For example, the Directive does not clearly define “adequate
legal protections”18 . As a matter fact, each Member State is obliged to determine

15 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, EUROPA , official texts available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:167:0010:0019:EN:PDF (last visited
9/12/2013).
16 See Art.6 (1) of Directive.
17 See Art.6 (2) of Directive.
18 Id.
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the extent of “adequate” protection. Moreover, as EU Community directive
mentions, the underlying feature of this Directive is closely connect to regional
commercial activity. Hence, the Directive primarily targets on circumventio n
occurs in commercial area, while the private possession of circumvention tools is
also prohibited. 19
3) China: Regulation on Protection of the Right to Network Dissemination
of Information (RPRNDI)
Distinguished from the US and EU framework, China does not enact specialized
legislation on the aspect of anti-circumvention. To the contrary, the technology
measures are incorporated into the protection of “the right to network
dissemination of information”. 20 The Regulation on Protection of the Right to
Network Dissemination of Information (RPRNDI) primarily aims at “protecting
the right to network dissemination of information for copyright owners”, and
“encouraging the creation and dissemination of works”. 21 Article 4 of the
Regulation provides that,
“No organization or person shall intentionally avoid or destroy the technica l
measures, shall intentionally manufacture, import, or provide the public with
devices or components mainly used to avoid or destroy the technical measures,
and shall intentionally provide technical services to others to avoid or destroy the

19

See Directive, Recital 49.
See generally Regulation on Protection of the Right to Network Dissemination of Information (2013 Revision),
LAW INFO CHINA , English version available at http://bl-lawkomodo.ads.iu.edu:2433/display.aspx?id=12572&lib=law&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=73%2bQtGjPEs
2SL4wVcq17uI3XUiM tiR%2bW (last visited 9/12/2013).
21 Id.
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technical measures.”22
With respect to rights-management information, Article 5 prohibits any person or
organization without permission to
1) Intentionally deleting or altering the electronic information on the manageme nt
right of the works, performances, or audio-visual recordings as provided to the
public through the information network, or
2) Providing

the public

through

the information

network with works,

performances, or audio-visual recordings while knowing or should have known
that the works, performances, or audio-visual recordings have been deleted or
altered without the permission of the owner. 23
Generally, the legislation is primarily suggested by the central government in
order to comply with the obligation of WCT and WPPT. Although online piracy
is severe and rampant in China, the interest groups for copyright are not as strong
as those in the US and the EU Community. Moreover, the perception for copyright
protection is still undergone development. As a consequence, anti-circumventio n
legislation in China is not a central issue compared to the development in the US
and the EU community.
2. Digital Technology
The legislation on anti-circumvention establishes the first type of foundation to
the private implementation. Copyright holders thus is entitled to the legal
protection on their digitally copyrighted works. On the other hand, digita l
22
23

Art. 4 of Regulation.
Art. 5 of Regulation.
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technology forges the second type of foundation to uphold the two-fold protection
to copyright holders.
Basically, there are two concepts with respect to digital technology on regulating
copyrighted works. Digital rights management, also known as DRM, refer to
“technology systems facilitating the trusted, dynamic management if rights in any
kind of digital information, throughout its lifecycle and wherever and however it
is distributed.” 24 The definition of DRM concentrates on the management of
given rights over creative works, which is distinguished from Technologic a l
Protection Measures (TPMs).
The TPMs refer to technological methods used to control the access to digita l
works by various kinds of means such as copying, distribution, performance, and
display. 25 Simply put, the TPMs emphasize on whether certain use of digita l
contents under authorization. Generally, most DRM contain TPMs to control the
access to creative works. Hence, some scholars categorize the mainstream DRM
as “TPM-enabled DRM”. 26 Therefore, the discussion on digital technology in
this chapter employ the same conceptual framework.
The digital technology varies according to specific functions. Because of the
widespread adoption by copyright holders, the technological strengths on
controlling digital works are the focal point. In general, there are three kinds of
technologies with respect to the licensing and use of works:
24 Ian Kerr, Alana M aurushat & Christian Tacit, Technological Protection Measures: Tilting at Copyright’s
Windmill, 34 OTTAWA L. REV. 7, 25 (2002-03).
25 Id., at 13.
26 J OAN VAN TASSEL , D IGITAL RIGHTS M ANAGEMENT: P ROTECTING AND M ONETIZING CONTENT, Elsevier, 77 (2006);
also see Kerr et al. supra note 24, at 25.
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1) Technology that control the access to content;
2) Technology that restrict the copying of content;
3) Technology that prevent the transforming content to other devices. 27
The first kind of digital technology concentrates on the access control. This
technology “blocks access to content unless the user is authorized to consume it
or the machine is authorized to play or display it.”28 Specific examples include
identification and password technologies, DVD regional encryption, Content
Scramble System (CSS), and Advanced Access Content System (AACS). 29
The second type of technology is the copy protection technology, which primar ily
designs to control the copying of copyrighted works. For example, the Analog
Copy Protection (ACP) to an encryption DVD player can make the unauthor ized
copy from the DVD player distorted and unable to play. 30 Similarly, the Copy
Generation Management System (CGMS) is a copy protection mechanism for
analog television signals. 31 The system contains waveforms which can be
detected by compatible devices. Once detected, the device blocks or restricts the
recording of video contents. 32
Finally, the third kind of technology focuses on the transforming of content into
other devices, such as Digital Transmission Content Protection (DTCP) and Highbandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP). 33 Needless to say, this technology

27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Hiram M elendez-Juarbe, DRM Interoperability, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & T ECH . L. 181, 195 (2009).
See Van supra note 26, at 92.
Id., at 88, 92-102.
Id., at 105.
CGM S-A, WIKIP EDIA , available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CGM S-A (last visited 9/11/2013).
Id.
See Hiram supra note 27, at 196.
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restricts the compatibility among different devices. Contents can only be
transferred through exclusive channels and permission.
According to the analysis, all three kinds of technology substantially expands the
control of copyright holders when they license copyrighted works to online users.
The users, by contrast, are adversely affected by the technology and confined to
single licensing framework.
Moreover, digital technology enables copyright holders to control copyrighted
works after distribution or licensing. They are able to prevent users from
transforming the content into other formats and playing the works on incompatib le
devices. In other words, a user or consumer is binding to a given licens ing
platform. A high-profile example is the FairPlay technology adopted by Apple in
licensing online music through iTunes.
The FairPlay is a proprietary digital technology and is incompatible to other
mobile devices on music playing. 34 The FairPlay consisted of multiple security
keys in digital format that are designed to prevent hacking and reduce relevant
damages. 35 All the musical files purchased through iTunes can only be played on
Apple’s devices such as iPod, iPad or the Mac with iTunes software. 36
Moreover, the FairPlay automatically encodes DRM-free music files and restricts
the playback to five computers. 37 To some extent, the Apple’s DRM limit its
34 Priti Trivedi, Writing the Wrong: What the E-Book Industry can Learn from Digital Music’s Mistakes with DRM,
18 J.L. & POL’Y 925, 943 (2009-10).
35 Daniel Eran, How FairPlay Works: Apple’s iTunes DRM Dilemma, ROUGHLYDRAFTED , available at:
http://www.roughlydrafted.com/RD/RDM .Tech.Q1.07/2A351C60-A4E5-4764-A083-FF8610E66A46.html (last
visited 9/11/2013).
36 Nicola F. Sharpe & Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the iPod FairPlay DRM
Controversy, 6 NW. J. T ECH . & INTELL . PROP. 332, 335 (2007).
37 Id.
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consumers’ freedom on choosing the devices and bind them to apple’s services.
From the perspective of copyright holders, digital technology enhances their
control on digital works and brings about substantial benefits. For one, online
users gradually tend to access works in digital format through online transaction.
The ease of copying, distributing, and sharing of electronic copies are highly
attractive to most people, especially among young generation. By employing
digital technology on works, copyright holders are able to binding consumers to
his products with various technological restrictions. Under the circumstances,
consumers have to continue on purchasing relevant products from copyright
holders.
For another, copyright holders rely on digital technology to prevent unauthor ized
access to copyrighted

works. Ordinary

people often are incapable

of

circumventing digital technology to access works. The costs of circumvention to
consumers or users far outweigh the payment to legal licensing. Due to this
assumption, copyright holders still insist on incorporating digital technology into
copyright works for the copyright enforcement.
B. the Root of Failure: the Imbalance by Twofold Protection
Copyright holders enjoy twofold protections under the private system. One is the
legislation that prohibit any circumvention to digital technology, the other is the
digital technology that control the access to copyrighted contents. Theoretica lly,
this twofold protection ensures the interests of copyright holders and it functio ns
as the most appropriate strategy to online copyright enforcement.
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The emphasis on the interests of copyright holders accords with the right-holdercentric model. This accordance, however, sometimes omits other party’s interest.
Put differently, a healthy development of the copyright system should take the
interests of online users into consideration.
On the one hand, copyright system emphasizes the importance of balance between
copyright holders and the public, aiming at promoting culture progress by
widespread access and participation. On the other hand, although copyright is
designed to solve the problem of market failure, copyright holders are still granted
with limited monopoly power.
Nevertheless, the private implementation through digital technology potentially
denies the balance of interests. Put into practice, it leads to tension between
copyright holders and online users form both legal and technological aspects.
1. Side effect on Legal Aspect: the Unavailable Fair Use
Since the legislation on anti-circumvention among various jurisdictions, copyright
holders are able to bring actions against any circumvention on their digita l
technology through judicial system. As a consequence, copyright holders actually
obtain an extra layer of protection. Under the circumstances, online users begin to
concern the expansion of copyright.
For instances, the US DMCA anti-circumvention provisions attracts widespread
criticism from the public over the years. 38 Specifically, they worry that copyright

38

See e.g. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the
Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U.L. REV. 354 (1999) (arguing that DM CA restrict the diversity of information sources and
bridge the freedom of speech).
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holders may employ the anti-circumvention provision to suppress the space of
users’ fair use, resulting in a stronger control and insufficient access to
copyrighted works.
Their concerns are not groundless regarding both theoretical and practical aspects.
In theoretical aspect, copyright

commentators

use “Para-copyright” as a

specialized word to describe the extra protection granted to copyright holders by
means of anti-circumvention legislation. 39 It is like, for example, an umbrella that
is above and beyond the traditional copyright, which also called “pseudocopyright” or “meta-copyright”. 40
Para-copyright provides protection on digital technology adopted by copyright
holders. By imposing liability and penalty to persons who unauthor ized
circumvent digital technology, copyright holders essentially enjoy new rights and
remedies created by the legislation, regardless whether the circumvention relevant
to copyright protection. 41 As a matter of fact, the legislation indirectly empowers
the copyright holders and “compromising other legitimate interests in digita l
content, such as fair use.”42
In practical area, the implementation of anti-circumvention provision had already
caused undesirable results in the early days of the DMCA. Judicial interpretatio n
in the US indicates that the fair use exception is generally difficult to obtain when

39 Jack M . Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the
Information Society, 79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1, at 18 (2004).
40 Para-copyright, Wikipedia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Para-copyright (last visited 9/13/2013).
41 Stacy F. M cDonald, Copyright for Sale: How the Communication of Intellectual Property Distorts the Social
Bargain Implicit in the Copyright Clause, 50 HOW. L.J. 541, at 561 (2007).
42 Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA’s Anti-device
Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. & T ECH . 111, at 126 (2005-2006).
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violation of the DMCA is at issue. As a result, copyright holders are in an
advantageous position.
a) Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes
The first salient US cases regarding the fair use exception under the DMCA anticircumvention provision was Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes. 43 The focal
issue in the case concerns an encryption technology on DVDs. The copyright
holders, namely the Studios, employed an encryption technology on their
distributed DVDs in order to protect their copyrighted movies. 44
The encryption technology is called Content Scrambling System (CSS) which
enable the encryption on DVDs and thus protect against unauthorized piracy. 45
The dispute arose when a Norwegian teenager, as a member of a high school
science project, developed a decryption algorithm for the CSS technology. 46 The
decryption code was called “DeCSS” and widely distributed in United States via
the Internet, resulting decryption of the Studios’ propriety DVDs. 47
The Studios thus brought an action against the website that posted the decryption
code and also facilitated others to download or use the code. 48 The defendant
argued that the fair use doctrine is a constitutionally protected right based on the
First Amendment. 49 The Second Circuit rejected the argument and ruled that the
Supreme Court has ever held the fair use doctrine is constitutionally guaranteed. 50
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id., at 309.
See Lipton supra note 42, at 127.
Reimerdes, F. Supp. 2d, at 311.
Id.
Id., at 294.
Id., at 327.
Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429,455(2d Cir. 2001).
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The court further ruled that the defendant could not avail themselves of the fair
use exception because they were not engaged in fair use of copyrighted works,
and the legislative preservation of the fair use defense in the DMCA said nothing
about rights to circumvent a digital lock. 51
b) United States v. Elcom Ltd.
This federal court case involves the claim for an Adobe eBook format and is the
first case that the defendant is prosecuted under criminal provisions under the
DMCA. 52
The person at the center of this case was a 27 year old Russian programmer,
Dmitry Sklyarov, who was arrested in Las Vegas on July 2001 and was charged
for “trafficking in and offering to the public a software program that could convert
a restricted eBook file into a standard PDF file.”53
In the litigation, the defendant raised a fair use defense and claimed that the
DMCA was constitutionally invalid under the First Amendment. 54 The defendant
further argued that the decryption technology to the eBook file, the AEBPR, could
be sued for fair use purposes that were protected under the First Amendment. 55
The court rejected defendant’s argument regarding the First Amendment defense
by referring to the same arguments in Reimerdes while eventually acquit Elcom
because it did not intend to violate the law. 56 More importantly, the court made

51

Reimerdes, F. Supp. 2d, at 332-35.
US v. ElcomSoft Sklyacov, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION , available at https://www.eff.org/cases/us-velcomsoft-sklyarov (last visited 6/11/2014).
53 See Lipton supra note 42, at 130.
54 United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1117-1118 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
52

55
56

Id., at 1134-35.
Id., at 1135-37.
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an observation with respect to the argument that DMCA adversely affected the
fair use:
[W]ith regard to the argument that fair use rights are impaired [by the DMCA],
the DMCA does not eliminate fair use or substantially impair the fair use rights of
anyone. Congress has not banned or eliminated fair use and nothing in the DMCA
prevents anyone from quoting…The fair user may find it more difficult to engage
in certain fair uses with regard to electronic books, but nevertheless, fair use is
still available. 57
The court expressly accepted that DMCA, especially the anti-circumventio n
legislation, did not affect or negatively impacted fair use rights, while indirectly
admitted that digital technology indeed impose more difficulty to users when they
claimed for the fair use defense. 58
c) 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc.
This case is another example that focuses on the circumvention on digita l
technology and the concern of copyright piracy. The software developer, the 321
Studios, marketed and sold software products for copying DVDs thorough a
specialized circumvention technology.

59

In the litigation, the 321 Studios

particularly emphasized on the fair use function of its software, and claimed that
it enabled the production of backup copies of legitimately purchased DVDs. 60
The court rejected the fair use defense by 321 Studios and held that the DCMA
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Id., at 1134-35.
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See Lipton supra note 42, at 131.
321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
Id., at 1089-1090.
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59
60

does not restricted the fair use, and prohibition on circumvention to digita l
protection does not adversely affect the ability to make fair use of a copyrighted
work. 61
The decision of the case indicates a similar tendency to Elcom case. Although 321
Studios’ software is not designed for infringing use, the fair sue argument is
similarly unsuccessful as in Elcom case. The court ruled that creating and
marketing products that enable fair use of a digital copyrighted work still violated
the DMCA if such product could be used to circumvent a DRM technology, even
though the circumvention facilitated ordinary users’ access. 62
Brief Observation
To be sure, fair use as an exception in copyright law ensures the users’ right to
access copyrighted works in certain circumstances. Hence, fair use maintains the
delicate balance between copyright holders and users. However, the fact courts in
Reimerdes, Elcom Ltd. and 321 Studios generally were reluctant to grant fair use
exception indicates the tendency that the judicial interpretation is generally in
favor of copyright holders when a violation of the DMCA is at issue. It is obvious
that courts in the US pay more attention to the concern of online piracy rather than
the consideration of balance.
From the perspective of judicial interpretation, the legislation on digita l
technology brings about certain side effects by raising up the difficulty in
obtaining fair use, and adversely affect the balance between copyright holders and
61
62

Id., at 1101.
Id.
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ordinary users.
In summary, legislation on digital technology provides copyright holders with
legal foundation to prohibit circumvention on technology. Despite the legislative
intent, the legislation on digital technology tends to break the balance between
copyright holders and users. Based on the judicial interpretation in the US, fair
use exception is generally difficult to obtain and rarely granted when there is a
violation of the DMCA. Under the circumstances, the delicate balance in
copyright system in fact weighs in favor of copyright holders through the private
system, placing ordinary users in unfavorable position.
2. Side Effect on Technological Aspect: the downside of user’s experience
As one of the twofold protection, copyright holders embrace and employ digita l
technology to facilitate their copyright enforcement. The internet connection not
only facilitates the distribution of digital contents, but offers better instruments to
exercise widespread control. For instances, digital technology can restrict multip le
use in a single

licensing

(e.g. prevent saving,

printing,

or annotating

simultaneously), or limit the access to digital contents (e.g. restriction of
installation on numbers of copies). 63
To be sure, the basic control over digital works is normal function and should be
acceptable to ordinary online users. The implementation of digital technology,
however, does not cease to that stage. Since digital technology is powerful and the
internet connection is unlimited, copyright holders are able to exercise post63

Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers under the DMCA, 22 BERKELEY T ECH . L.J. 1119, at 1124
(2007).
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purchase control.
Compared to copyright law enforcement which is usually triggered after
infringement occurs, such post-purchase control is not available to copyright
holders in pre-digital age as a private strategy. A user who purchases a digital copy
may be restricted to specific hardware devices.
For example, suppose you purchase a copy of digital book from Amazon Kindle
store. You are only able to read the e-book in Kindle devices. The license
agreement of Amazon Kindle generally prohibits you to the transfer the e-books
to a different type of device. 64 Under the circumstance, you are not be able to
transfer your favorite e-book, The Adventure of Tom Sawyer, from the Kindle
device to your iPad simply because the screen size of iPad is bigger than Kindle
which allows you to read the book more comfortable.
This hypothetical scenario is what exactly happen in reality when Apple Company
strategically distribute their digital works through Apple iTunes store. In industria l
practice, Apple Company relies on the FairPlay encryption technology to
automatically encode the digital content purchased from iTunes store, and restricts
consumers from using other portable devices to play the digital content. 65

Below

is the detailed description of Apple’s industrial experience.
Industrial Practice: Apple iTunes & FairPlay
Before the emergence of online music store, digital encryption technology have
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already incorporated into musical works. Therefore, it is not surprisingly to
witness major online music licensors employ digital technology in order to
preclude unauthorized access to licensed music.
Among a variety online music stores, the most popular and successful example
should be the Apple iTunes.
The Apple iTunes store is an online proprietary store owned by Apple Company
which offer online music, video, podcast, eBooks, and apps for licensing.
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Among the diversified digital contents, the digital music are the iTunes’ primary
product. When iTunes 1.0 was launched in January 2001, its major feature was as
an “ultimate way to manage digital music and create customized CDs.”67
Since iTunes allows users to customize personal playlists within one or more
libraries, edit file information, record Compact Discs, copy files to a digital audio
player, and purchase music built-in online store, it quickly become popular among
online users. 68 Over one decade since its initial launch, Apple iTunes has
acquired 63% digital music market share as of the fourth quarter in 2012
compared to 22% by Amazon MP3. 69
To the very beginning, Apple employs an encryption technology called FairPlay
to control the usage of digital contents purchased through iTunes store. 70
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Generally, the FairPlay encryption imposes restriction on a user who purchased
music from iTunes in several aspects:
1) A music can be played up to five authorized devices simultaneously; 71
2) The FairPlay-encrypted music can only be copied up to seven times to a CD;72
3) The mandatory copying of music to a standard CD may result in no DRM
protection or ripped. Such CD does not contain first sale rights and cannot be
legally leased, lent, sold or distributed. 73
Obviously, the restrictions by FairPlay impose substantial inconvenience for users
who purchase music through iTunes store and limit their normal usage. Being
frustrated with the undesirable experiences, a couple of technicians attempted to
circumvent the FairPlay encryption.
For example, the RealNetworks, a technician group, once launched a Harmony
Project and designed a software program called Harmony which primarily aims
to be compatible with Apple’s FairPlay encryption program. 74 Apple threatened
to file lawsuits against RealNetworks under the DCMA, and the RealNetworks
eventually cease the decryption plan and compromise. 75
To RealNetworks, the purpose is to compete with Apple iTunes through
compatibility. Users may receive substantial benefits from the competitio n
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because it drives the price of digital contents to reasonable level through
competition. So long as the incompatibility precludes the competition to some
extent, copyright holders have advantages in determining the price over their
subscribers who are locked in a single licensing platform.
In addition to the Harmony Project promoted by RealNetworks, other technic ia ns
also designed their own software to battle against the FairPlay. For instances, Jon
Johansen designed the QTFairUse which reverse engineered the encryption
technology of FairPlay; a software package named PlayFair created by an
anonymous developer which remove the encryption from files using the FairPlay
DRM mechanism; The Requiem software allows a person to decrypt music that
they are authorized to play in iTunes by reverse-engineering Apple's FairPlay
algorithm.
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The fight back from technology community warns the Apple that digita l
technology is not as reliable as they expect with respect to exclusive control on
digital works. The Apple, however, quickly responded to the challenge by
continuously updating their software system to nullify the circumvention.
For instances, Apple introduced iTunes 6.0 and iTunes 7.0 in a short period during
2005 to 2006 which includes technical updates intended to cease programs like
Hymn and JHymn, the successors of PlayFair. 77 Similarly, the release of Requiem
forced Apple to update its iTunes version for several times so as to prevent the
circumvention. The Requiem kept evolving as response to Apple’s updating and
76
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the “digital armed race” between the two parties had lasted for almost two years
since 2008. 78
Realizing the endless, time-consuming and expensive “digital arms race”, Apple
moved to change its strategy. Apple announced the removal of FairPlay
encryption on digital music in 2007. 79

In a public letter made by Apple entitled

in Thoughts on Music, Steve Jobs publicly persuade other label records to sell
their music without DRM encryption. 80 According to Jobs, the reason that Apple
adopted encryption was largely due to the licensing agreements between Apple
iTunes and four major label records. 81
In addition to the public letter, the Apple began to release DRM-free EMI’s music
on iTunes in 2007. 82 Two years later, Apple reached an agreement with all major
label records and sold music on iTunes without encryption. 83 There were totally
eight million music free of FairPlay encryption on the first day of removal on
iTunes store. 84
Brief Observation
Needless to say, the user’s experiences

are adversely affected

by the

incompatibility of digital contents. As a consequence, ordinary users who obtain
licenses from copyright holders and pay to access digital contents now face a new

78

Id.
Thoughts on Music, AP P LE , available at http://www.apple.com/au/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic/ (last visited
1/24/2014).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Huge Hart, EMI’s Last-Ditch Effort: DRM-free Music, WIRED , available at
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2007/04/emi_business0403 (last visited 1/24/2014).
83 Apple to end music restrictions, BBC N EWS, Jan. 7th 2009, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7813527.stm (last visited 1/24/2014).
84 Id.
40
79

problem: they are confined to specific licensing platform. In other words, the
licensing platform determines the quality and diversity of available contents.
Under the circumstances, ordinary users are either continue their subscription, or
switch to other licensors at the expense of losing current access and bearing the
sunk costs.
As a whole, the digital technology employed by copyright holders restricts users’
experiences on the access to copyrighted works. As a consequence, users group
either accepts this undesirable experience, or break the limitation to enhance their
experiences at the risk of infringing copyright.
Consequently, copyright holders and ordinary users, who should have been mutual
beneficial

to the other side, eventually

raise the tension

through

the

implementation of digital technology.
C. Other Observations on Copyright Private implementation
1. Digital Technology Cannot Offer Reliable Protection Against Piracy
The private implementation system provides copyright holders with advanced
technology to prevent unauthorized access to copyright works. In other words, the
major function of digital technology under the system is to deter and prevent
copyright piracy. The employment of digital technology, however, indicates the
undesirable results.
Within the private system, the digital technology is of most importance because it
serves as the foundation to reinforce copyright holders’ control over their works.
However, the weaknesses of digital technology gradually become the problem
41

through the operation of the system.
It is true that digital technology facilitates the control on digital works.
Nevertheless, no guarantee can be made with respect to the protection against
piracy. As a matter of fact, the harder copyright holders strive to protect their
works through digital technology, the harder talented technicians work for
circumvention. 85 Specifically, the major threat is the hackers group who are able
to circumvent or “crack” encryption technology on a given work. The experience
from computer games industry is a high-profile example.
Compared to other industries such as online music or e-books, the computer game
industry generally received less attention by the public but suffer from more
severe piracy and losses. 86 The severe piracy on computer games usually causes
higher losses than other entertainment industry. 87 The actual losses to computer
games industry due to online piracy is difficult to gauge because pirated users
often claim they rarely purchased the games they actually pirate. 88
The major concern to the computer games industry is the “Zero-day” piracy,
which refers to the successful circumvention of digital protection on or before the
official launch date of a given computer game. 89 Such kind of piracy is the most
damaging because game fans are eager to gain access to the launched one and the
85

John Black, the Impossibility of Technology-Based DRM and a Modest Suggestion, 3 J. T ELECOMM. & HIGH
T ECH . L. 387, at 388 (2005).
86 Andrew V. M oshirnia, Giant Pink Scorpions: Fighting Piracy with Novel Digital Rights Management
Technology, 23 DE PAUL J. ART T ECH . & INTELL . PROP. L. 1, at 3 (2012).
87 Julian Sanchez, SOPA, Internet Regulation, and the Economics of Piracy, A RTS T ECHNICA , Jan.18th 2012,
available at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/01/internet-regulation-and-the-economics-of-piracy/ (last visited
9/17/2013).
88 Id.
89 Koroush Ghazi, PC Games Piracy Examined, T WEAKGUIDES, available at
http://www.tweakguides.com/Piracy_1.html (last visited 9/17/2013).
42

piracy offer them the convenience. The pirated version of games may contain bugs
or program flaws which still need modification and improvement. 90 Under the
circumstances, the undesirable gaming experience may adversely affects the sales
of that game.
In addition, piracy also affects legitimate gamers. Put differently, the piracy often
consumes resources devoted to sustain the operation of games. For example,
gamers who use pirated version of copies may download patches or other content
for the game, such as game skins or modifications, increasing the costs of
bandwidth to game server.

91

To computer games that contain multiplayer design,

piracy may overload the main server of the game. 92
Despite the threat, computer game companies still have strong confidence in
digital technology with respect to the protection of their games. They argue that
that circumventing digital technology required a huge amount of efforts, suffic ie nt
experiences and investment of time. Their argument further goes that the majority
of people are either incapable of cracking or are unwilling to invest substantia l
costs on circumvention. Only a small group of people, usually the hacker group,
who can break the technology and they do not account for the revenue to computer
industry.
These optimistic arguments generate a positive effects on the adoption of digita l
technology as protection, while omitting an important consideration—the Internet
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transmission. A well-known principle among technicians community known as
BORA: “break once run anywhere”. 93 Specifically, a hacker who invests time
and efforts to break the digital technology will choose to distribute the unprotected
content with the cracking

technology

through

the Internet.

Under the

circumstances, ordinary online users merely need internet connection and the
knowledge of copying to access the unprotected content. 94
Working under the general principle, the BORA, hackers design three main
methods to circumvent the superficially powerful digital technology. Firstly, a
hacker may locate the security weakness in DRM code which allows a hacker to
break the technology without installing software onto the target computer. In other
words, a hacker may take advantage of a known weakness in a given technology
which originates from the basic design and the structure. For example, a hacker
can edit a computer’s registry or delete given files in order to prevent the
technology from normal functioning. 95
The second method relies on specialized software: Key Generator Software
(KeyGens). This software is able to produce a serial counterfeit number which
can be used to unlock the licensed contents. 96 Because a license is a necessary
component that activates the use and distribution of computer software, right
holder often issue a sequential code as the digital key to unlock protected contents
as well as prevent access without authorization. Hence, the KeyGens actually
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break the technology

framework and legal mechanism,

resulting in the

distribution of unprotected works online. 97
The third method is similar to the first type, which directly modify the code of
software and prevent the detection and triggering of the digital protection. This
method is widely used in the circumvention of the DRM installed in PC games.
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Because of the sophisticated process and substantial difficulty, only the elite
groups of hackers can successfully complete the circumventions. 99
The weakness of digital protection and the challenge from hackers demonstrate
that digital technology cannot provide reliable protection on copyrighted works.
Although the hackers are minority compared to the majority of online users, the
hackers’ devotion on widespread distribution of unprotected contents impose
great threat to copyright holders. Therefore, relying on digital technology to
prevent and deter online piracy is unsound and ineffective.
2. Digital Restriction is not the Only Factor to the Success of Online
licensing
Since the private system provides twofold protection, copyright holders usually
assume that such system secure the stable inflow of revenues. Such assumptio n,
however, overlooks other elements that contribute to the success of online
business. As a matter of fact, a successful online licensing builds upon the
combination of flexible business strategies.
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The Amazon’s dominance in e-books market creates a high-profile example. The
Amazon exercises the limitation of compatibility on e-books as its business
strategy and has a high level of control on the usage.
Specifically, Amazon kindle can only read e-books in its proprietary format or
other formats approved by Amazon such as PDF. 100 Although other format like
EPUB can be converted into Amazon’s format, the entire process require thirdparty software to complete the conversion. 101 Considering the inconvenience,
users may prefer to opt in the Amazon Kindle system rather than use a differe nt
device. Moreover, even a user successfully convert an e-book to compatible
version, he may find the e-book does not display appropriately or just partially. 102
Despite the digital restriction on e-books, the Amazon establishes a substantia l
market share of e-books industry in English-speaking countries. In the US,
Amazon takes up 60% of market share regarding e-books. 103

As to the market

share of e-reader, the Amazon has about 50% share of the US market. 104 In the
UK, Amazon is considered to have a market share of 90% regarding e-books
industry. 105 In Australia, Amazon is estimated to take a share of over 60
percent. 106
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Because Amazon employ digital restriction in its e-books licensing, the market
success is naturally attributed to the digital technology. However, there are other
factors which contribute to the success rather than the technology itself.
In general, the Amazon employs a variety strategies to establish its dominant
position in e-books market. Compared to other e-books competitor, Amazon is
first mover to constitute the complete business circulation. Amazon introduced its
kindle device in 2007 as specialized e-reader which allowed its users to shop for,
download, browse, and read e-books, newspapers, magazines, and blogs via
wireless networking. 107
In addition to its first mover advantage, the Amazon constitutes its e-books value
chain by various business strategies. For one, Amazon sells the kindle as e-reader
device. For another, Amazon operates its online bookstore with kindle-formatted
e-books. Amazon is also a publisher by introducing its “Kindle Direct Publishing”
project and acting as a self-publishing platform for authors to sell their e-books
directly from kindle store. 108 As a consequence, the combination of these
business strategies with its first mover advantages lead to its leading market
position in major English-speaking countries.
On the other hand, Amazon employs a flexible licensing agreement as to the price
of its e-books, which is cheaper and affordable to online users. In late 2007, the
new releases and “New York Times” best sellers were being sold for
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approximately $11, while the first chapter of many books were free for
download. 109 Moreover, magazines and newspapers provided by Amazon with a
free trial period followed a monthly subscription fees. 110 Specifically, newspaper
subscriptions costs ranged from $1.99 to $27.99 per month; magazines charge
between $1.25 and $10.99 per month. 111
With a variety of price choices, user are able to afford the accessing costs based
on their capability. Under the circumstances, the Amazon in fact attracts more
users to opt in their kindle system and the large number of users also triggers the
increase of e-books collection contributed from authors. Therefore, the two-side
interaction eventually establishes a positive circulation of e-books industry to
Amazon.
To be sure, the flexible business strategies substantially contributes to the success
and popularity of the Amazon kindle system. Assuming Amazon does not cater to
users’ demands and preferences, other competitors will quickly deprive the market
share. However, someone may argue that the Amazon still integrates DRM into
their kindle system and thus exercises strong control over the usage of Amazon ebooks. Because users are not easily to switch to other devices, their arguments
further goes, the DRM adopted by Amazon still contributes the success of its
business. In other words, the Amazon case is more likely a circumstantia l
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evidence to demonstrate that digital technology is indispensable to a successful
online business.
It is true that Amazon takes up substantial e-books market share with strong
control through digital technology. However, examples in other industry indicates
that lack of digital restriction still contributes to the success of online business.
The most notable case is the online music after the removal of encryption.
The EMI is the first major record label which sold DRM-free music through Apple
iTunes store. According to an interview between EMI senior VP Lauren
Berkowitz with the Bloomberg in 2007, the sales of EMI music indicated DRMfree music is noticeably popular than encrypted music. 112 The album of Pink
Floyd's Dark Side of the Moon increased 272 percent since going DRM-free. 113
Moreover, the digital sales of other albums increased as well. For instances,
Smashing Pumpkins' Siamese Dream raised up by 17 percent; Norah Jones' Come
Away with Me increased 24 percent, and Coldplay's A Rush of Blood to the Head
doubles the sales to 115 percent. 114
The EMI statistics seven years ago was more like a short-term feedback to the
releasing DRM-free music. A recent academic paper by a researcher, Laurina
Zhang, confirms the trend of increased music sales after encryption removal in
music industry.
Zhang’s research included 5,864 albums from 634 artists and compared the sales
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figures before and after the removal of encryption in music. 115 According to her
research, she concluded that the sales of music actually increased after the
removal of encryption on music and the specific increased figure was 10%.116
Specifically, approximately 30% sales boost of lower-selling albums because the
DRM-free music made it easier for users to share and discover new music. 117
The result of EMI’s music sales and the research made by Laurina Zhang
demonstrated that digital restriction on works does not contribute to the success
of online licensing. To the contrary, the removal of restriction on music essentia lly
push the increase of music sales. Even in the newly-developing e-books industry,
the digital restriction at most partially contributes to the success of Amazon kindle
system. In summary, digital technology on restriction is not as constructive as its
design and is not an indispensable component to the establishment of a successful
online licensing.
3. The Shifting Attitude & Strategy
Having been adopted for over a decade, the private implementation system does
not works well to meet the expectation of copyright holders. On the one hand,
digital technology does not provide reliable protection on copyrighted works and
the circumvention occurs frequently. On the other hand, incompatibility adversely
affect users’ experiences. Under the circumstances, a significant tension emerges
between copyright holders and ordinary users. As a consequence, the private
115
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implementation through digital technology gradually become an ineffective
enforcement option to copyright holders.
Since the system is a working example under the right-holder-centric model,
copyright holders are the dominant party in the interaction with ordinary users. To
relieve the tension between the two parties, copyright holders begin to change
their attitude and strategy towards the private implementation system. Generally,
the industrial practice witness a shifting trend. Specifically, copyright holders
gradually adopt a more flexible strategy to ordinary users and develop userfriendly digital restriction.
a) Voluntary Pricing Mechanism
One of the flexible strategies is the voluntary pricing mechanism, which is widely
employed in music industry. The best known example is the Radiohead, a payment
system that enables music fans to set the price they are willing to pay for a given
album online. 118
The Radiohead releases albums exclusively through its website, and fans have the
option to pay as little as nothing for albums with only a small services fees.119
The songs in the album are DRM-free. As a result, musician or artist who makes
the album is able to sidestep the music industry as intermediary for marketing. 120
Moreover, this flexible strategy enables bands or musicians to gain publicity than
they would otherwise receive, which is especially important to individ ua l
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musician or small band who is less competitive to large record labels. 121
In computer games industry, the voluntary pricing mechanism is also adopted by
some companies. One case in point is a company release the “Humble Bundle”
and license DRM-free games on a “pay what you want” basis for a limited
period. 122 The gamers are able to divide their payments between the game
developers and two charities association—the Electronic Frontier Foundation and
Child’s Play. 123 Owning to the flexible and optional mechanism, the bundle is
purchased for 138,813 times with an average payment of $9.18 and leads to the
gross sales of over $1 million. Almost 31 percent of funds were directed to the
two charities. 124
To be sure, the voluntary pricing mechanism is more an alternative option and
prospective strategy than an ultimate solution to the tension and side effect out of
the private implementation system. Although this strategy brings about flexib le
purchasing option that meet the demand from ordinary users, it does not guarantee
stable revenues to copyright holders.
As in the Radiohead case, approximately two-thirds of fans pay around $5 to $15,
while the rest choose to download for free. 125 In another case, a musician released
two albums for online users to choose: $5 for a high quality DRM-free; and a low
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quality album for free. 126 The result showed that only 18.3 percent of users pay
the high quality album, whereas the majority still downloaded the free version. 127
Therefore, the voluntary pricing mechanism indicates that copyright holders are
willing to make a change regarding the interaction with ordinary users. Instead of
implementing strict and inflexible digital restriction, copyright holders attempt to
offer convenient licensing mechanism to users. To some extent, users have no
stance to make complaint when copyright holders relax their control and provide
affordable

choice.

More importantly,

the shifting

attitude

and strategy

demonstrate that the private implementation is not a sustainable enforceme nt
option.
b) User-Friendly Encryption: downgrading experience
The second strategy is an innovative solution to combat against copyright piracy.
The computer games industry primarily employ this strategy. Generally, this
strategy takes place of traditional digital encryption and develops endogenous
mechanism into games.
Instead of restricting the access to games, the new mechanism deter piracy
through in-games elements to degrade the experiences of players who run the
unlicensed copies of Computer games. 128 The downgrading experience, however,
does not negate the access to the digital works. It merely levels down the quality
of a pirated copy and force the users to consider high quality copy through
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legitimate licensing.
For example, developers may shift the game mechanism, add undesirable bugs,
or introduce undefeatable enemies in the game. Since its operation often is
triggered during the process of game playing, it raises the difficulty for hackers to
circumvent or break the technology.
Such kind of inherent technology is more user-friendly to ordinary users because
it does not exclude the access to the digital content in the first place, whereas
frustrates and embarrasses game players who play the pirated copy. 129 The
developers achieve that goal by introducing virtual rivals into the game which are
often extremely powerful and impossible to defeat. Because games fans generally
highly value the gaming experience and obtain self-esteem by defeat all rivals in
the game, they are most likely to quit the pirated copy and move to legitima te
copy. As a consequence, the developers defeat piracy not in reality, but in the
virtual game environment. 130
The case in point is regarding the popular first person shooter (FPS) game—
Serious Sam 3. In the game, the player controls the role, Sam “Serious” Stone,
with a variety of weapons to fight against different kinds of monsters. 131 If the
game server detects an unlicensed copy, it immediately triggers “a giant,
invincible, pink scorpion armed with two shotguns” that attack the player
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relentlessly. 132 Moreover, the player only equips with the weakest pistol when
confronting the scorpion. The scorpion moves very quickly and the attack impose
heavy damages to the player. 133
Under the circumstances, even a professional player will die due to the severe
attack by the scorpion and the entire game process is greatly delayed. According
to the design, the scorpion is triggered in the early stage of the game. 134 Therefore,
it achieves the goal to frustrate and embarrass the pirated player.
The endogenous mechanism as a user-friendly digital restriction includes several
advantages over traditional digital technology which deny the access to works.
First of all, the mechanism does not trigger substantial negative feelings to game
players. In the community of game playing, the cheaters have always been
belittled,

humiliated

and segregated by most players.

135

The design of

endogenous mechanism is highly similar to identifying the cheater and imposes
the humiliation.

Under the circumstances,

mechanism as another punishment

game players may view such

to cheaters. Hence, the operation of

endogenous mechanism may not cause severely negative reaction from ordinary
gamers.
Secondly, endogenous mechanism significantly lower the quality of pirated game.
Players cannot experience the full version of games. As a matter of fact, the
pirated game is turned into a demo to players for experience before purchasing.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
See M oshirnia supra note 86, at 61.
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Since game demo has been widely accepted by the majority of game players, the
mechanism is highly possible to be accept by game players.
Finally, endogenous mechanism treat pirates as normal game players rather than
infringers. Those pirates merely experience a high difficulty in the game than
ordinary players. The group identity provides them with the opportunity to turn
themselves into a legitimate licensee. In the long run, computer games piracy can
be reduced because the increase of game players far outweighs the number of
pirates.
D. Concluding Remark
The private implementation through digital technology, as an enforceme nt
strategy under the right-holder-centric model, gives copyright holders the power
to exercise high level of control over their copyrighted works. Compared to
copyright law enforcement, copyright holders are able to control the distributio n
of works even after sales. As a consequence, copyright holders employ digita l
technology as an efficient solution to copyright piracy.
Moreover, the legislation on anti-circumvention provides copyright holders with
legal foundation to implement the private system. As a consequence, copyright
holders enjoy a twofold protection under the system.
Despite the twofold protection, the private system gradually show its weaknesses.
For one, the legislation on circumvention generally tends to favor copyright
holders in judicial practice. The judicial interpretations in the US indicates that
the fair use exception is difficult to obtain when a dispute involves the violatio n
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of the DMCA. The courts further admitted the difficulty in establishing a
successful fair use defense under the DMCA.
For another, the users’ experiences are adversely affected by digital encryption on
licensed copies. Ordinary users have inadequate freedom on exploitation of a
licensed copy even after sales. Industrial practice, especially in online music
licensing, demonstrates the inefficiency of digital encryption as well as the issue
of incompatibility.
To sum up, the twofold protection weighs in favor of copyright holders than
ordinary users. Under the private system, the interest of ordinary users are readily
omitted and prior consideration is granted to copyright holders. As a consequence,
the tension

between two parties become severe. Therefore,

the private

implementation system essentially break the balance of the copyright system.
In addition to the imbalance, digital technology under the system is not as
effective as its design to preclude copyright piracy. Digital encryption is always
vulnerable to talented hackers and Internet transmission enables widespread
distribution of unencrypted digital contents.
Moreover, the digital restriction barely contributes to the success of online
licensing. Industrial practice demonstrates that successful online licensing rely on
the combination of multiply flexible business strategies rather than the digita l
restriction
Realizing the inefficiency, copyright holders begin to shift the attitude and
strategy under the private system. They attempts to provide ordinary users with
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flexible licensing mechanism and user-friendly digital restriction that does not
trigger negative reaction. The voluntary pricing mechanism and endogenous
mechanism are the cases in point.
The change in the side of copyright holders implies that private implementa tio n
lacks reliability and efficiency to copyright enforcement. A flexible and userfriendly private implementation should be the correct direction for copyright
holders to update and modify the old system in order to establish a WIN-WIN
landscape in copyright realm.
The private implementation system is the first type of the right-holder-centr ic
model. The second type of the model, copyright law enforcement, is quite
different in terms of its operation and effects. The copyright law enforcement, as
one of the enforcement choice, has long been the reliable option for copyright
holders to enforce their exclusive rights. For one, the law enforcement contains a
backward function that compensate the losses due to infringement. For another,
copyright law enforcement includes a forward function that cease and deter
ongoing infringement in order to prevent losses in the future. More importantly,
the law enforcement is decisive than the private implementation because it
operates through the judicial system. Next chapter will discuss copyright law
enforcement as the second right-holder-centric model.
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Chapter III Right-holder-centric model: Copyright Law Enforcement
Copyrighted works generate substantial benefits, primarily the financial revenues,
to copyright holders by means of production and distribution. However, copyright
infringement frequently occurs and distorts the normal circulation of copyrighted
works. As a consequence, copyright infringement adversely affects copyright
holders.
Stepping into the digital age, copyright infringement and piracy display a differe nt
landscape. The past decades had witnessed how digital technology with the
Internet Architecture changes the liability framework of online copyright
infringement. Specifically, new technology such as the P2P software significa ntly
facilitates the unauthorized downloading and distribution. Therefore, online
piracy become rampant and severe in online environment.
To cure such undesirable situation, copyright holders choose to combat against
copyright piracy via copyright law enforcement. As the second type of strategy
under the right-holder-centric model, copyright law enforcement is fundamenta lly
distinguished

from the private implementation through digital technology.

Because copyright law enforcement is operated through judicial system by means
of remedy, it is decisive and influential than the private system. Due to the feature,
copyright holders have long relied on copyright law enforcement as the major
strategy to enforce their copyright throughout history.
In general, the copyright law enforcement functions by means of two types of
remedy on infringement.
First of all, copyright holders are able to seek for injunctive relief through the
judicial system. The injunctive relief works to cease ongoing infringement and the
continuing injury. Copyright holders in common law jurisdictions employ the
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remedy because injunction represents the tradition of equitable consideration.
On the other hand, copyright holders may choose to copyright damages as the
second type of remedy. The first type of copyright damages is measured in the
actual losses of copyright holders or the profits of infringers due to infringeme nt.
Basically, such type of damages is primarily designed to compensate the copyright
holders as an ex post remedy. Moreover, this type of damages also function to
punish and deter infringers by deprive the unjust enrichment.
Due to the feature of digital technology, actual losses and profits are often diffic ult
to measure. Hence, copyright holders gradually prefer to the second type of
copyright damages—the statutory damages. The statutory damages enable
copyright holders to be granted damages under the discretion of courts without
regard to the proof of actual losses. The ease of awarding ensures the final remedy
to copyright holders.
Both injunctive relief and monetary damages constitute the general framework of
copyright law enforcement. As a working example under the right-holder-centr ic
model, this system relies on the judicial system to effectuate its impact on
copyright infringement. Therefore, judicial practice are the best resources to
analyze how this system works to copyright enforcement.
In terms of injunctive relief, the common law countries such as the US, the UK
and Ireland have a line of cases that issuing injunctive order against major
infringing P2P network and illegal websites. Courts in these jurisdictions tend to
award the injunction in favor of copyright holders when they establish the merits
of prevail and have a strong case at issue.
As a consequence, the injunction strategy successfully shut down certain amount
of illegal P2P networks and ceases the ongoing infringement facilitated by the
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network. In the European Union, the injunctive orders to ISPs block infringing
websites and prevent unauthorized access to copyrighted works. From the stance
of copyright holders, injunction is qualified as an effective enforcement towards
online copyright piracy, especially targeting on existing illegal P2P network or
infringing website.
On the other hand, statutory damages are widely employed by copyright holders
to online copyright infringement, yet the adoption give rise to unexpectedly
problematic results.
In addition to targeting on infringing technology or network, copyright holders
cover individual online users as another type of major targets. The judicial cases
in the US, however, demonstrates the inflexibility of statutory damages to
individual infringers with respect to the issue of proportional punishment.
Moreover, the disproportional damages awarding trigger negative reaction from
the public. To make matter worse, the misunderstanding from the public toward
copyright holders essentially create the tension between two groups and raise the
difficult in sustaining copyright enforcement.
Being a working example under right-holder-centric model, copyright law
enforcement primarily focuses on the interest of copyright holders. By placing
copyright holders in a favorable position, this system inherently neglects the
demands and interest of ordinary users.
The different results of judicial practice regarding injunction and statutory
damages indicate that copyright holders should reconsider their strategies under
copyright law enforcement. Infringement are culpable regardless whether the
infringement is committed by technology-based entity or individual online users.
However,

by targeting

on inappropriate
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infringers

with

disproportiona l

punishment, the copyright law enforcement has the tendency to fail the effect of
copyright protection. Therefore, copyright holders should ensure the effect of
copyright law enforcement by distinguishing culpable party with proportional
enforcement strategy.
A. The Background to Copyright Law Enforcement
In general, two prerequisites need to be clarified prior to the discussion of
copyright law enforcement. The first and foremost is the widespread copyright
piracy which threats the interests of copyright holders. Secondly, the advanced
digital technology brings about new type of copyright infringement. Therefore,
this section looks into online piracy and copyright infringement to establish the
background of copyright law enforcement.
1. Copyright Piracy
a) Defining Piracy
Although online copyright piracy just emerged within a decade due to the
technology breakthrough, the term “piracy” itself has a long history in copyright
realm. Prior to the enactment of the Statute of Anne, the Stationers' Company of
London had exclusive rights on publication because the Royal Charter granted the
company with monopoly. 1 Anyone who violated the Royal Charter was labeled
as “pirates”.

2

Hence, the term “piracy” usually

refers to unauthorized

reproducing or distributing copyrighted works, which becomes a close synonym
to copyright infringement and widely accepted by copyright holders to justify
their enforcement actions.
To establish the consensus on copyright protection, multiple internatio na l

1

Copyright infringement, WIKIP EDIA , available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyright_infringement#cite_note2 (last visited 10/8/2013).
2 Id.
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copyright treaties define and highlight piracy in the official statutory texts. For
example, Article 12 (1) of the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works clearly uses the term "piracy" in relation to copyright
infringement, stating that "…pirated works may be seized on importation into
those countries of the Union where the original work enjoys legal protection...” 3
Moreover, the 1994 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
define “pirated copyright goods” in Article 51. 4 Article 61 provides crimina l
procedures and penalties in cases of "willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright
piracy on a commercial scale."5
b) Piracy in digital age
Despite the statutory regulation on copyright piracy in international level, the
copyright industry frequently report that they have severely suffer substantia l
losses from the rampant piracy. As early as 2011, it is estimated that 23.76% of
traffic was infringing in nature across all areas of the global internet. 6 Among
various infringing

traffic,

the most notable were BitTorrent

traffic

and

Cyberlocker traffic, which respectively accounted for 17.9% of and 7% of all
internet usage. 7 As of 2013, a report commissioned by NBC Universal confirms
the increasing and persistent online piracy in major regions globally—North
American, Europe, and Asia-Pacific. 8

3

Darrel Panethiere, The Persistence of Piracy: the Consequences for Creativity, for Culture, and for Sustainable
Development, E-COP YRIGHT BULLETIN 14, available at
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/28696/11513329261panethiere_en.pdf/panethiere_en.pdf (last visited
10/8/2013).
4 TRIPS: Text of the Agreement, WORLD T RADE O RGANIZATION , available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm4_e.htm (last visited 10/8/2013).
5 Id.
6 Technical Report: An Estimate of Infringing Use of the Internet, at 2, T ORRENTF REAK , available at
http://zh.scribd.com/doc/48336443/Envisional-Internet-Usage-Jan2011 (last visited 1/29/2014).
7 Id.
8 New report claims online piracy accounts for 23.8% of all bandwidth, M OVIE SCOP E , available at
http://www.moviescopemag.com/featured-editorial/new-report-claims-online-piracy-accounts-for-23-8-of-allbandwidth/ (last visited 1/29/2014).
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The report found that 82.6% of all internet users and 95.1% of all bandwidth
usage in the major three regions accounted for the increase of 159% from 2010 to
2012, which represents 23.8% of the global total bandwidth usage. 9
In addition to the general estimation of online piracy, different copyright industry
reported suffering in recent years. In music industry, the International Federation
of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) claimed “Widespread piracy is the biggest
factor undermining the growth of the digital music business.”10 According to
IFPI report, 28% of internet users accessed unauthorized music on a monthly basis
and approximately half of the usage relied on peer-to-peer networks. 11 The other
half of online users employed non-P2P channels to access unauthorized music
such as blogs, cyberlockers, forums, websites, and streaming sites. 12 Moreover,
the IFPI found that only 35% P2P users spend $42 annually, compared with $76
per year by those who pay to download and $126 per year by those who subscribe
for the service. 13 Regardless the reliability of statistics, such kind of figure is
often used to describe the losses of online music business and justify the necessity
to strengthen online copyright enforcement.
Other industries also report the undesirable situation due to online piracy.
According to the Business Software Association (BSA), global software piracy
increased to 42% in 2011 and the losses to the industry are estimated to $63.4
billion. 14 Over half of the world’s computer users admit that they conduct
software piracy. 15 In e-books industry, it is reported that the unauthorized copies

9

Id.
Digital Music Report 2012, at 16, M USIC M ARKET STATISTICS, available at
http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2012.pdf (last visited 1/29/2014).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Ninth Annual BSA Global Software Piracy Study, T HE SOFTWARE A LLIANCE , available at
http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2011/ (last visited 10/8/2013).
15 Id.
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of digital books have already cost American publishers $2.8 billion in lost sales
in 2010. 16
Needless to say, copyright piracy poses great threat to copyright holders,
especially to the content industry. Because of the digital technology, online piracy
become the major concern to copyright holders. As a consequence, copyright
holders generally rely on copyright law enforcement as the best available strategy
to deter piracy and protect their copyrighted works. Under the circumstances, the
first prerequisite of copyright law enforcement is established.
2. Online copyright infringement
Due to the evolving features of both digital technology and the internet
architecture, online copyright infringement display distinctive and complicated
circumstances. Although digital technology brings about some confusion to the
very beginning, a line of cases quickly provides reliable resources to establish the
framework of liability. This section briefly describes the liability framework by
reviewing a line of cases regarding online infringement.
a) Direct infringement
Direct infringement constitutes the first type of liability framework. In general, an
ISP or an online user triggers the liability by using the copyright work without
authorization from copyright holders. As a matter of fact, the finding is basically
identical to traditional copyright infringement in spite of the digital technology.
Based on the type of infringer, direct infringement can be divided into two
categories: 1) infringement by ISP, or 2) infringement by online user.
1) Direct Infringement by ISP
16

Paul Boutin, E-books piracy costs US publishers $3 billion, VENTURE BEAT, available at
http://venturebeat.com/2010/03/02/book-piracy-costs-u-s-publishers-3b-says-study/ (last visited 1/29/2014).
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Internet Service Providers, known as ISPs, offer a variety of services to online
users such as e-commerce services; online entertainment (music, movie, etc.),
online communication (e-mail, live-chat, etc.), or information search (Google,
Wikipedia, Baidu, etc.). Because ISPs store and transmit information or digita l
contents through network, ISPs can easily infringe copyright. A case in point is
UMG Recording, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. 17
MP3.com was a website which stored and distributed music and allowed its
subscribers to convert the songs from their CDs to the website. 18 The MP3.com
quickly owned “tens of thousands of popular CDs” into the MP3 format and stored
them on its servers. 19 As a result, several record companies sued MP3.com for
infringement of their sound recording copyright. 20
The court held in favor of plaintiffs and noted that the defendant actually copied
the converted version of songs from plaintiffs’ CDs, and replayed them to its users
without permission from copyright holders.

21

rights recognized in §106 of US Copyright Act.

This action violated the exclusive
22

Although MP3.com argued for

the fair use defense, the court rejected the argument and confirm its infringe me nt
liability. 23
Direct infringement by ISPs mostly occurred in early digital age. Most ISPs focus
on users’ experiences so that many online users were attracted for subscriptio n,
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92 F. Supp.2d 349 (S.D.N.Y.2000).
Id., at 350.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 353.
Id.
Id. at 351-52.
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which often increases the possibility of infringement. The infringement by ISPs
falls within the traditional framework of direct infringement. The transforma tio n
of physical works into digital copy, usually the binary code in nature, does not
change the liability standard.
2) Direct Infringement by online users
Direct infringement by online users is highly straightforward. Simply put, a
personal computer with valid network connection makes the access to works
inexpensive and convenient. With the emergence and development of P2P
technology, more and more online users are able to infringe copyright online.
For instance, imagine you are keen on popular music and are not satisfied with
CDs or albums due to the delay of release and also the expensive price. One day,
you surf the Internet and happen to find a software named “Latest Free Music”.
So long as you install the software in your laptop, you are able to download dozens
of popular music for free.
Being attractive to the prospective benefits, you install the software and begin
your downloading. After a few days, you receive a letter from local record label
and accuse you of copyright infringement. As a result, you either have to answer
the complaint or pay for a settlement. As a matter of fact, the software is an illega l
P2P file-sharing software and you conducted copyright infringement the moment
you install the software and begin downloading.
In general, the liability framework is not substantially distinguished from that of
ISPs. Because of the large quantities of online users, copyright holders highly
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concern the scale of their infringement and sometimes take massive actions
against them. For example, the RIAA began a legal campaign against individ ua l
end-users in 2003. 24 At the end of 2008, RIAA had filed lawsuits against
approximately 35,000 individual end-users. 25
3) Indirect infringement
On the other hand, the traditional framework of indirect infringement, mainly
contributory

infringement and vicarious liability,

is applicable

to online

infringement through a line of cases.
One early case that confirmed the application was the Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom. 26
The Netcom was an ISP that allowed internet news group to make copy of the
plaintiff’s copyrighted work through bulletin board service (BBS) without
authorization. 27 Although the court denied Netcom’s vicarious liability due to the
lack of revenue to defendant 28 , the court confirmed the finding of contributor y
infringement because Netcom had actual knowledge of the direct infringement. 29
The Netcom case is a high-profile example. In addition to the Netcom, a line of
cases echoed the application. Among all cases, the A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc. 30 was the most famous and influential one.
Napster was a P2P file-sharing platform and distributed free software through its
24 Will M oseley, A New (Old) Solution for Online Copyright Enforcement After Thomas and Tenenbaum, 25
BERKELEY T ECH L.J. 311 (2010).
25 Id. at 316.
26 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N. D. Cal. 1995).
27 Id. at 1238-41.
28 Id., at 1244-45.
29 Id., at 1373-76.
30 239 F.3d 1004, (9th Cir. 2001).
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network. 31 The major feature of Napster was that it kept digital files on its
centralized indexing system, but merely facilitated the distribution and enabled
files sharing.

32

The court ruled that Napster conducted both contributor y

infringement and vicarious liability because Napster had actual knowledge of
direct infringement by its subscribers 33 and it recouped the revenue from
advertisement by attracting users to view its webpage. 34
Although the successor of Napster, the P2P software Grokster, designed the
decentralized indexing system and seek to sidestep the liability framework, the
US Supreme Court created a new theory called “inducement liability” that
borrowed from patent law to confirm the liability of Grokster. 35
Since the decentralized indexing system employed by Grokster did not control its
users’ conduct after they installed the software, 36 the inability of control in fact
circumvented the finding of vicarious liability. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the finding that Grokster had actual or constructive knowledge of its users’
infringement. 37 The Supreme Court, however, held the Ninth Circuit misapplied
Sony doctrine by omitting the business mode of Grokster:
“One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infr inge
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third party.”38
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

239 F.3d, at 1011.
Id.
Id.
Id., at 1023.
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, at 937-38 (2005).
Id.
380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
545 U.S. at 919.
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In summary, traditional framework of liability appropriately fits into to online
environment. Although online copyright infringement relies on digital technology
and the internet architecture, the finding of liability still falls into the traditiona l
framework. In other words, online copyright infringement is equivalent to
traditional copyright infringement in terms of liability. Under the circumstances,
copyright holders have solid ground to adopt the law enforcement and impose
penalty on online infringement.
B. Copyright Law Enforcement: the general framework
Copyright law enforcement primarily aims at eliminating infringements in two
aspects. On the one hand, copyright infringement distorts the copyright licens ing
process because unauthorized copies are more likely to substitute the ones
licensed by copyright holders. From economic perspective, the public tend to
become free riders and copyright holders are deprived of the revenue. As a
consequence, copyright holders will have insufficient incentives to continue their
creation, which depart from the copyright policy. Therefore, copyright law
enforcement is indispensable to maintain the operation of copyright system.
On the other hand, copyright law enforcement functions to cease the injury upon
copyright holders, make ex post compensation, and to deter infringeme nt.
Specifically, the law enforcement serves as deterrence to illegal actions that may
happen in the future. By imposing harsh penalty on specific infringement action,
copyright law force infringers to think twice before they commit infringement. In
theory, the law enforcement comes into force when infringers weigh between the
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benefits and the cost of infringement. So long as the costs of infringe me nt
outweigh the benefits, infringers will cease their actions.
Copyright law enforcement is basically initiated by copyright holders under
copyright law through the judicial system. In other words, copyright holders must
bring an action to court in order to protect their copyrighted works. Stepping into
the digital age, the strategy remains the same. The decision handed down by courts
are decisive and influential to the infringers, especially in common law countries
where case law are generally binding.
Under the right-holder-centric model, copyright holders employ two type of
strategies to fulfill copyright law enforcement. In general, the two strategies
depend on the remedy in copyright law through judicial system. Specifica lly,
copyright holders must bring actions to make both strategies come into force.
The first strategy is seeking for injunctive relief against infringers, including P2P
platforms and online users. With the final awarding relief, copyright holders
expects to cease ongoing infringement and protect their copyrighted works
The second type of strategy, on the other hand, is seeking for copyright damages
against infringers. Due to the nature of digital technology, copyright holders prefer
to the statutory damages as the best available monetary damage to compensate
their losses and also deter online infringement. In addition to illegal P2P platform,
copyright holders target on individual online users who are detected by
specialized software due to unauthorized use of copyrighted work.
The two strategies constitute the general framework of copyright law enforceme nt.
71

Being a working example under the right-holder-centric model, copyright holders
have the general control of each strategy. Therefore, the purpose and objective of
each strategy essentially affect the ultimate effect of copyright law enforceme nt.
The remaining part of this chapter discuss these strategies in detail.
1. Copyright law enforcement: Injunctive Relief
The first type of strategy is the injunctive relief, also known as injunction, as
available remedy in copyright law through copyright litigation. In general, an
injunction is an equitable remedy that ordered by a court to a given party so as to
prohibit that party from doing certain actions. 39 Because injunction primarily
takes equitable factors into consideration when applied by courts, this kind of
relief is mainly adopted in common law jurisdictions such as the US, the UK,
Australia and Ireland. The consideration on balance of interests determines
whether an injunction is appropriately issued to cease the injury and protect the
copyright holder.
The injunction as remedy was incorporated into copyright codification in early
copyright history. The first English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne,
provided injunctive relief as a remedy to copyright infringement. 40 The statute
provides that “…infringers shall forfeit any misappropriated works to the
Proprietor or Proprietors of the Copy thereof, who shall forthwith Damask and
make Waste-Paper of them…”41 Moreover, historical records showed that actual
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Injunction, WIKIP EDIA , available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Injunction (last visited 10/11/2013).
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19.available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/anne_1710.asp (last
visited 10/11/2013).
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72
40

monetary damages were not available as penalties to copyright infringement under
most British copyright statutes until 1801. 42 Although monetary damages are
widely awarded by courts to copyright infringement today, history suggests that
the monetary awards were considered “categorically inadequate”. 43 Injunctio ns,
to the contrary, were regularly issued as a matter of course upon the finding of
copyright infringement in history. 44
Because injunctive relief is able to immediately cease illegal infringement and
prevent continuing injury, such kind of remedy is a preferable option to copyright
holders, especially on infringement facilitated by Peer-to-peer technology.
Therefore, copyright holders in the US and the EU countries generally rely on
injunctive relief to fight against online piracy and fulfill copyright law
enforcement in the digital age.
Injunctive relief in United States
As one of the common law countries, the US naturally incorporated the injunctive
relief as remedy in the copyright law. Section 502 of US Copyright Act expressly
provides that:
(a) Any court having jurisdictions Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action
arising under this title may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title
28, grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem
reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.

42 Thomas H. Gomez-Arostegui, What History Teaches us about Copyright Injunctions and the InadequateRemedy-at-law Requirement, 81 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (2008).
43 Id.
44 Id.
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(b) Any such injunction may be served anywhere in the United States on the
person enjoined; it shall be operative throughout the United States and shall
be enforceable, by proceedings in contempt or otherwise, by any United States
court having jurisdiction of that person. The clerk of the court granting the
injunction shall, when requested by any other court in which enforcement of
the injunction is sought, transmit promptly to the other court a certified copy
of all the papers in the case on file in such clerk's office. 45
Despite the statutory texts, the legislative guidance to ordering injunction is
usually insufficient for courts to make direct reference. As a matter of fact, most
courts in common law jurisdictions, including the US courts, rely on case-by-case
analysis to determine whether to issue an injunction. Such practice is more
apparent and common in the US courts. For a majority of modern copyright cases,
the US circuit courts routinely presume the adequacy of legal remedies to
copyright holders and automatically award injunctions upon the finding of
infringement. 46
The US Supreme Court, however, did not support the judicial practices on
injunctions by the circuit courts. The Court repeatedly issued opinions stating that
injunction as copyright remedy should not be automatically granted. 47 In
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Court reasoned that “the goals of
copyright law are not always best served by automatically grant injunctive
45

17 U.S.C. §502.
See e.g., Nat’l Football League v. McBee & Bruno’s, Inc., 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); Pac & S. Co., Inc. v.
Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984).
47 See e.g. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tanisi, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
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relief.”48 In N.Y. Times Co. v. Tanisi, the Court in the majority’s opinion stated
that “it hardly follows from today’s decisions that an injunction…must issue.”49
The different holdings of injunctive relief between the US circuit courts and the
US Supreme Court indicate the art of balancing in copyright policy. In other words,
the difference lies in the perception of utilitarian rationale in copyright.
Copyright protection in the US builds upon the utilitarian rationale that maximizes
the societal welfare by promoting cultural progress and enhancing available works
to the public. To maintain cultural progress, the copyright law grants limited
monopoly power to copyright holders to preserve sufficient incentive. Lack of
incentive discourages copyright holders to continue their cultural creation. Under
the circumstances, awarding injunction is justified from the perspective of
incentive preservation.
Judicial Practice in United States: Cases Review
Due to the feature of digital technology and the Internet architecture, online
copyright infringement become more destructive and often lead to irreparable
harm to copyright holders. Under the circumstances, copyright injunction is
usually an appropriate remedy to cease on-going injury and meanwhile prevent
the source of infringement. In judicial practice, copyright injunction has been
frequently awarded by the US courts with respect to infringement facilitated by
peer-to-peer platforms. A look into a line of the US cases involving P2P
infringement and injunctive relief will reveal how copyright holders employ
48
49

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
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injunctive relief to protect their copyrighted works and simultaneously deter
online piracy.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
The Napster case has been frequently mentioned with respect to its influence on
copyright infringement facilitated by P2P software. However, another focal point
in case was the discussion and ruling on the awarding of preliminary injunc tio n
on Napster, which concentrates on the issue of the cease to ongoing irreparable
injury on copyright holders.
In the case, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court correctly recognized
the necessity of a preliminary injunction against Napster P2P software.

50

However, the Ninth Circuit held that the scope of preliminary injunction by
district court was inappropriate and need to be modified. 51 The Circuit Court
further reasoned that the injunction was overbroad because:
It places on Napster the entire burden of ensuring that no ‘copying, downloading,
uploading, transmitting, or distributing’ of plaintiffs' works occur on the system.
As stated, we place the burden on plaintiffs to provide notice to Napster of
copyrighted works and files containing such works available on the Napster
system before Napster has the duty to disable access to the offending content. 52
Based on the reasoning, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding in
preliminary injunction and remand for modification. As to the Napster’s
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A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, at 1028 (9th Cir. 2001).
239 F.3d, at 1028.
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contention that using a monetary penalty in place of an permanent injunction, the
Ninth Circuit clearly rejected and reasoned that a monetary penalty such as a
compulsory royalty “would give Napster an ‘easy out’ of this case”53 , and Napster
could sidestep the liability by paying royalty fees in the future. 54
Although the Ninth Circuit directed the district court to modify the scope of
preliminary injunction to Napster, it still upheld the awarding of permanent
injunction in case. For one, the Ninth Circuit were cautious on the awarding
copyright injunction. For another, the irreparable harm made by Napster hardly
denied the justice of imposing preliminary injunction in order to protect the
copyright holders.
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation
Unlike the Napster case, the Aimster case expressly upheld the awarding of
preliminary injunction because the plaintiff had a stronger case on the merits than
Napster. In this case, the Aimster system consisted of several components which
facilitated its users to infringe online music: a propriety software that can be
downloaded from Aimster website for free, Aimster’s server which establish users’
communication network, a computerized tutorial that taught its users how to
“share” music through the network, and the “Club Aimster” which provided better
experience for music downloading and sharing by charging subscription.

55

The

plaintiffs thus sued Aimster for both contributory infringement and vicario us
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Id., at 1029.
Id., at 1030.
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, at 647 (7th Cir. 2003).
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liability, and the district court awarded a broad preliminary injunction against the
Aimster. 56
The Seventh Circuit upheld the holding by district court from two aspects. Firstly,
the Seventh Circuit held that the evidence were sufficient to support that the
plaintiffs were likely to prevail on claim that the Aimster substantially facilita ted
its users’ infringement due to the structure of its system. 57 Particularly, the tutorial
served as invitation to its users’ infringement and also explained how to “share”
music. 58 Moreover, because Aimster did not provide evidence to prove its use of
any non-infringing purpose, the imposition of preliminary injunction was based
on sufficient evidence. 59
As to the consideration of balance of harms, the Seven Circuit reasoned that the
harm to Aimster due to the awarding of injunction must be compared with the
harm that plaintiff would suffer if the injunction was denied. 60 Specifically, the
Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s harm were undoubtedly irreparable
because Aimster would be unlikely to pay for plaintiff’s financial losses in any
event considering Aimster’s capability. 61 In other words, the plaintiff was
unlikely to compensate their losses. On the other hand, Aimster’s irreparable harm
was less than that of plaintiff because Aimster did not content that the required
injunction bond of $ 500,000 was inadequate. 62 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit
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affirmed the awarding of preliminary injunction by district court.
University City Studios Productions LLLP v. Bigwood
This case regarding a personal computer user who downloaded copyright movie
through P2P network without authorization. Hence, this case is relatively differe nt
from the Napster and Aimster cases because copyright holders targeted o online
users and seek for injunctive relief. In this case, the defendant was as individ ua l
user of KaZaA—a popular P2P file-sharing

network.

63

The defendant

downloaded copyright movies through KaZaA and stored the contents in his
computer for other KaZaA users to access. 64 Under the circumstances, the
plaintiff sued the defendant for infringement and claimed for permanent
injunction on defendants in the motion of summary judgment. 65
The district court affirmed that the defendant infringed copyright through P2P
system and constituted the liability by willful infringement. 66 Moreover, the court
ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to an order of permanent injunction on
defendants in order to prevent further infringement. 67

However, the court

reasoned that the permanent injunction on motion was too broad so that it covered
copyrighted works not included in the lawsuit, which inappropriately expand the
scope of permanent injunction. 68 The district court further reasoned that:
“Plaintiffs have not produced evidence of any threat of continuing infringe me nt
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or a substantial likelihood of threat of future infringement in Plaintiffs' other
copyrighted works, let alone works that have not yet been created or copyrighted,
and an injunction of sufficient scope to reach those materials is denied.”69
Based on the reasoning, the court merely enjoined the defendant from infringing
the two copyrighted movies owned by plaintiff and rejected the extension of
injunction to other copyrighted works.
Injunctive Relief in European Union: the Website Blocking
Similar to the experience in the US jurisdiction, a key strategy to fight against
online piracy in the European Union countries, including the United Kingdom and
Ireland, is an order of injunction from courts that direct an ISP to block the access
to websites that containing infringing or illegal contents. The injunctive order
specifically addresses the power that a third party may apply for an injunctive
order to an extraterritorial website that conduct copyright infringement. 70
The EU legislation functions as the primary authority to provide direction on this
issue. Under Article 8(3) of the Directive on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects
of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society71 , member states of
European Union “shall ensure the rightholder are in a position to apply for an
injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to
infringe a copyright or related right.” In March 2014, the European Court of
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Online Copyright Infringement, DISCUSSION PAP ER, Australia Government, July 2014, at 7, available at
http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/Onlinecopyrightinfringement/FINAL%20-%20Online%20copyrig
ht%20infringement%20discussion%20paper%20-%20PDF.PDF (last visited 6/20/2014)
71 See Art. 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC, Europa, available at
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visited 6/20/2014).
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Justice confirmed that the Directive authorize the third party injunction to be
granted against ISPs. 72 Under the circumstances, the Directive leave it to
individual member state to incorporate the obligation into domestic law as fit.
Application in United Kingdom ＆ Ireland
In the United Kingdom, Section 97A of the Copyright, Design and Patent Act
1988 implement the obligation under the EU Directive. Section 97A provides that:
(1) The High Court (in Scotland, the Court of Session) shall have power to grant
an injunction against a service provider, where the service provider have actual
knowledge of another person using their service to infringe copyright.
(2) In determining whether a service provider has actual knowledge for the
purpose of this section, a court shall take into account all matters which appear to
it in the particular circumstances to be relevant. 73
The essential issue of this section is to determine whether an ISP has “actual
knowledge” of another person’s infringement via its Internet service. Specifica lly,
the Court must take into account whether the ISP received notice of infringing
activity as well as the quality of notice itself. 74
On the other hand, the Ireland legislation on injunction implements the Directive
obligation by statutory instrument in 2012. 75 Section 5(A)(a) of Copyright and
Related Rights Act 2000 provides that,

72 See UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Ors (C-314/12), Curia, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-314/12 (last visited 6/20/2014).
73 §97 of Copyright, Design and Patent Act 1988, available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/97A (last visited 6/20/2014)
74 See Discussion Paper supra note 70, at 7.
75 European Union (Copyright and Related Rights) Regulations 2012 (Statutory Instrument no. 59 of 2012).
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The owner of the copyright in a work may, in respect of work, apply to the High
Court for an injunction against an intermediary to whom paragraph 3 of Article 8
of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
May 20011 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights
in the information society applies. 76
When it comes to the direction on issuing injunction, the court “shall have due
regard to the rights of any person likely to be affected by virtue of the grant of any
such injunction and the court shall give such directions (including, where
appropriate, a direction requiring a person be notified of the application) as the
court considers appropriate in all of the circumstances.”77
Judicial Practice in the UK and Ireland: Case Review
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation & Ors v. British Telecommunications
plc 78
This 2011 UK case was about the availability of legal remedies against online
copyright infringement, especially on the application of injunctive order to
infringing ISPs. The copyright holders, the Studios, were six well-known film
production companies or studios that distribute and produce films. 79 In 2010, the
Studios found that the British Telecom, the largest ISP in the United Kingdom,
provided their subscribers with link to Newzbin.com which is an infringing
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website. The Newzbin.com was found to have infringed the Studios’ copyright on
a large scale.

80

Under the circumstances, the Studios seek an injunctive order

against the BT pursuant to Section 97A of Copyright, Design, and Patent Act
1988. 81
In considering relevant facts and applicable law, the High Court of United
Kingdom ruled for the Studios and ordered the BT to block access to
Newzbin.com. 82 The High Court reasoned that the BT had actual knowledge of
subscribers and the operation of Newzbin.com with respect to copyright
infringement. 83 Specifically, the judge noted that,
[BT] it knows that the users and operators of Newzbin infringe copyright on a
large scale, and in particular infringe the copyrights of the Studios in large
numbers of their films…it knows that the users of Newzbin include BT
subscribers, and it knows that those users use its service to receive infringing
copies of copyright works made available to them by Newzbin… 84
By confirming the knowledge test on British Telecom, the court issued injunctive
order for the Studios. As to the analysis of “actual knowledge” under section 97A
(1), the ruling in this case essentially indicates that the knowledge of specific
infringement is not required, the knowledge of general infringement by using ISP
will suffice. According to governmental report, the UK courts follow the decision
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to continue issue injunctive order to block infringing websites. 85
EMI Records Ireland Ltd & Ors v UPC Communications Ireland Ltd & Ors 86
Similar to the UK case, this Irish case concerns an injunction to require the ISP to
block or disable access of their subscribers to an infringing website. The plaintiff
in this case, EMI Records, was recording company who recorded and distributed
music and video. 87 On the other hand, subscribers of UPC were able to access to
“The Pirate Bay” through the UPC network, which infringed EMI’s copyrighted
works.

88

To cease the infringement and protect copyright, EMI seek for

injunctive order against the UPC.
One interesting observation on this case is that the EMI as copyright holders
brought action against the UPC under the same set of facts and also seek for
injunction back on 2010. However, the judge concluded that a blocking injunc tio n
was not available in Irish law despite other such injunction exists in other
European jurisdictions. Notwithstanding the ruling, the judge noted that “Were it
available, I would grant it”.

89

Since the European Union Regulations 2012 comes into force, the blocking
injunction become available legal remedy to Irish copyright holders. This is
exactly echoed by the 2013 EMI v. UPC case. The court gave full credit to the
2010 opinion because of the identical matter and further ruled that an injunctive
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order to UPC is appropriate in order to block the access the “The Pirate Bay”. 90
Moreover, because the Irish law does not establish a similar knowledge test as in
UK law, Irish courts does not need to consider the knowledge of ISP on
infringement. To some extent, the removal of knowledge test in Irish law
facilitates the issuing of injunctive relief. Since the implementation of 2012
Regulation, several infringing websites had been blocked under injunctive order,
including “The Pirate Bay” and “Kickass Torrents”.
To be sure, the above judicial cases in the US and the EU community are
inadequate to cover the application of injunctive relief. However, three cases are
high profile examples with respect to the injunctive remedy on infringement via
P2P software or websites. Since infringement by P2P network or websites place
substantial threat to copyright holders and become the major component of online
piracy, the judicial experiences on this aspect can be quality precedents.
Due to the nature of digital technology and the substantial injury it may cause, the
courts in different jurisdictions generally rule a permanent injunction for the
copyright holders. When a copyright holder have a strong case, he may further be
granted preliminary injunction against a given P2P platform. However, the courts
were prudentially issued injunction against individual infringer and were cautious
in terms of the scope of injunctive relief. This is especially the case in US
jurisdiction.
The focal point lies in the target of an injunctive relief. In other words, the courts
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were basically willing to uphold the awarding of injunction to infringe me nt
facilitated by P2P platforms or websites, but cautiously determined the scope and
degree of injunction based on the evidences and the balance of harm.
Although these cases ended with different holdings with respect to the awarding
of injunction, the courts’ opinion acknowledged the substantial harm to copyright
holders due to the operation of P2P platforms or websites because monetary
damages were generally inadequate to compensate the losses under the set of facts.
In summary, the judicial experiences demonstrates injunctive relief is a reliable
remedy option to a shutdown of existing illegal P2P platform or blocking illega l
websites

as long as the copyright holders can establish a strong case on merits

with sufficient evidences.
2. Copyright Law Enforcement: damages
Unlike copyright injunction, the damages as remedy operate under clear statutory
instruction. Although courts still have discretion over the final awarding, the
discretion is still within the statutory limit. More importantly, copyright damages
are the only remedy which compensates copyright holders after infringe me nt
occurs. In other words, such remedy functions as ex post solution by compensating
the financial losses to copyright holders. In theory, the damages should be
equivalent to the losses of copyright holders. Following the compensation, the
next step should be the deprivation of unjust enrichment: the illegal profits of
infringers. The underlying purpose is to deter infringement and make infringe rs
unprofitable.

Basically,

copyright

damages
86

design

to function

of both

compensation and deterrence.
a) Actual damages or/and profits
Generally, Awarding damages upon actual damages or/and illegal profits is the
common type in most jurisdictions. The purpose of this type is to compensate
copyright holders. The degree of compensation determines whether such kind of
remedy preserves sufficient incentive to copyright holders.
Sufficient compensation can eliminate financial losses due to infringement as if
no infringement occurs. As a consequence, copyright holders will continue their
creation to maintain sustainable cultural production.
Moreover, damages on profits due to infringement primarily deters and punishes
unjust

enrichment.

Disgorgement

of illegal

profits

makes infringe me nt

meaningless because infringers are not better off financially.
In theory, a plaintiff in a copyright dispute can recover both his actual damages or
illegal profits of infringers, or the combination of the two. For example, §504(b)
of US Copyright Act provides that “the copyright owner is entitled to recover the
actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken
into account in computing the actual damages.” 91 In practice, plaintiff often
choose either actual damages or illegal profits provides that most plaintiff can
prove financial harm and meet the standard of proof, while the possibility of
gaining the two exists. 92
91
92

17 U.S.C. §504(b).
M ARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COP YRIGHT LAW, LexisNexis
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459 (5th ed. 2010); see also Abeshouse

Both actual damages and profits require proof without speculation. 93 The US
courts in copyright dispute are entitled to reject plaintiff’s claim for damages if
the proof is speculative. 94 In some situations, courts might ease the burden of
proof. The court in Deltak Inc. v. Advanced Sys., Inc. 95 held that once the fact of
actual damages was proved, the degree of harm did not need to be proved to exact
certainty. 96
Despite the holding, actual damages are still difficult to prove. Generally, actual
damages are based on the consideration that whether infringements lead to
diminution of market value of works, and the degree has a final voice on the
amount of awarded damages. 97 When infringements occur, the depreciated
market value is often measured as actual damages to copyright holders.
Because of the difficulty, plaintiffs are inclined to choose illegal profits instead of
actual damages. §504 (b) provides that: “in establishing the infringer’s profits, the
copyright owner is required to present proof only of infringer ’s gross revenue.” 98
After proving the gross revenue, the burden of proof is shifted to defendant by
proving deductible costs due to factors other than infringement. 99 The primary
purpose of profits recovery is to deprive defendants of unjust enrichment.
The 1976 US Copyright Act, however, does not specify how to calculate

v. Ultragraohics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467 (2d Cir 1985)(held that §504(b) was designed to compensate the copyright
owner’s actual damages, yet recognizing the possibility of cumulative damages in addition to profits).
93 Id.
94 Stevens Linen Assocs., Inc. v. Mastercraft Crop., 656 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1981).
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deductible costs. Several cases indicated that costs correlate to infringing
activities with reasonable and certainty proof can be deductible, such as taxes,
royalties to authors, overhead and production costs. 100 On the other hand, courts
would favor plaintiff and grant gross revenue as damages when defendant cannot
meet the standard of proof.
b) Statutory damages
Statutory damages are another branch under copyright damages. Although
generally adopted in common law countries, such damages gradually become the
indispensable remedy to online infringement. The popularity of statutory damages
is largely due to the fact that the measurement of actual damages or/and profits is
speculative and difficult in online infringement case.
The history of statutory damages, however, can dates back to eighteen century
England when copyright disputes were brought in the courts of equity with
discretion upon awarding. 101 Therefore, statutory damages share some equitable
features under common law jurisprudence—“high degree of flexibility; regardless
of actual proof; functions due to the failure of other damage.”102
On the other hand, the framework of statutory damages is simple. Simply put, the
awarding of statutory damages substitutes actual damages or/and profits at the
discretion of courts within a statutory range. The range is determined by
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legislation and courts award specific amount according to the culpability of
infringement and justice.
For instance, The 1976 US Copyright Act generally provides that:
the copyright owner may elect…instead of actual damages and profits, an award
of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action…for which any
one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are
liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000
as the court considers just. 103
Specifically, a plaintiff is able to elect statutory damages in lieu of actual damages
or/and profits at any time prior to the final judgment. 104 It was an absolute right
regardless of the sufficiency of evidence of actual damages or profits, subject to
registration procedure 105 The US House Report further indicated that a plaintiff
might

intentionally elect statutory damages even though adequate proof

existed. 106
Moreover, §504 (c) entitled a plaintiff to recover only a single statutory damages
regardless of how many times a defendant infringed the work or whether the
infringing acts are separated, simultaneous, or occurred sequentially. 107 The
amount of single award depended on the number of infringements; market value
of the work; revenue losses by infringement; the culpability of infringement; and
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the defendant’s fault. 108
One noteworthy feature of the US statutory damages is the flexible statutory range.
The provision set out that the statutory range from $750 to $30,000 to ordinary
infringements. 109 In case that an infringer commits infringement willfully and the
copyright owner meets the burden of proof, a court may increase the award of
statutory damage up to $150,000 in sum. 110 To the contrary, if “the infringer was
not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of
statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.”111
Copyright damages in the digital age
Because of the digital technology, damages upon actual damages or/and profits
are rarely used as the major monetary remedy by copyright holders. Instead,
statutory damages become a more attractive choice to copyright holders.
As Professor Paul Goldstein explains, statutory damages exist
“[B]ecause actual damages are so often difficult to prove, only the promise of a
statutory award will induce copyright holders to invest in and enforce their
copyrights and only the threat of a statutory award will deter infringers by
preventing their unjust enrichment.”112
The advantages of statutory damages are obvious to online copyright infringeme nt:
the flexibility accelerates judicial procedure, the statutory range leaves enough
108
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111
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space for judgment to specific cases, disregarding the proof on actual damages
or/and profits alleviate the burden on both parties, etc.

This section looks into

the effects of statutory damages in a line of the US judicial cases.
1) The early adoption
The early adoption of statutory damages was relatively straight forward. The line
of cases in this aspect primarily indicated the enforceability of statutory damages
to online copyright infringement.
BMG Music v. Gonzales
The plaintiff in this case was a copyright holder in musical recordings and brought
actions against the defendant who unauthorized downloaded the recordings
through a P2P network. 113 The defendant was an individual user who downloaded
more than 1,370 copyrighted songs through the KaZaA file-sharing network
during a few weeks, and kept these songs in her computer until she was caught. 114
The plaintiff claimed copyright on 30 of the total 1,370 songs and elected to seek
statutory damages instead of proving actual injury. 115 The district held the
defendant infringed copyright and ruled for the plaintiff by awarding statutory
damages of $22,000 ($750 per infringed song). 116
Although the plaintiff claimed for “fair use” and “innocent infringer” in appeal to
seek for the deduction of statutory damages, the Seventh Circuit rejected the claim
by reasoning that downloading full copies of copyrighted material without
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compensation to authors cannot be deemed as “fair use” 117 and downloading
copyrighted music through P2P file-sharing network was not entitled to “innoce nt
infringer” reduction in statutory damages. 118 As a consequence, the Appellate
Court affirmed the holding by district court.
Disney Enterprise v. Farmer
Unlike BMG Music, this case emphasized how courts award statutory damages in
practice and provides a working example on court’s discretion. The plaintiff,
Disney Enterprise, filed suit and brought action to stop Farmer, the defendant,
from copying and distributing five unauthorized motion pictures on the
internet. 119 The plaintiff elected statutory damages as remedy in the amount of
$6,000 for the total five motion pictures (1,200 per item). 120
The district court held the defendant was liable for the infringement of five motion
pictures and ruled for plaintiff by awarding $6,000 statutory damages to
plaintiff.

121

As to the issue of statutory damages, the court reasoned that:

Courts have wide discretion in setting damages within the statutory range set forth
in § 504(c)(1)…may consider several factors in determining statutory damages
“including: the expenses saved and profits reaped by the defendants in connection
with the infringements, the revenues lost by the plaintiffs as a result of the
defendants' conduct, and the infringers' state of mind whether willful, knowing,
or merely innocent…The option of electing statutory damages is especially
117
118
119
120
121

Id.
Id., at 893.
Disney Enterprise v. Farmer, 427 F. Supp. 2d 807, at 811 (U.S.D.M a 2006).
Id., at 812.
Id., at 820.
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appropriate where “the information needed to establish an exact measure of actual
damages is within the infringers' control and often is not fully disclosed… 122
Based on the general instruction, the court held that the awarding

of $1,200

statutory damages per motion pictures against defendant was warranted and
reasonable both to compensate the copyright holders and deter future infringe me nt
by defendant. 123
2) The problematic development: two notable cases
The BMG Music and Disney Enterprise were the early cases which indicate the
application of statutory damages to online copyright infringement, especially
infringement through P2P network. The holdings in both cases provided
instructions on how courts should award the specific amount upon specific
circumstances.
Instead of targeting on the P2P software, copyright holders target on the
defendants who were both individual online

users.

Compared to the

infringement in commercial scale via P2P network or websites, the infringe me nt
by one online user who merely download copyrighted works for personal
enjoyment imposes less losses than that in P2P cases. Hence, one concern to
statutory damages is the proportionality of punishment as well as the ultima te
deterring effect on individual infringers.
Despite the concern, copyright holders believe that individual online users are less
capable of affording the statutory damages. Based on the assumption, copyright
122
123

Id., at 817-18.
Id., at 818
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holders are optimistic on the assumption that the deterring effect should be more
effective to individual infringers because the cost of infringement substantia lly
outweigh the benefits of infringement.
With solid confidence, statutory damages continue to be the optimal choice to
copyright holders. Two recent cases, however, raise the consideration of
proportional punishment and cause certain negative comment from the public.
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset
The plaintiff, Capitol Records, filed lawsuit against Jammie Thomas and claimed
that she illegally

downloaded and distributed

twenty-four songs without

authorization through a P2P platform: KaZaA. 124 The jury found defendant
willfully infringed all twenty-four songs at issue, and awarded the plaintiff $9,250
per infringed song, which amounts to $220,000 in total. 125
Following the judgment, Thomas moved to a new trial based upon the
unconstitutionality of the excessive awarding. 126 In the retrial, although the
plaintiff provided the substantially same evidence to prove defendant’s liability
and Thomas argued that the infringing actions might be committed by her son and
boyfriend, 127 the jury still found Thomas liable for willful infringement and
awarded the plaintiff statutory damages in the amount of $1,920,000 in total, with
$80,000 per work. 128
Thomas still rejected the amount in the second trial and files a post-trial motion
124
125
126
127
128
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argued that the court should reduce statutory damages based on Due Progress
Clause. 129 The district court granted the motion and reduced the awards to $2,250
per work, for a total $54,000 because the court reasoned that the amount of jury’s
award was “shocking”. 130
However, the plaintiff rejected the reduced version of statutory damages after
Thomas declined a $25,000 settlement in a negotiation, and the plaintiff moved to
a third trial to determine the amount of statutory damages in 2010. 131 This time,
the jury awarded the amount of $62,500 per work to the plaintiff, for a total of
$1,500,000. 132 However, the court held that the award of $1.5 million was “severe
and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously
unreasonable” and insist that the amount of 2,250 per work was the maximum
award permitted under the Due Process Clause. 133
Being not satisfied with the judgment by district court, the plaintiff appealed for
oral argument and asked to reconsider the amount of statutory damage on the
constitutional and Due Process Clause ground. 134 The Eighth Circuit ruled that
the award of statutory damages $9,250 per work for a total of $222,000 was
constitutional and should not be reduced on Due Process Clause Ground. 135
The war did not end in the stage of oral argument and Thomas’s counsel asked the
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Supreme Court for certiorari and argued case law governing punitive damages
should apply. 136 However, the petition for certiorari was rejected on March 18,
2013. 137
Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum
Similar to the Thomas-Rasset case, the Tenenbaum is an enduring war between
the copyright holders and the individual online users with respect to the awarding
of statutory damages. The plaintiff, Sony BMG, brought action against Joel
Tenenbaum and claimed the defendant willfully infringed thirty copyrighted
songs by using peer-to-peer network to download and distribute the songs without
authorization from copyright holders. 138 The district quickly ruled against the
defendant with the liability and the jury award the plaintiff statutory damages of
$22,500 per infringed songs, for a total $675,000, which was within the statutory
range of $750 to $ 150,000 per infringement. 139
The Tenenbaum moved to reduction of the damages and the district court affir m
the motion by reducing the total amount of damages to $67,500 with the reasoning
that the original award was excessive in violation of Tenenbaum’s Due Process
Clause. 140
Both parties were not satisfied with the result and had cross-appealed. 141 In
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appeal, the Frist Circuit rejected all Tenenbaum’s argument and held that district
court had erred by ruling on the constitutionality of the jury award before
considering whether the award should be reduced by common law remittitur, and
reinstated the original $657,000 award. 142
Following the appeal, the Tenenbaum’s attorney filed a couple petitions to
rehearing the case by Appellate Court or the Supreme Court, seeking to reduce
the amount of statutory damages. 143 However, none of his attempts succeed and
the district court affirmed the $675,000 award of statutory damages to plaintiff. 144
Both cases display an interesting phenomenon. The defendants in both cases were
individual online users and they basically acknowledged their infringe me nt
actions in the first trial. Therefore, the judicial process should end in this stage. In
reality, however, both defendants continuously petition to retrial or rehearing
because of the amount of statutory damages in trial. In other words, the awarding
of statutory damages made the entire judicial process enduring and complicated.
To be sure, both defendants in trial were found willful infringed copyright and
imposed substantial financial penalty as the deterrent to their infringeme nt.
Nevertheless, the high amount of statutory damages did not convince both
infringers of their culpable actions, but triggered them to “fight” against the
copyright holders as well as the judicial system. Under the circumstances, it is
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questionable that the deterring effect is working in Thomas and Tenenbaum.
On the other hand, the total amount of statutory damages to both defendants are
significantly huge figures considering their identity: a single- mother and a college
student. Regardless the convincing explanation of Constitution and Due Process
Clause by courts with respect to the awarding of statutory damages, the public
who lack of legal background may simply find the two “poor” defendants were
suppressed by the alliance of “giant” content industry and “indifferent” courts
system. As a consequence, the misunderstanding from the public may weaken
their perception of online copyright protection.
C. General Observation:
1. Injunction Works to Infringement through Illegal P2P networks and
Websites
One of the major objectives of copyright law enforcement is to deter infringe me nt
and control copyright piracy. Because digital technology reshapes the landscape
of copyright infringement in online environment, online piracy poses signific a nt
threat to copyright holders in terms of their online distribution and licens ing.
Under the circumstances, copyright holders rely on copyright law enforcement to
fight against online piracy. Among all strategies, the injunctive relief on illega l
P2P networks or websites generate substantial positive effects with respect to
prevent ongoing infringement and continuous injury.
A case in point should be the post-trial development of some peer-to-peer filesharing platforms.
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The notable Napster, was awarded injunction and enjoined from operation. As a
result, copyright holders should be satisfied with the result because all infringing
activities on Napster were ceased because of the shutdown of the P2P platform. 145
In the case, the court imposed an injunction on Napster system and thus
successfully ceased mass scope of piracy through that system because nearly 99%
of uploading materials were infringing. 146

When it comes to Grokster, the

shutdown made nearly 70-90% infringing materials unavailable online. 147
From the perspective of controlling online piracy, the injunction remedy achieves
its objective to some extent. The deterring effect on P2P network by law
enforcement is usually significant and efficient regarding the decrease traffic of
infringement.
For example, the popular P2P network, LimeWire, was ordered to shut down by
court order. It was reported the shutdown lead to a notable drop of the usage of
Lime network. 148 In the wake of LimeWire shutdown, the percentage of U.S.
Internet users who access the P2P network dropped approximately 7% in 2007.149
Similarly, other once popular P2P file-sharing platforms basically faced with the
similar result of shutdown by the force of copyright law enforcement includ ing
Grokster, Madster, and the original eDonkey network. 150 Therefore, the strategy
of shut down proved to be effective because online users heavily rely on these P2P
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network for downloading and distribution.
In the United Kingdom, the injunctive order of website blocking are widely
implemented by the “Big Five” ISPs resided in the UK. 151 In the wave of
implementation, notorious infringing website such as Newzbin2, The Pirate bay,
TorrentFreak were entirely blocked by the major ISPs in the UK. Because each of
the “Big Five” ISP has at least 400,000 subscribers, the blocking access to
infringing website substantially reduce the possibility of piracy through the
specialized ISPs.
In addition to eliminate illegitimate platform, the resurrection to legitima te
licensing is another positive result of injunctive relief. For example, the Napster
became a legitimate online music store when it was acquired by Rhapsody from
Best Buy in December 2011. 152 The switch from an infringing platform to a legal
online business demonstrates that copyright law enforcement has at least
circumstantial effects on forging online business. It is true that the establishme nt
of online business is largely under the control of an enterprise or company, but the
force from law enforcement often is an important element to the decision-mak ing
process.
2. Copyright Law Enforcement: Inappropriate Strategy & Practice
To be sure, the positive effects by copyright injunction under no circumsta nces
indicates that copyright law enforcement is perfect and flawless. To the contrary,
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copyright law enforcement to individual online users is highly debatable.
a) Individual Users as Appropriate Target?
Began in 2003, the RIAA initiated to file lawsuits against individual online users
who illegally distributed copyrighted music through P2P file-sharing platform. 153
As a consequence, the RIAA filed lawsuits against individual end-users in the
amount of approximately 35,000 during the five-year period. 154 Generally, the
legal campaign between wealthy plaintiffs and poor, non-commercial defendants
proved to be unreasonable and ineffective.
As aforementioned, the Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum cases represents how the
awarding of statutory damages leads to the enduring and complicated litiga tio n
process. Since the courts in both cases basically confirmed the huge amount of
statutory damages to the plaintiff, the two cases are more likely to have
precedential influence to the future awarding of statutory damages. In other words,
an individual infringer is highly possible bear significant amount of damages
when he was found of willfully infringe copyright.
Although the RIAA claimed success of this strategy on increasing public
awareness of illegality to file-sharing and forcing users back to legal markets,
some surveys indicated the opposite results by such kind of strategy. 155 For
instance, a study indicated that the number of people sharing music on P2P
platform increased between 2006 and 2007, which was the climax when RIAA
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actively pursued individual online users. 156
The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) Digital Music
Report 2009 also found that “around 95 percent of music tracks are downloaded
without payment to the artist or the music company that produced them.” 157
Furthermore, the lawsuits against individual end-users by the RIAA raised general
resistance from the public, especially among college students. 158
b) Overcompensating copyright holders & Disproportional damages
Awarding statutory damages is under the discretion of courts when the actual
losses to copyright holders are difficult to measure. However, the determina tio n
of actual amount gives rise to undesirable results: unprincipled, inconsistent and
arbitrary awarding. 159 A line of cases indicates the problematic situation.
Our first example is the UMG Recording, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. 160 , which can be
deemed as predecessor of Thomas-Rasset in the context of disproportiona l
statutory damages. The trial court held that the defendant had willfully infringed
copyrights and awarded statutory damages of $25,000 per infringed CD. 161 Given
the fact that there were less than 47,000 CDs at issue, the total amount was
approximately $118,000,000. 162
This amount was disproportional given the fact that no actual damages caused by
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infringement because MP3.com actually did not operate its service prior to trial
and had not charged fees to its subscribers. 163 Moreover, MP3.com merely
streamed CDs owned by subscribers, which means copyright holders had already
obtained some remuneration. 164
William Party commented the awarding in MP3.com was “hardly necessary as a
detergent for a defendant who had not made a penny in profits off its use, and
where plaintiff had conceded that it could not prove any actual damages…”165
Despite copyright law does not strictly bind statutory damages to actual damages,
it seems the amount of $25,000 in MP3.com case was still a modest figure because
it falls within the range from $750 to $30,000.
One recent case, however, has directly linked to the maximum end. In Macklin v.
Mueck, the defendant operated a poetry website and posted plaintiff’s two poems
online without authorization. 166 The plaintiff subsequently filed lawsuit against
the defendant and moved for award of maximum statutory damages due to willf ul
infringements after the defendants defaulted by not answering the complaint. 167
The trial court ruled for the plaintiff and awarded $30,000 per infringed poem. 168
Obviously, such awarding was plainly punitive and highly excessive compared to
the need of compensating copyright holders and deterring future infringeme nt,
because the defendants was unlikely to recoup profits from the infringement and
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the actual damages tends to be modest under the circumstances. 169
Similar disproportional awarding also imposed to the defendant in Los Angeles
Times, Inc. v. Free Republic. 170 The defendant, Free Republic, was a “bulletin
board” website which enabled their members to comment the news articles posted
on its webpage. 171 The plaintiff, Los Angeles Times, contented the defendant
facilitated copyright infringement by routinely posting entire copyrighted news
articles, and charged for “archive fees” to members for accessing these works.172
After addressing fair use argument proposed by Free Republic, the court rejected
and ruled $1 million amount of statutory damages to the defendant. 173 However,
the lawsuit was finally settled between LOS Angeles Times and Free Republic.
The amount of their settlement was $10,000, which constitutes the ration of 1:100
to the statutory damages. 174
D. Concluding Remark
The right-holder-centric model by means of copyright law enforcement is decisive
and influential

to online

copyright

infringement

compared

to private

implementation through digital technology. Unlike the private system which
serves as ex ante precaution, copyright law enforcement functions as ex post
remedy to copyright holders and function to deter copyright piracy.
On the one hand, copyright injunction design to cease infringement so that

169

Id. at *5-6.
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2000).
171 Id. at*1.
172 Id. at* 1-2.
173 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20484, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2000).
174 Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy In Need of Reform, 51
WM. & M ARY L. REV. 439, (Nov. 2009).
105
170

ongoing injury to copyright holders cannot be maintained. On the other hand,
copyright damages, especially the statutory damages, provide copyright holders
with compensatory option and meanwhile serve to deter infringement. Under the
circumstance, the copyright law enforcement strongly favors of copyright holders
and take them as prior consideration. Therefore, copyright law enforceme nt
become the best available option to copyright holders in the course of copyright
enforcement.
The judicial practice of copyright law enforcement, however, leads to mixed
results. On the one hand, copyright law enforcement, primarily the injunctive
relief, forces existing illegal P2P platforms to shut down and successfully block
the access to infringing websites. The deterring effect indicates that copyright law
enforcement works to control online piracy, especially to large technology-based
online entity.
On the other hand, copyright law enforcement encounters undesirable situatio n
when applied to individual online infringers with the disproportional punishme nt.
The inappropriate application give rise to the negative comments and reaction
from the public, and creates misunderstanding between copyright holders and
online users. As a consequence, the deterring effects through injunction may
substantially be outweighed by the side effects through inappropriate applicatio n
of statutory damages.
Copyright policy emphasizes the balance between copyright holders and the
public. However, the right-holder-centric model by copyright law enforceme nt
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focuses on the interests of copyright holders and gradually expand the boundary
of rights in the digital age. Under the circumstances, this model triggers the severe
tension between copyright holders and online users.
To ease the tension and enhance the efficiency of online copyright enforceme nt,
copyright holders begin to explore other options. Instead of concentrating on the
right-holder-centric model, copyright holders begin to reconsider their interactio n
with other copyright participants such as the ISPs and ordinary users. The
graduated response system, as a working example under the cooperative model,
opens a new horizon to copyright holders.
Distinguished from copyright law enforcement, the graduated response system
requires internet service providers (ISPs) to work with copyright holders by
actively monitoring the activities of online users. Once infringement actions are
detected, they will send warning letters to accused users and take actions to
facilitate the copyright enforcement.
On the other hand, copyright holders are willing to join the graduated response
system for cooperation because such system transfers partial enforcement costs to
the ISPs. The entire system is less expensive than copyright law enforceme nt.
Moreover, ISPs are in better position to control online infringement due to their
technological capability. To sum up the graduated response system establishes the
cooperation between copyright holders and the ISPs, and enables a joint
enforcement to online copyright infringement. Next chapter will discuss and
analyze this new system in details
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Chapter IV Cooperation between Copyright Holders and ISPs: the Graduate d
Response System
Although copyright holders produce and distribute creative works, they usually are not in the
best position to distribute their works to the public inexpensively and efficiently. Througho ut
history, copyright holders rely on the intermediary for efficient distribution of creative works
in order to meet the demand from the public. Without the aid from the intermediary, copyright
holders are most likely to be overwhelmed by massive amount of negotiations and licens ing.
By cooperating with copyright holders, the intermediary in fact facilitate the distribution of
copyrighted works and meanwhile obtain revenues through the cooperative process.
Although this kind of cooperation is simple, it highlights the possibility of cooperation
between the two parties.
Enlightened by this strategy, the cooperative model is established as a prospective and
alternative option compared to the right-holder-centric model. While the right-holder-centr ic
model focuses on the interests of copyright holders, the cooperative model requires the
balance between copyright holders and ISPs so that cooperation can be established.
On the other hand, the emergence of cooperative model also builds upon the digita l
technology and Internet architecture. The new online intermediary, internet service provider
(ISP), becomes a major competitor to the old intermediary such as book publishers, televis io n
network, and broadcasting system. With the aid of digital technology, the ISPs provide their
subscribers with widespread accessibility and diversified contents. The ISPs gradually draw
a huge share of consumers in online copyright markets.
Just as a mirror has two faces, ISPs facilitate the distribution of copyrighted works, while
opening a channel for illegal copying and dissemination.
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ISPs can be used as the platform

for either direct infringement or indirect infringement due to its feature of storage and
transmission. The MP3.com, Inc. and Netcom cases respectively display how ISPs facilitates
the online copyright infringement in the early digital age. 1
To avoid the downside of ISPs, copyright holders seek for other strategy to control the online
infringement. They rely on copyright legislation as solution. For instance, the US and EU
Community respectively enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and ECommerce Directive which immunes ISP’s liability to online copyright infringement so long
as ISP complies with the requirement under the provisions. 2
The legislation in “safe harbor” provisions in fact establishes a prototype of cooperation
between copyright holders and ISPs. For example, ISPs are able to participate in the
copyright enforcement by complying with the Notice-and-Takedown procedure under the
DMCA. However, the procedure has some controversial issues in practice and ISP merely
passively react to the requirement from copyright holders.
In other words, the primitive cooperation of ISP legislation does not provide reliable
mechanism to meet the demand of copyright holders with respect to copyright enforceme nt.
Under the circumstances, copyright holders determine to update the cooperative partnership
and introduce a new system to establish the sustainable cooperation.
The graduated response system echoes their decision. The “graduated responses” is a term
used to describe an alternative enforcement strategy to solve online piracy by establishing
the cooperation between copyright holders and the ISPs. The worldwide movement of
graduated responses system was first appeared in France in 2009 then rapidly spread to other
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countries such as New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States. 3
Simply put, the graduated response system requires an ISP to issue a notice to the subscriber
when the subscriber is found to engage in online piracy. If the subscriber ignores the first
notice, the subsequent notices will be sent and further actions may be imposed on the
subscriber based on the response of subscribers. 4 The focal point lies in that ISP should
actively monitor the activities of their subscribers.
According to the architecture design, ISPs under the graduated responses system bear partial
duty and costs to online copyright enforcement. Generally, there are three types of graduated
responses system among different jurisdictions. First of all, France creates an independent
administrative authority to regulate operation of the system. Such independent authority
operates under a general legislative guidance and provides specific regulation within its
discretion.
On the other hand, countries like New Zealand and South Korea employ the graduated
response system through copyright legislation. Put another way, the graduated responses
system is incorporated into domestic copyright law.
Finally, countries like the US implement the graduated response through private contractual
agreement. Copyright holders in these jurisdictions sign agreements with major ISPs to
establish cooperative partnership for regulating online copyright infringement.
Being a new enforcement strategy, most countries employ the graduated responses system
with prudence. As a consequence, practical experiences are still insufficient compared to
enforcement strategies under the right-holder-centric model. So far, France and New Zealand

3 Daniel Lieberman, A Homerun for Three Strikes Law: Graduated Responses and its Bid to Save Copyright, Journal of the
Copyright Society of the USA, Vol.59, No.2 (Winter 2012).
4
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has provided some reliable resources for assessment, while the US has begun the applicatio n
with a short period.
Although the graduated responses system is viewed as a prospective enforcement strategy. It
is still too early to reach a final conclusion on its success or failure. The application of
graduated response system in France and New Zealand leads to mixed results. For example,
the usage of illegal P2P file-sharing decreased due to the application, while the general online
piracy still remain unchanged. Meanwhile, the penalty of account disconnection is under
criticism and rarely used in both France and New Zealand. Therefore, the cooperative model
by means of graduated response system still need more time and examination before it
essentially become reliable a with respect to copyright enforcement.
A. Defining ISPs
Internet service providers, known as online intermediaries, facilitate copyright holders to
distribute their works online and offer a variety of services to online users such as ecommerce service, online entertainment (music, movie, etc.), online communication (e-mail,
live-chat, etc.), search engine (Google, Wikipedia, Baidu, etc.). Due to large volume of
creative contents, ISPs are difficult to locate every unauthorized works in their websites.
Therefore, ISPs can easily infringe copyright by intent or negligent.
In offline world, an individual entity can become the source for distribution of pirated copies,
such as a CD shopping site along the street, the flea market, etc. As to online environme nt,
the situation remains the same. A single website can store thousands of pirated works and
serve as source for further distribution.
B. Legislation on Regulating ISPs
1. US: the DMCA
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The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, known as DMCA, was enacted primarily to protect
copyright holders regarding their copyrighted works for reproduction and distributio n:
“…Copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on the internet
without reasonable assurance that they will be protected against massive piracy…”5 On the
other hand, the DMCA takes into consideration on the development of Internet architecture
and relevant services so as to immune the Internet from overwhelming copyright protection.
According to the Congress report,
Without clarification of their liability, service providers may hesitate to make the necessary
investment in the expansion of the speed and capacity of the internet…Many service
providers engage in directing users to sites…some of them may contain infringing
materials…the DMCA insure that the efficiency of the internet will continue to improve and
that the variety and quality of services on the internet will continue to expand… 6
Pursuant to above legislative history, the DMCA contains “Online Copyright Infringe me nt
Liability limitation Act” as its second title, known as Section 512 or “Safe Harbor”
provision. 7 Section 512 of DMCA provides immunity to four distinctive types of ISPs.
§512(a) protects ISPs who are passive conduits from liability for copyright infringeme nt,
provided that the infringing material is being transmitted at the request of a third party to a
designated recipient. 8 §512(b) governs ISPs who merely functions as system caching. 9
§512(c) applies to ISPs that store infringing material, provides that the ISPs comply with
“notice and takedown” regime. 10 §512(d) eliminates liability for an ISP who links users,
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through a tool such as a web search engine, to an online location that contains infringing
material, provided that the ISP does not know the material is infringing. 11
In summary, the purpose of enacting this Act is,
“…preserve strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperative to
detect and deal with copyright infringement that take place in the digital networked
environment. At the same time, it provides greater certainty to service providers concerning
their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in the course of their activities…”12
Obviously, legislative designed a distinctive option for both copyright holders and ISPs to
deal with their online activities: from adversarial conflict to cooperative regulation.
2. EU: E-Commerce Directive
Distinguished from DMCA in US, the EU does not enact independent statutes on the
regulations over ISPs. The E-Commerce Directive primarily focuses on setting up an interna l
market for free trade within European area, which contains specific liabilities on online
intermediaries under the topic of information society services. 13 The E-Commerce Directive
regulates ISPs on their online activities by charactering their actions into three types: “Mere
Conduits”, “Caching”, and “Hosting”.

14

Article 12, the “Mere Conduits”, exempts an ISP

from liability when it (a) does not initiate the transmission, (b) does not select the receiver of
the transmission, and (c) does not select or modify the information contained in the
transmission. 15
Article 13, “Caching”, requires member states should not impose liability when an ISP (a)
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does not modify the information, (b) comply with the conditions on access to the informatio n,
(c) comply with rules regarding the updating of the information, specified in a manner widely
recognized and used in industry, (d) does not interfere with the lawful use of technology,
widely recognized and used by industry, to obtain data on the use of the information, and (e)
acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information upon actual knowledge
of infringing actions. 16
Article 14, the “Hosting”, exempts an ISP from liability when it (a) does not have actual
knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware
of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or (b)
upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable
access to the information. 17
According to the EU Commission Report, E-Commerce Directive aims at,
Eliminating existing legal uncertainties and to avoid divergent approaches between member
states. The Directive establishes an exemption from liability for intermediaries where they
play a passive role as a ‘mere conduit’ of information from third parties and limits service
providers’ liability for other ‘intermediary’ activities such as the storage of information. The
Directive strikes a careful balance between the different interests involved in order to
stimulate co-operation between different parties and so reduce the risk of illegal activity online… 18
Based on the report, the EU’s emphasis contains two aspects: eliminate potential trade
barriers among member states, and strike the balance between copyright holders and ISPs to
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ensure their join interests. Under the circumstances, both the US and EU accept the idea that
cooperation between copyright holders and ISPs is an appropriate option to address online
piracy and enforce online copyright. Given that both statutes were enacted more than one
decade ago, the idea of cooperation is upheld by legislation and is more convincing based on
the analysis of legislative history.
3. Summary of ISP Legislation
The DMCA and E-Commerce Directive contain specific provisions in terms of the regulatio n
on ISPs in online environment. Although not entirely similar in original texts, both statutes
actually create legal certainty to ISPs because clear legislation ensure them of their exemption
against online liability. According to a survey report on the title of “Economic Impact of the
E-Commerce Directive” conducted by Colophon in 2007, 17 member states in the EU
Community admitted that there was not a specific legislation concerning liability for online
intermediary prior to the enactment of E-Commerce Directive. 19

Therefore, the ISP

legislation serves to clarify the legal standard and establish certainty to ISPs with respect to
copyright enforcement.
With clarified legislation, ISPs can ensure and avoid the liability in the light of their specific
services. For example, both the DMCA and E-Commerce Directive provide that an ISP serves
as a conduit of information is not liable even if the information is illegal, as long as this ISP
does not know the illegality. 20
As aforementioned, the limitation ISPs’ liability in fact creates an opportunity for copyright
holders and ISPs to work for their joint interests. Under the circumstances, copyright holders
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(last visited 8/3/2014).

can better protect their online works. ISPs bear fundamental duty to monitor their subscribers
in exchange for the exemption of liability.
The clarified legislation and legal certainty, however, are more theoretically ideal than
practically efficient. Being in practice for nearly one decade after enactment, the DMCA and
E-Commerce Directive generates certain ambiguity and confusion. As a result, ISPs
gradually find it difficult to comply with specific provisions in order to immune from liability.
Some provisions lack of further policy guidance and clear interpretation by courts, leading
ISPs exposed to significant but unintended legal risks. For example, the standard of actual
knowledge is highly controversial,

the procedures of “Notice and Takedown” are

complicated to enforce, and the difficulty to distinguish “repeated infringers”, etc. Under the
circumstances, copyright holders realize that providing liability limitations to ISPs through
legislation is not as effective as its initial design. Moreover, the ISPs do not always actively
participate in cooperation with copyright holders by scanning or monitoring their subscribers
so long as they successfully meet the requirement of liability exemption. Obviously, the
motivation by such legislation cannot fully stimulate ISPs to cooperate with copyright
holders.
C. The Turn to Graduated Responses System
1. Status Quo of Copyright Law Enforcement
The emergence of graduated response system is largely due to the inefficiency of current
copyright enforcement. Specifically, the copyright law enforcement on copyright piracy does
not satisfy the demands of copyright holders in the course of their enforcement.
On the other hand, advanced digital technology enables ISPs to monitor their subscribers
thoroughly so as to better cooperate with copyright holders in terms of online copyright
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enforcement. Under the circumstances, copyright holders have compelling need to embrace
the prospective graduated responses system as an alternative enforcement option.
a) Copyright Law Enforcement & Inappropriate Target
At the very beginning, copyright holders primarily targets on ISPs which infringe their
copyrights. Those ISPs either directly store copyrighted works on their websites or functio ns
as channels for online users to access these works. 21 By pursuing infringing ISPs, copyright
holders are able to prevent these ISPs from distributing copyrighted works without
authorization.
This traditional strategy, however, does not last long in online environment. On one hand,
the introduction of ISP legislation, namely the DMCA and the E-Commerce Directive,
provides flexible and broad protection on ISPs of their online activities. ISPs are generally
qualified for the exemptions as long as they satisfy specific provisions under the statutes.
On the other hand, judicial interpretation are in favor of ISPs with respect to the qualifica tio n
of “service providers” under ISP legislation. The statutory definition of “service providers”
is broadly explained by the US courts. Most courts tend to impose general analysis on the
qualification of “service providers” and are easily offered the qualification to an online entity.
For instance, in the case of Wolf v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., the court found that
Photobucket was a “service provider” under §512 because its websites hosts photos and
videos for sharing at the discretion by users. 22 As a consequence, ISPs enjoy a strong legal
protection and copyright holders must target on other copyright infringers.

21
See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); also See Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004
(2001); and MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). (The ISPs in these cases contains “Hosting” websites,
centralized or decentralized P2P network.)
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2011 WL 940056, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2011); a bunch of similar cases also indicate the trends, See
generally Corbis Corporation v. Amazon.com , Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Viacom
International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 448 F. 3d 1102
(9th Cir. 2007).
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Because of the popularity of P2P network among the young generation, file-sharing is
gradually labeled as the notorious synonym to online piracy by copyright holders. According
to a survey by International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) estimated that
nearly 95% of music downloading was unauthorized.

23

The Nielson Company projected

that 25% of internet users in Europe visit online music website monthly, compared to 45%
Brazilian and Spanish users. 24
From economic perspective, the cumulative impact by illegal file-sharing is fatally
destructive. Economists Stephen E. Siwek concluded that online piracy accounts for the costs
of US economy $58 billion in total output, $16 billion total input, and $2.6 billion lost tax
revenues in federal, state, and local government. 25 The US Department of Labor reported
that the quantity of professional musicians decreased by nearly 15,000 due to the operation
of Napster from 1999 to 2009. 26
Under no circumstances would copyright holders accept such significant losses by rampant
online piracy. Their option is certainly to fight against illegal file-sharing. As a response to
the legal protection on ISPs, copyright holders begin to bring actions against copyright piracy
facilitated by P2P network. In addition to pursuing given P2P networks, they also targets on
individual online users.
Among those courageous copyright guardians, the Record Industry Association of America
(RIAA) becomes the most aggressive vanguard in the course of pursuing individual online
users.

23 Eric Pfanner, Music Industry Courts the Cost of Piracy, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 21st 2011, available at
www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/business/global/22music.html?_r=1
24
See IFPI 2011 REP ORT, at 8, available at www.ifpi.org/content_section_resources/dmr2011.html
25
Stephen E. Siwek, the True of Copyright Industry Piracy to the US Economy 189 (2007).
26
Joshua P. Friedander & Jonathan Lamy, Googling Adele MP3, M usic Notes Blog, RIAA , available at
http://www.riaa.com/blog.php?content_selector=illegal%20Downloading_Fewer%20M usicians (M ar.19, 2012).
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Began in 2003, the RIAA initiated to file lawsuits against individual online users who
illegally distributed copyrighted music through P2P file-sharing platform. 27 According to
the RIAA, the legal campaign was to both raise public awareness of illegality of unauthor ized
downloading and distribution, and force online users to legally purchase music. 28 Eventually,
the RIAA filed lawsuits against individual end-users in the amount of approximately 35,000
during the five-year period. 29
The RIAA’s aggressive campaign eventually ends up with two results. To most accused
individual users, the costs to join civil lawsuits are formidable. The unbalancing power
between wealthy plaintiffs and poor, non-commercial defendants in judicial procedure is selfevident. Under the circumstances, most individual users eventually choose to settle with the
RIAA. 30
Even if individual end-users are willing to fight against the wealthy RIAA, they need to face
unpredictable monetary penalty. Two recent well-known case, Capital Records, Inc. v.
Thomas-Rasset and Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, 31 indicated how
unreasonable the statutory damages under copyright law could be when RIAA targeted on
individual online users. 32
Although the RIAA claimed success of the strategy on increasing public awareness of
illegality of file-sharing and forcing online users back to legal markets, some surveys

27

Will M oseley, A New (Old) Solution for Online Copyright Enforcement after Thomas and Tenenbaum, 25 BERKELEY T ECH L.J.
311, at 332 (2010).
28
Id.
29
Sarah M cBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec.19, 2008, at B1.
30
Ray Beckerman, How the RIAA Litigation Process Works, BLOGGER,
http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2007/01/how-riaa-litigation-process-works.html(last updated Jan.11,
2008)(stating that twelve defendants in the lawsuits have filed motions to dismiss, for summary judgment, or made challenges to
pretrial discovery).
31
See 692 F.3d 899, (8th Cir. 2012); also see 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011).
32
680 F. Supp.2d 1045 (2010) (the jury impose 22,000 damages on Thomas who download and distribute 24 songs thorough a
P2P platform.)
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indicated the opposite results by such kind of litigation. 33 For example, a study indicated
that the number of people sharing music on P2P platform increased between 2006 and 2007.34
The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) Digital Music Report 2009
also found that “around 95 percent of music tracks are downloaded without payment to the
artist or the music company that produced them.” 35 Furthermore, the lawsuits against
individual online users by the RIAA raised general resistance from the public, especially
among college students. 36 In summary, inappropriate targeting on individual online users
demonstrate the side effects by copyright law enforcement.
b) New technology enables ISPs to better cooperate with copyright holders
Internet service providers not only have the social obligations to participate in online
copyright protection, but equipped with advanced and updating digital technology to
facilitate the enforcement. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), also called complete packet
inspection, is a state of the art technology which echoes the emergence of graduated
responses system.
The DPI is a form of computer network packet filtering that examines data in a packet when
it passes through the inspection port on the internet for the purpose of searching or collecting
information. 37 The DPI enables ISPs to gather statistical information about use patterns by
users group. DPI can identify and classify specific contents or information based on the ISP’s
database in a given packet, allowing finer control over information flow on the network. 38
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See M oseley, supra note 27, at 315.
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Accordingly, an identified and classified packet can be redirected, marked, blocked, rate
limited, and even reported to an agent in the network.

39

Such powerful position of ISPs is not only recognized by copyright holders, but have been
employed in practice by courts and IP rights groups with respect to facilitate copyright
enforcement.
In 2006, one of Denmark's largest ISPs, the Tele2, was issued an injunction and the court
held that it must block its subscribers from accessing The Pirate Bay, a BitTorrent file-shar ing
websites. 40 Meanwhile, the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) and
the big four record labels EMI, Sony BMG, Universal Music, and Warner Music have begun
suing ISPs such as Eircom for not doing enough about protecting their copyrights instead of
prosecuting individual users. The IFPI and label companies want ISPs to filter traffic to
remove illicitly uploaded and downloaded copyrighted material from their network.

41

2. The Graduated Response System
The graduated response system is an enforcement strategy employed by copyright holders
with the aid from ISPs in online environment. As aforementioned, the ISPs are equipped with
the powerful digital technology which can readily search and collect information of their
subscribers. Copyright holders thus propose that ISPs should block the access or connection
of their subscribers if accused infringements are detected for multiple times.
Distinguished from the “Three Strikes” approach, the graduated response system aims at
providing sufficient warnings to accused users and meanwhile protects copyright holders’
interests through the Internet. Generally, the accused subscribers will receive multip le
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warnings from the ISPs before they are imposed with any substantial sanctions. The
flexibility of this system is the most salient character different from the old “Three Strikes”
approach in copyright law.
The operation of graduated response system can be reduced to simple steps:
1) the ISP firstly use their centralized process device to scan all the contents or informa tio n
in order to detect if any available works are distribute within the network without
authorization;
2) if such kind of work is detected, the ISPs will locate the IP address which upload or
distribute the accused work;
3) the ISP then issues several warnings to the subscriber within a prescribed period, and
further to impose sanctions on the subscriber if needed. 42
Generally, the sanctions contain the substantial affection on a given subscriber such as
degrading internet speed, temporary suspension of a given account, or finally terminate
account subscription. Theoretically, the adverse impact would force the accused users to
cease infringement. 43
Anticipating the prospective effect, several jurisdictions accept the graduated response
system and adapt it to various schemes. France, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United
States respectively design their own graduated response system to address the online
infringement: independent institution for regulation (France), direct regulation under
legislation (New Zealand ＆ South Korea), or private contractual regulation (United States).
Despite the popularity of graduated response system, most countries introduce this system
for a relatively short period. This section looks into the three types of graduated responses
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system in detail.
3. The Operating Models under Graduated Response System
a) Independent Institute for Regulation: French Experience
France is one of the earliest countries which introduces the graduated response system and
customizes the system for the implementation. The HADOPI-1, “High Authority for the
dissemination of Works and the Protection of Rights on the Internet”, was introduced by Law
of 12 in 2009 as an independent administrative institution which primarily dedicated to the
protection of online copyright. 44 However, the French Constitutional Council declared
certain provisions under HADOPI-1 restrict the internet access and therefore was
unconstitutional. 45 Due to this unexpected problem, the HADOPI-2 was passed to rectify
certain defects so as to be constitutional. 46 As a consequence, the legislation establish
statutory scheme of graduated response in France.
Article 336-3 of the Intellectual Property Code provides that an internet service provider
should ensure that the connection is not used for the purpose of infringement. 47 When a right
holder informs HADOPI an accused infringement, the Rights Protection Commiss io n
reviews the case within a period of two months.

48

If the result ends with confirmation of

infringement, the Commission sends an email (also called “Recommendation”) to the
accused user notifying the infringing facts, informing him of the availability of legal content,
and advising him how to avoid infringement in the future. 49
If a further infringement is detected within six months, the Commission sends a second email
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to the user with the same requirement.

50

Within the period of one year, the commissio n

would send the user a third email with the warning of prosecution if he continues his ille ga l
actions. According to the reactions by accused user, the Commission may forward the case
to the Public Prosecutor. 51
The sanction under HADOPI system can be severe compared to other copyright infringeme nt.
An accused user may face with a copyright offense by the Public Prosecutor pursuant to
current law. In addition to ordinary legal penalty (such as a fine or imprisonment), the court
may issue an order that suspend the internet access of the accused user up to twelve months.

52

Moreover, subscribers who are suspended of the internet access are required to keep paying
the subscription fees during the term of suspension and may not be permitted to switch to
other ISPs to avoid the penalty. 53
b) Direct regulation by legislation
Distinguished from the experience in France, several jurisdictions directly demands
copyright holders and ISPs to cooperate for online copyright enforcement.

These

jurisdictions integrate the graduated response into their copyright statutes such as New
Zealand and South Korean
1) New Zealand
Similar to France, New Zealand was one of the earliest adopters of graduated response system.
The first statutory regime was introduced as “Section 92A of Copyright Amendment Act
2008” which imposed an obligation on ISPs to “adopt and reasonably implement” policies
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for the termination of access to repeater infringers. 54 Because of the lack of due process and
the inappropriate breadth of ISPs (which covers organizations such as libraries and schools),
the New Zealand government redesigned a new statutory framework and repeal section
92A. 55
The revised law mainly applies to Internet Protocol Address Providers (IPAPs). 56 This scope
contains ISPs which offer transmission, routing and providing of connections through online
environment; allocate IP addresses to

subscribers; charge subscribers for services.

57

Therefore, the graduated response in New Zealand primarily intends to concentrates on
traditional ISPs involved in commercial activities, while leaving libraries and schools
unattended.
The law sets up a three-notice framework.

A copyright holder is entitled to contact an ISP

for infringement allegation after the right holders identify a subscriber via the IP address. The
ISP should issue a notice to the accused subscriber within seven days.

58

Because the IP

address may be allocated to multiple subscribers, the ISP has the responsibility to carefully
identify the exact subscriber who may conduct the illegal actions.
Generally, the first notice refers as “detection notice”, the second one as “warning notices
and the third as “enforcement notices”. Each notice should include the name of copyright
holders, details of infringement actions, an explanation of consequences, and an instructio n
for challenging the notices. 59
A copyright holder is able to seek for remedy after the third “enforcement notice” has finally
54
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been issued to the accused subscriber. The law provides that repeat infringers are subjected
to the disconnection of internet access, which is only in force by an Order from the Council. 60
Additionally, a copyright holders can bring the allegation to the Copyright Tribunal for
financial remedy. The Tribunal measures the total payment to copyright holders by adding
together the value of each infringed work, the amount paid by the right holders to enforce the
rights under the process, and any amount the Tribunal considers “appropriate as a deterrent
against future infringement”. 61 Despite the general discretion of Copyright Tribunal on
calculation, the total amount should not exceed NZ＄15,000 as the ceiling. 62
2) South Korea
South Korea Copyright Law provides that ISP has the duty to prevent online copyright
infringement when it receives an evidenced complaint from copyright holders. 63 Upon the
receiving of complaint, an ISP should immediately block the infringing transmission and
inform both copyright holders and accused infringer of the blocking action. 64
On the other hand, the subscriber has the right to request of resumption of its account. An
ISP should notify copyright holders and may resume the internet access of the subscriber ’s
account without incurring liability. 65
Under Article 133-2 of the Copyright Act, the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism may
order an ISP to suspend the accused subscriber’s internet access for up to 6 months after 3
warnings where infringing copies have been transmitted
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through “information and

telecommunications network”.

66

An associated Presidential Decree provides that a

subscriber’s first suspension must be for less one month, the second for at least one but less
than three months, and the third for at least three but not more than six months. 67 Despite
the disconnection, the subscriber is not prevented from switch to other ISPs so as to resume
internet connection. 68
Moreover, the Copyright Act empowers the Korean Copyright Commission to issue
recommendations to ISPs to issue warnings to subscribers or suspend or delete subscriber ’s
account. 69 Distinguished from Article 133-2, the recommendation of disconnection does not
require prior warnings as premise. So long as the “repeated” infringement is determined, the
ISP is able to suspend the subscriber’s account based on the recommendation from the
Commission.
The detailed implement procedures are listed in the Presidential Decree. Article 40-43 clearly
provides that a claimant who wants to request a suspension on accused infringer should
submit written request with the copy of registered copyright certificate. Upon receiving the
request, the ISP should deliver the written request to the accused infringer within three days
from the date of suspension.
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On the other hand, the accused infringer should be entitled to request of access resumptio n
to the ISP. The format and requirement is identical to the request of suspension. The ISP
should make decision of whether the accused action is legal within three days upon receiving
the written request. Normally, the expected date of resumption shall be between the 7th and
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14th day of the receipt of written request of resumption. 71
c) Private voluntary agreement for regulation: United States
In addition to regulation by independent institution or by legislation, the third type of
graduated response system is implemented by means of private contractual agreement.
Generally, this private regulation occurs outside the judicial or governmental process and
primarily focus on the interaction between copyright holders and ISPs. The voluntar y
agreements between copyright holders and ISPs in United States is the example.
In July 2011, a voluntary private agreement was adopted by the Center for Copyright
Information (CCI), an organization formed by several major record companies, film factories,
and broadband ISPs, to create a uniform graduated response system in United States. 72
Before the final agreement was reached, major ISPs and copyright holders spent almost three
years for the long and complicated negotiations. 73
The agreement was also Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which all members
collectively agree to implement a private voluntary agreement functions as the “graduated
response” to deal with online copyright piracy. According to the MOU, the goal of this
enforcement system contains “providing education, privacy protection, fair warning, and an
opportunity for review that protects the lawful interests of consumers.”74
The CCI is a consortium which aims at constructing collaboration between content industr ies
and internet service providers in order to educate online users about the importance of

71
72

See Art. 40-44.
M ary LaFrance, Graduated Response by Industry Compact: Piercing the Black Box, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 165, at
166 (2012).
73
M atthew Lasar, Big Content, ISPs nearing agreement on piracy crackdown system, ARS T ECHNICA , available at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/06/big-content-isps-nearing-agreement-on-piracy-crackdown-system/(last visited
1/6/2014).
74
Memorandum of Understanding, CENTER FOR COP YRIGHT INFORMATION , available at
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/M emorandum-of-Understanding.pdf
128

copyright protection and help to find better ways to enjoy digital content. The CCI announce
that their members includes，
“artists and content creators like members from Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) and Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)…and five major broadband
service providers like AT&T, Cablevision, Comcast, Time Warner Cable, and Verizon…o ur
leadership also includes an Advisory Board made up of consumer advocates, privacy
specialists and technology policy experts.”75
Based on the announcement, the CCI’s policies cover all parties involved in online copyright
activity and consider all their interests, especially the demand of consumers.
In addition to the general announcement, the CCI also design a specific implement system to
facilitate its regulation on online piracy. The Copyright Alert System (CAS) is a program
created by major parties that prefer to cooperation in online environment.

76

The CAS

requires an ISP to issue a serious of warnings to its subscriber who is suspected on P2P ille ga l
file-sharing. 77 Under the CAS system, the subscriber is responsible for ensuring his account
is not used for copyright infringement. Several assists are provided to subscribers with
respect to this issue:
1) making subscribers aware of unlawful contents;
2) educate them how to prevent copyright infringement;
3) provide them with access to legal contents. 78
If the accused subscriber ignore the warnings and continue his actions, the ISP should impose
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“mitigation measures” on the subscriber. The “mitigation measures” includes:
1) a temporary reduction of internet speed;
2) a temporary downgrade in internet service tier; or
3) redirection to a landing page for a period of time, until a subscriber contact the ISP or
until the subscriber completes an online copyright education program. 79
These measures are all under the discretion of ISPs depends on various situations. However,
the ISP should cautiously locate illegal content and the subscriber’s account to ensure the
content is protected by copyright and the warning is issued to the correct subscriber. 80
On the other hand, the CCI also provides an opportunity to subscriber who feels one or more
warning is in error. The Independent Review Process enable subscribers to file a request
before any “mitigation measures” are actually taken. 81 The subscriber who believes he
wrongly receives one or more warnings from the ISPs should request an Independent Review
to the American Arbitration Association (AAA) through its ISP’s online system. When a
subscriber is presented with the review opportunity, your ISP will provide a link to the AAA’s
system where a subscriber will be able to register and view those warnings eligible for
review. 82
Normally, a subscriber can challenge the validity of one or more warnings on the grounds
that 1) misidentification of accounts; 2) unauthorized use of account; 3) authorization by
copyright holders; 4) Fair use; 5) misidentification of files; 6) works in public domain. 83
Once the request is filed with the payment of $35 application fees, the “mitigation measures”
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implemented by ISPs will be suspended during the process of reviewing. If the subscriber
prevails at the end of reviewing, all warnings and “mitigation measures” will be removed and
the application fees will be refund. 84
D. The Road So Far: Implementation of Graduated Response
Although the graduated responses system provides opportunity for the cooperation between
ISPs and copyright holders, it does not follow that this system immediately works as expected.
After all, the willingness for cooperation under graduated responses system is one
consideration, the practical effects is quite another.
Countries like France and New Zealand have been implementing the graduated responses
system for quite a period, while other countries such as the US just launches its customized
system shortly. In recognition of the fact, the investigation of practical effects would not
cover all countries that adopt the system, but focus on France and New Zealand with actual
results and evidences.
On the other hand, the graduated responses system is designed as an alternative enforceme nt
strategy to copyright enforcement and meanwhile educate the public how to access legitimate
licensing in online environment. Being the major purposes and objects under the system, the
analysis in this section primarily focus on the two interdepend aspects.
Although several jurisdictions have employed the system, empirical data and evidences are
still insufficient to depict a full landscape on its ultimate effect on copyright enforceme nt.
However, the available empirical data and evidences still indicates how the system affect
online piracy and how online users react to its implementation. Moreover, the implementa tio n
especially of the sanction mechanism is another noticeable point for observation.
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1. France
a) Judicial Practice
As aforementioned, online users who receive the third warning notices (the final stage) may
be referred to a prosecutor for further actions including litigation under HADOPI system. As
of September 2013, HADOPI had referred only 14 cases to prosecutors for possible actions
and four of them had gone to litigation stage. 85 In the first case, the Belfort court fined a 40

after his IP a

year old Frenchman 150
copyrighted

song.

86

The fine was imposed even though the Frenchman reported

disconnection after the second warning notices. 87
The second case involved a subscriber whose IP address associated with a copyrighted film. 88
The St Gaudens Court found him guilty of “failing to secure his internet connection” and did
not impose any penalty because the court reasoned that the subscriber “did not understand
the nature of technology and the infringements alleged against him”. 89
In the third case, the subscriber was acquitted by court because the notice had been dispatched
too long after the infringement occurred. 90 In the fourth case, the subscriber was accused
infringed two copyrighted songs, but did not appear in court. 91 The District Court of
Montreuil issued a default judgment with a fine of 600
access for 15 days. 92

85

M egan Geuss, French anti-piracy agency Hadopi only sued 14 people in 20 months, ARS T ECHNICA , available at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/french-anti-piracy-agency-hadopi-only-sued-14-people-in-20-months/ (last visited
1/7/2014).
86
Cyrus Farivar, France convicts first person under anti-piracy law (even though he didn’t do it), ARS T ECHNICA , available at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/france-convicts-first-person-under-anti-piracy-law-even-though-he-didnt-do-it/ (last
visited 1/7/2014).
87
Id.
88
See Giblin supra note 54, at 11.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id., at 12.
132

and the discon

The French experiences indicated that the final actions and penalty under HADOPI system
were used in a highly low frequency. Among the 14 subscribers referred to prosecutors, only
four subscribers finally reach the litigation stage. Two out of the four cases end up with no
penalty, while the first case merely involved with small amount of fine compared to the

ed 600
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lastsuspensi
cases w
.

maximum 1,500

of internet, this was largely due to the fact of default judgment. Therefore, the French judicia l
system is cautious on imposing disconnection as penalty when involved in non-commerc ia l
infringement.
b) The Positive Side
France has been adopting the graduated responses system known as the HADOPI for three
years since late 2010. The proponents of HADOPI speak highly of the system and anticipate
its overwhelming effects to online piracy. For example, the general secretary of HADOPI
made a statement that HADOPI is “a well-accepted system that works and can evolve”.

93

He emphasized that the French graduated response system is “most protective as regards
internet users’ rights as it creates complete imperviousness between subscribers’ personal
data and records of offences perpetrated by the right holders.”94
To be sure, the positive comments and confidence from the general secretary do not convince
the public that the HADOPI works well. As a matter of fact, such viewpoints based on actual
results and evidences. The HADOPI published a report in March 2012 which investigate the
status of HADOPI after 17months of the system launched. Pursuant to HADOPI’s
methodology, this survey primarily focus on users’ activities and statements made by internet
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users. 95
The report first points out that illegal downloading in France show clear decline over the
period from October 2010 to December 2011 based on the data collected from the French
Rights Protection Commission’ information system. 96 In a total 755,015 records of
subscribers who received as least one warning notices:
1) 95% who received the first notice did not conduct further actions and receive the second
one;
2) 92% who received the second one showed the same trend(no further actions detected);
3) 98% who received the final notices were in the same situation. 97
As to the major targets of HADOPI—the P2P file-sharing network, notable results showed
that HADOPI effectively reduce the usage and traffic in P2P network in 2011:
1) 17% decline in audience level(Nielson Report);
2) 29% decline in audience level(NetRating);
3) 43% decline of illegal data sharing(Peer Media Technologies);
4) 66% decline of illegal data sharing (ALPA). 98
On the other hand, the report also emphasized the educative function of HADOPI. In a
dialogue with 65,848 people who had receives notices from HADOPI regarding their
behavior:
1) 6% who received the first notices contacted HADOPI and stated they would cease ille ga l
sharing on P2P network and seek for legal resources;
2) 25% who received the second notices did the same actions;
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3) 71% who received the final notices show the same trend. 99
Moreover, the report releases an online survey about online users’ opinion to HADOPI. The
survey cover 1,500 online users in France. The result showed that more than 1 out of 3
surveyed stated that “HADOPI give them reason to more regularly consume cultural works
via websites that comply with copyright law” and 71% of P2P users said they would “stop
downloading illegal content if they received a recommendation from HADOPI”. 100
At least from the standpoint of proponents, this general report demonstrates that the French
graduated responses system—the HADOPI effectively achieve the aims by decreasing ille ga l
downloading and force online users to change their behaviors by the educative function.
In addition to the direct evidence in the report, other indirect evidence also strengthen the
stances of proponents. According to IFPI 2012 Digital Music Report, France experienced an
increase in music subscription revenues of over 90% in the first 11 months in 2011. 101 As
the end of July 2013, the HADOPI had issued 2,004,847 first warning notices and 201,288
second notices. 102 A total 710 investigation were conducted to see whether the subscribers
who received the third noticed should be referred to prosecutors.
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These figures

demonstrate that the HADOPI system in France is an effective enforcement strategy to online
protection.
c) The Challenge
Despite the notable evidence, the support to HADOPI in online enforcement does not affect
the challenge and query to its application. The First challenge to HADOPI is from the French
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government. The newly elected French government commissioned Pierre Lescure, former
CEO of the Canal cable television network, to investigate the HADOPI policy on cultura l
development. 104 The report was published in May 2013 and concluded that HADOPI did not
achieve the purposes. His statement indicated “while it had perhaps brought about some
reduction in P2P infringement, that traffic had been diverted to other infringing sources rather
than to the legitimate market.”105
The report by Pierre Lescure directly challenges the argument that HADOPI effective ly
educate the users and direct them to the legal resources. Moreover, the action took by French
government enhance the credibility of this report. In August 2013, the government passed a
decree that abolished the suspension as a possible penalty for a subscriber who neglige ntly
infringe copyright. 106 The Cultural Minister in a subsequent press release announced that the
HADOPI agency would be abolished

and its “remaining responsibilities

allocated

elsewhere.”107 Although the suspension as a penalty still works to proven infringement 108 ,
these actions by French government indicated that the HADOPI is not as effective as design
and do not meet the requirement of government.
The French government is not the only party that launch the challenge to HADOPI. Scholar
like Professor Rebecca Giblin also sets out questions to the report by HADOPI. In general,
her questions target on the statistics listed in the report. The first questioning figure is the 17%
reduction of P2P illegal downloading attributed by Nielson/IFPI in the “Digital Music Report
2012”. She claims that the 2012 report did actually lack such figure in official texts, while
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only mentioned the number of P2P file-sharing in France dropped 26%. 109 However, the 17%
figure was mentioned in the 2013 report, which was published a full year later than the
HADOPI report. 110 Furthermore, she claimed that the authority and methodology of the
report by IFPI were unclear and unavailable. Based on her finding, she stated that “the
provenance cannot be determined”. 111
The second questioning figure is the 29% reduction in P2P audience level, which is attributed
by NetRatings. Giblin claimed that the NetRatings was a French audience measureme nt
company and an affiliate with Nielsen. 112 Under the circumstances, her concern was that the
figure might be calculated in conjunction with the first one, which may eventually lack
credibility. 113
2. New Zealand
a) Judicial Practice
Although the penalty of graduated responses under New Zealand law includes the suspension
of internet connection to repeat infringers, this provision is currently in dormant and must be
enforced by an Order in Council. 114 Under the circumstances, the only available penalty to
an accused subscriber is the fines pay to the right holder under the discretion of the Copyright
tribunal. 115
As of October 2013, the Copyright Tribunal had decided seventeen cases. In each cases the
applicant was the Rianz on behalf of different record labels. 116 For the total thirteen cases,
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the Tribunal reasoned that the applicant should not be reimbursed for their full costs and the
reasonable costs of the copyrighted works should be determined by references to the market
price when purchased. 117 Moreover, the Tribunal considers deterrent as an important
element when measures the sum of fines.
For the total seventeen cases, an order of payment by the infringer usually is made of four
components: the costs of purchasing legal works; the fees pay to IPAP for representation; the
application fees pay to the Tribunal; the deterrent fees determined by the Tribunal. 118 In
general, the first three payment items are relatively stable, while the deterrent fees are
variable ranges from $0 to $600 according to the condition of infringements. 119
b) The General Effect
In the “Digital Music Report” 2013, the IFPI claimed that “P2P use in New Zealand fell by
16%.”120 The Recording Industry Association of New Zealand (Rianz) stated that an 18%
reduction in the use of P2P network after seven months of the law was introduced. 121
Moreover, the New Zealand Federation Against Copyright Theft (NZFACT) claimed that the
number of major US films shared in New Zealand effectively halved monthly when the
graduated response came into force. 122
One independent research conducted by Waikato University suggested that P2P traffic and
the number of users engaged in P2P file sharing in New Zealand decreased by half after the
law came into operation. 123 The research group continued to conduct the research in
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September 2012 and found that the usage of P2P was still below the levels of the year before
even though the P2P traffic recovered slightly. 124
Despite the notable effects by graduated responses system in New Zealand, questions still
exist with respect to the reduction of P2P usage. Although P2P traffic has greatly been
decreased after the law came into force, the HTTPS type of online infringement massive ly
increased and found by researchers. 125 The downloaded HTTPS bytes have increased five
times in the last 20 months. 126 The HTTPS is a form of encryption which prevents traffic
from being easily analyzed. 127 The subscriber can obtain online content by using a foreign
web-server with the HTTPS for safely transmission without being detected. 128
The HTTPS contains several features that greatly distinguishes from the P2P architecture,
which is more appropriate for illegal sharing:
1. The transfer of content is encrypted so that it is difficult to use DPI technology to filter
and determine whether the content is copyright protectable or not;
2. The content in web-server can be downloaded via usual web browser rather than
specialized software;
3. HTTPS has substantial amount of legitimate users so that it is difficult to be shut down
or blocked. 129
Although the increase of HTTPS infringement may not account for the decrease of P2P usage,
it can be reasonably assume that the existence of HTTPS provides users with an alternative
platform to continue illegal actions. Because the graduated response in New Zealand
http://wand.net.nz/sites/default/files/caa.pdf (last visited 1/7/2014).
124
Shane Alcock, The Impact of the Copyright Amendment Act: Update for September 2012, WAND NETWORK RESEARCH GROUP,
available at http://wand.net.nz/content/impact-copyright-amendment-act-update-september-2012 (last visited 1/7/2014).
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
See Giblin supra note 102, at 42.
128
Id.
129
See Alcock supra note 124.
139

concentrate on P2P network, users who opt out the P2P network are able to switch to nonP12P resources for infringement. Under the circumstances, the effects of graduated responses
are greatly weakened.
3. South Korea
Similarly, the graduated responses system in South Korea has been working since 2009.
According to the 2012 Annual Report on Copyright in Korea, the Korea Copyright
Commission has kept on issuing the correction recommendations to ISPs to suspend
infringing individual online users or illegal websites. 130 In 2009, the Commission issued
35,345 recommendations and the figure increased to 85,085 in 2010, followed by 107,724
and 250,039 in 2011 and 2012 respectively. 131
With the general increasing trend of issuing recommendations, the account suspension in
South Korea also surged during the four years period. According to the Annual Report, there
were 39 suspension of account in 2009, and the figure raised up to 91 in 2010. 132 Within one
year, the suspension of account doubles under the operation of graduated response system in
South Korea. In the following years of 2011 and 2012, the account suspension amounted to
114 and 175 respectively. 133
The report indicated that the graduated responses system in South Korea is strictly
implemented and is generally upheld by administrative agency. As to its practical effect on
copyright enforcement, the copyright stakeholders in Korea strongly favors of this system
and noted it as “an example of the success of stricter enforcement.”134 Moreover, the IFPI
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also claimed in the Digital Music Report 2012 that “similar positive indications come from
South Korea.”135
Despite the positive arguments, one notable feature from the Korean experience is the
gradually stricter and expanded enforcement compared to those in France and New Zealand.
The original Korean system primarily targeted on infringing online users. In 2011,
cyberlockers and P2P services are required to register with the government and imple me nt
filtering measures against online infringement. 136 Currently, nearly 150 local ISPs has
participated in the program and authority reports that over 90 percent of ISPs voluntar ily
cooperated under the program with copyright holders and the KCC. 137
Furthermore, the Korea Copyright Commission launched a “Citizen’s Open Monitoring
System” which allowed online users to illegal website that distributed unauthor ized
copyrighted works through the Internet, which has been fully operated since 2012. 138 By
aligning with the ISPs and online users, the Korean graduated responses system essentially
expand the groups of stakeholders and the scope of cooperation.
4. United States
Compared to the France, New Zealand, and South Korea, the United States is merely a new
entrant with respect to the implementation of customized graduated responses system.
Because the US graduated responses system operates under private contractual agreement
between copyright holders and ISPs, the only available empirical data for analysis comes
from the industrial report.
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In May 2014, the Center for Copyright Information (CCI) published its first report on how
the copyright alert system operated in the US since its initial introduction in February 2013.
During the first ten months of operation, the CAS claims its “ramp up” operation has been
smooth and successful in terms of addressing digital copyright infringement “in a fair and
consumer-friendly” manner. 139 According to the report, the CAS sent more than 1.3 millio n
Copyright Alerts to online subscribers within the US and predicted that the program will
double the number of notices in next year. 140
Moreover, the CAS reported that the majority of alerts sent to online subscribers occurred at
the first warning stage—the initial educational stages, which account for more than 70% of
total alerts. As a comparison, less than 3% alerts reached the final mitigation stage. 141
With respect to deterring online piracy, the report focus on the attitude of online users during
the operation of Copyright Alert System. 57% of online users surveyed stated they would
cease infringement immediately upon the receiving a copyright alert, only 9% reported they
would ignore such alert. 142
Furthermore, only a few online users challenged the copyright alerts delivered to them
through the independent review process by the American Arbitration Association. Among
the 1.3 million copyright alerts sent, only 256 requests for review were filed to AAA, which
account for 0.02% of all alerts during the 10 months period. 143 Based upon the report, only
47 out of 256 request successfully challenged the copyright alerts and were primarily based
on “unauthorized use of account by unknown third party.”144
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Being a newly implemented system, the CAS in the US is still in the early stage. The survey
report provides limited information about how this system works to its educational and
enforcement purposes. Therefore, the graduated responses system in the US still need more
practice to examine its practical effects.
E. General Observation
The graduated responses system has been working in different countries for quite a period.
The empirical data from these countries demonstrate that the operation of this system acquire
mixed results with respect to its purpose and objective. These results are not enough to reach
a clear conclusion, which lead to uncertainty of this system. To clarify the uncertainty, this
section analyzes the graduated response system based on available resources and figure out
some clear general observations.
1. Graduated Responses system decrease illegal usage through P2P network
The first focal observation is whether the graduated response system actually decrease the
illegal file-sharing vie P2P network. Based on available data, the graduated response system
works well to decrease illegal usage and traffic through P2P network. This is especially
notable under the French HADOPI system.
According to HADOPI surveys and reports after the launched of system, 72% online users
declared they reduced or completely stopped their illegal usage after receiving the warning
notices. 145 Furthermore, four statistical agencies publish their figures that demonstrate the
decrease of usage in P2P network. 146 In New Zealand, similar reports showed that the
nationwide usage of P2P network decreased ranging from 16% to 18%. 147
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Although one cannot simply based on these figures and statistics to reach a credible
conclusion, the decreasing tendency in P2P usage is basically assured. Despite the opponents
to the system are usually suspicious on specific figures regarding its credibility, they are
hardly able to deny the general trend of decreasing illegal usage. 148 Under the circumstances,
the graduated responses system indeed decrease the usage of illegal file-sharing via P2P
network.
However, the success of graduated response system on P2P platform does not mean it
eventually deter and control online piracy. In other words, the decrease in P2P usage does
not equal to the decrease of online piracy. As the research by Shane Alcock, online users are
able to switch from P2P network to other available platforms to continue illegal sharing. 149
The new platforms usually are equipped with safety measures which are difficult to filter and
detect. Without the need of installing specialized software, users are easily evaded from
detection and monitoring. Moreover, these new platforms often mix legitimate and ille ga l
usage together, which increase the difficulty for enforcement.
Furthermore, current framework of graduated response may deteriorate the situatio n.
Because graduated responses system in various countries primarily targets on P2P
architecture, users who stop using their P2P network are able to switch to other online
platforms in order to sidestep the enforcement. As a consequence, the online piracy may still
remain the same ratio.
2. The penalty of suspension is at stake
The suspension of account access is one of the major sanctions under graduated responses
system. Generally, the suspension of subscriber’s account is widely accepted as an effective
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strategy to preserve the deterring effect. Nevertheless, the implementation of graduated
responses indicates the opposite result.
Both France and New Zealand rarely order account suspension to accused subscribers after
their graduated responses system came into force. As of October 2013, the French HADOPI
only referred 14 cases to the prosecutors for further actions, and four out of the total finally
reached litigation stage. 150 Only one defendant out of the four cases were imposed
suspension of account as penalty, and the suspension merely lasted for 15 days. 151
The French government even moved to pass a decree that substantially restrict the availability
of suspension as a possible sanction, while retain the financial penalty as the regular
penalty. 152 In New Zealand, the total seventeen cases to date were referred to the Copyright
Tribunal for judgment, and the only available penalty was fines under the framework. 153
On the other hand, the US Copyright Alert System (CAS) provides a weaker actions toward
online users who continue infringement after they receive the sixth alert notices.

154

Depending on the ISP, the mitigated actions includes:
1) A temporary reduction in Internet speed;
2) A temporary downgrade in internet services; or
3) Redirection to a landing page for a set period of time, until a subscriber contacts the ISP
or until the subscriber completes an online copyright education program. 155
Compared to the direct suspension of subscriber’s account, these mitigated actions still
contain deterring effects like financial penalty, but may cause less criticism from the public
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with respect to human rights issues.
3. Graduated response system is a better enforcement option to copyright holders
Compared to traditional enforcement strategy, the graduated responses system is a better
enforcement option with respect to the enforcement costs. As to private implementation by
digital technology, the costs to develop effective technology mainly burden on copyright
holders and developers. The decryption of a given digital technology usually means the loss
of all investment. Likewise, filing a copyright lawsuit costs the copyright holders a lot with
no guarantee of the prevailing judgment.
Similar to traditional enforcement strategy, the graduated responses system is unlikely to
entirely terminate online piracy. However, the enforcement costs to copyright holders under
the graduated response system are greatly less than the traditional strategies under the rightholder-centric model.
The graduated responses system relies on the cooperation between copyright holders and
ISPs. In other words, both parties need to burden the enforcement costs. As a matter of fact,
copyright holders are not the major group to bear the costs to enforce their rights under the
framework.
For example, almost the entire costs of enforcing the system in France have been borne by
ISPs and French government. 156 For a single year of 2011, the French governme nt
11.4 m illion

contributed
10.3 m illion for 2012 and 8 m illion for 2013.157 Copyright holders have no obligation to
contribute the costs of issuing notices or operating the system, but only need to bear the costs
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of identifying and investing infringement. 158 On the other hand, although the exact amount
of implementation costs to ISPs are unclear, their demand for reimbursement implies that the
figure cannot be trivial. 159
As to the US Copyright Alert System, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) provides
that the funding to operate the system will be provided fifty percent (50%) by the
participating Content Holders Group and fifty percent (50%) by the participating ISPs. 160
According to the French and US schemes, copyright holders basically would not bear the
total costs for the operation of graduated responses system. Depending on the nature of this
system in various countries, substantial costs are borne by the ISPs and governments. Under
the circumstances, copyright holders essentially invite the ISPs and even local governme nts
as stakeholders in the course of copyright enforcement.
F. Concluding remark
The graduated response system establishes the cooperation between copyright holders and
ISPs. By transferring partial burden of enforcement to ISPs, copyright holders save
substantial enforcement costs and transfer a neutral party into a stakeholder in the course of
copyright enforcement. As a prospective enforcement strategy, various jurisdictions have
implemented the system as an enforcement option.
Despite the different design, every jurisdiction aims at decreasing online piracy. However,
the practical experiences in France and New Zealand indicates that the adoption of graduated
response system achieve mixed results. The system indeed decreases the illegal usage
through P2P network, but still have limited impact over the entire online piracy because there
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are other available platforms for infringement.
Moreover, the suspension of subscriber’s account as major penalty receives widespread
criticism and are rarely used in actual implementation. Since the deterrent effect of graduated
response system lies in suspension to a large extent, the negative treatments to this penalty
and the low implementing ratio adversely affect the effectiveness of this system.
On the other hand, the graduated response system become a better enforcement choice to
copyright holders regarding the costs of enforcement. Based on the practical experiences and
scheme in various countries, the costs of implementing the graduated responses system are
usually split among ISPs, copyright holders, and sometimes the government. Under the
circumstances, copyright holders bear less enforcement costs than the enforcement under
right-holder-centric model.
Moreover, the enforcement duty force ISPs and government become the stakeholders to
copyright holders. The infringers would suffer monitoring and punishment from three parties
rather than merely the copyright holders. Compared to enforcement under the right-holdercentric model, the graduated response under cooperative model is far more effective to
copyright infringers in terms of multiple pursuing. In summary, the cooperative model by
means of graduated response system is a prospective strategy to copyright enforcement.
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Chapter V Cooperation between Copyright holders and online users: the Open Access
Program
The cooperative model by means of the graduated response system enables the cooperation
between copyright holders and the ISPs with respect to online copyright enforceme nt.
However, this is merely the first type of the cooperative model which concentrates on online
piracy. The second type of cooperative model, the open access program, focuses on the
possibility of cooperation between copyright holders and ordinary users. This kind of
cooperation significantly distinguishes from the graduated response system because it is
directly related to copyright creation and licensing, rather than copyright enforcement.
Copyright holders produce and distribute creative works in exchange for financial benefits.
Meanwhile, ordinary users pay for the access to copyrighted works, which provides the
incentive to copyright holders for future copyright creation. In theory, this is an ideal
circulation of copyright production and distribution.
However, copyright holders always want to maximize financial benefits through the
copyright circulation. The ordinary users, on the other hand, prefer to access diversified
creative works inexpensively.
In the digital age, the opposing objectives between the two parties lead to tension. Copyright
holders struggle to control online piracy, while online users are frustrated by the inflexib le
licensing mechanism provided by copyright holders.
Based on the undesirable situation, the Open Access Program (OAP) aims at providing n new
licensing framework and provides an alternative route to lower down the threshold of
copyright creation and licensing.
The primary feature of the open access program is to license creative works with less

149

restrictions from copyright holders to online users. 1 Online users are able to access
copyrighted works without payment so long as they complies with the licensing agreement.
Under the circumstances, the accessing costs by online users are significantly less than those
under traditional copyright licensing.
On the other hand, online users who access copyrighted works under the Open Access
Program have greater freedom to employ the works. They are able to create and license their
own works with a flexible mechanism. Under the circumstances, ordinary users who have
talent in copyright creation obtain the opportunity to develop a professional career. As a
consequence, the OPA opens an alternative channel to copyright creation and licens ing,
increasing the quantity of creative works.
Currently two major projects under open access programs are available through the Internet:
the open-source software and the creative commons licenses. The emergence and popularity
of open-source software demonstrate that copyright holders do not solely rely on financ ia l
benefits as incentives to continue software. Rather, the open-source software primarily
emphasizes the free release, modify, and improvement on software. 2
Because the open-source software operates outside copyright regulation, its operation
depends on the Open Source License. In general, the licenses allow source code to be freely
shared, modified, and reused by other software developers as long as they complies with the
specific terms and conditions. The most popular licenses currently includes GNU General
Public License, GNU Library or “Lesser” General Public License, MIT license, Apache
License, etc. 3
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The second project, the Creative Commons License, applies to a broader category of
copyrighted works than the open-source software. For example, the CC licenses apply to
online works like music, videos, academic journals, etc. 4 In general, there are six types of
CC licenses available for adoption. 5
Both projects provide benefits to online users and copyright holders. To online users, the
benefit is direct and influential because the works licensed under the program are usually free
for use. In other words, online users do not bear accessing costs, usually licensing fees, to
copyrighted works. Hence, the incentive for online users to join the program is strong and
apparent.
To copyright holders, the benefits are multiple with respect to specific projects. As to the
open-source software, the free source code greatly lowers the investment and simplifies the
process of software design. Moreover, the backward improvement from downstream
software to the original version is instrumental to the development of entire software industry.
On the other hand, the CC licenses are widely used by copyright holders who sustain
professional career without relying on content industry. By licensing works under the
Creative Commons, these copyright holders establish an alternative channel to the creation
and licensing of copyrighted works.
Although open access program operates outside the copyright system, the validity and
enforceability of open-source software and CC licenses have been upheld and confirmed by
courts in various jurisdictions. Moreover, the Successful examples in both projects such as
the Android operating system, the music band Nine Inch Nails, and single musician Jonathan
Coulton all demonstrate the reliability of open access program in terms of copyright licens ing
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and creation.
Despite the successful example, the open access program is far from a substitute system to
the traditional copyright creation and licensing scheme. The majority of copyright holders
still prefer to license their copyrighted works within the copyright system. Moreover, the
successful examples of cooperation under open access program are limited in quantity and
are more like the exception to the mainstream of copyright creation and licensing.
A. Open-source software license
1. Computer software is copyrightable
Computer software is a relatively new category of works entitled for copyright protection.
With the development of digital technology, whether software should be granted copyright is
highly controversial in history.

Most software companies treat their products as valuable

property and try to prevent unauthorized reproduction and distribution. In its early stage,
however, computer software was not effective protected because they were not qualified as
“fixed, tangible object”. 6 Because computer software contains source code and object code
which primarily shows utility rather than creativity, software was generally not entitled
protection under copyright law.
Despite the reluctance of granting copyright on computer software, stakeholders in software
industries successfully push the Congress to added an definition of “computer program” in
§101 of US Copyright Act 1976 and meanwhile amended §177 to grant software owners
reproduction and adaptation rights on software. 7
Moreover, the court decision in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. echoed the

6
7

17 U.S.C. §102(a).
17 U.S.C. §101, §117.
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legislation and ensured that computer software was under copyright protection. 8 In the case,
the Franklin’s most persuasive argument was that Apple’s software was merely machinereadable language embedded in ROM and did not fix on a physical form.
However, the appeal court ruled that the 1) object code in computer program is copyrightab le;
2) computer embedded in ROM is copyrightable; 3) operating system in computer program
is copyrightable. 9
Based on this decision, computer software is under copyright protection equivalent to literary
works in copyright law. Under the circumstances, copyright protection on computer software
is widely accepted and implement as other types of works.
2. The rise of open-source software license
Open-source software license is computer software licensing scheme that licenses the source
code (human-readable) to ordinary users who are able to modify, distribute, and reuse
pursuant to the terms and conditions under licensing framework. 10 Because this type of
software is often developed in a public and collaborative form, it rapidly obtains popularity
among users groups, especially the software developers’ community.
During its development, software developers are the major groups that stimulate the
prosperity of the OSS program. In general, the shift from proprietary protection under
copyright to the free licensing scheme comes from the demand of software developers’
community. They prefer to license the software under the OSS program because developers
are able to access the software and figure out its design and internal function. This process
allows them to make modification, integrate it into new system or architecture, and contribute
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714 F. 2d 1240, (3d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1246-1251.
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to new improvement which eventually enables the software for marketing. 11 Under the
circumstances, software companies can save additional R&D investment by incorporating
the improvement into their software products.
The earliest pioneer who proposes the idea of free software, Richard Stallman, contributed
to create a new path for software distribution. 12 He founded the Free Software Foundation
(FSF) to promote his “free software” project and design the well-known General Public
License (GPL). 13
According to Stallman, the free software does not mean free of charge but relevant to
freedom. 14 The freedom contains four fundamental elements: 1) the freedom to run the
software, for any purpose; 2) the freedom to study how the software works, and adapt it to
your needs; 3) the freedom to redistribute copies so that you can help others; 4) the freedom
to improve the software so that benefit the community. 15
Despite the establishment of FSF and the popularity of GPL, not every developer in the
community accepts Stallman’s approach regarding the free software project. In 1998, Eric
Raymond and other developers created the Open Source Initiative (OSI). The OSI was not
equivalent to the FSF regarding free software. The primary distinction lies in that OSI
deliberatively avoids moral and ethical issues, and OSI is more concerned with obtaining the
practical benefits by free software licensing than moral inquiry. 16 Its announcement defines
open source software as “a development method that seeks better quality, higher reliability,
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more flexibility, lower cost, and an end to predatory vendor lock-in.”17 Therefore, the OSI
emphasized on utilitarian aspect and echoed the rationale in copyright law.
Obviously, the proprietary protection under copyright cannot provides software developers
and their companies with flexible mechanism. For one, granting copyright over software
means the copyright holders are entitled to charge licensing fees. The process of obtaining
authorization or a valid license may be time-consuming and costly if both copyright holders
and ordinary users do not reach satisfactory agreement. As a result, the failure of software
licensing becomes blocks the access to software products.
For another, the source code in software may not be readily accessible by other developers
under copyright licensing framework. This substantially deprives developers of the
opportunity to improve the quality, compatibility and security on software. Consequently, the
software product may lose the competence in markets.
3. Categories of open-source software license
The open-source license is the core mechanism under the open-source software program. The
license generally allows the source code to be freely distributed, modified, shared, and reused
under specialized terms and conditions. Developers thus are able to customize their own
software products based on the widespread use of source code.
The open-source licenses essentially open a new channel to software design. Traditio na l
model software design usually requires a fixed group of developers to design the architecture
to manage the project and test the operation. 18 Unlike traditional model, open-source license
displays distinguished features.
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Eric S. Raymond, the Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental Revolutionary,
CAMBRIDGE , REV. ED . (2001).
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Among all features, one of the most salient is that the software users are actively treated as
co-developers rather than passive users of the software. 19 Because users can access source
code freely, they are encouraged to experience and test the entire software on its function and
operation. They can report bug-project, add refined code to the original, and give additiona l
suggestions.

20

Moreover, each user is able to test the operation of given software in different hardware
environment. 21 Under the circumstances, the users function as early consumers to test the
basic operation of software, which is lucrative to software industries which want to have
start-up advantages over other competitors.
Owing to the strengths of open-source license, such licensing scheme is popular and
undergone significant development among software community. Currently more than
180,000 open source projects are available with over 1400 unique open-source licenses. 22
Despite the diversity and prosperity, these open-source licenses can be reduced into two
general types based on the specific terms and conditions.
a) Restrictive license
The restrictive license refers to license that the derivative software users should abide by the
terms and conditions under the original open-source license. 23 The user essentially cannot
license the downstream products with additional restrictions. 24 One high-profile example is
the GNU General Public License (GPL). A software user who modifies a software under the
GPL is able to distribute his modified version only when he obtains the equivalent terms and
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conditions under GPL even if he creates new or distinctive code. 25 The GPL currently
includes two major forms adopted by the community: the GPLv2 and GPLv3. 26 Both major
forms apparently embody the restrictive characteristics with specific terms and conditions.
First of all, the restrictive requirement is strictly clarified in the texts of a given license. Under
GPLv2, the source code for distribution should “in whole or in part contains or is derived
from the original or any part therefore.”27 In GPLv3, a derivative work out of the origina l
must be licensed in its entirety “regardless of how the work is packaged”. 28
Moreover, the GPL prohibits users to impose higher level of restrictions than the original in
the process of distribution.

29

A case in point is the “liberty-or-death” clause in GPL. The

clause provides that additional obligations that are exceeded to the requirement of
distributing GPL software cannot exempt the distributors from potential liability.

30

Furthermore, the users who distribute object code of software subjected to GPL must make
the entire source code available to the public according to specific terms under GPL.
Under GPLv2, a distributor must provide “all the source code for all modules, plus any
associated interface definition files, plus the scripts used to control compilation and
installation of the executable.”31 Similarly, the GPLv3 requires “all the source code needed
to generate, install, and run the object code and to modify the work, including scripts to
control those activities.”32
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The restrictive license primarily aims at limiting the capability of software users to distribute
free software products so as to preserve the availability of free software to the public. Put
differently, the restriction by restrictive license is to ensure the access to software. Without
unambiguous restriction on distributers under restrictive license, users may encounter
substantial transaction costs when seek to obtain licensing.
b) Permissive (non-restrictive) license
Distinguished from the restrictive license, the permissive license is the second type of opensource licenses that provides minimal restrictions on the distribution and adaptation of
software. 33 In general, the criteria of permissive licenses are contrary to the restrictive
license. The major difference lies in the distribution of modified version software, while the
terms with respect to adaptation of software are closely similar. 34
Permissive license traditionally allows users to distribute modified software under differe nt
licensing agreement, which is contrary to restrictive license. Usually a distributor is able to
combine the licensed material with other license terms. 35 This may enable a user to add
additional restrictions on derivative software.
For example, the source code of MIT license is usually incorporated into FOSS code under
GPL license with high level of restriction. 36 Most permissive licenses, such as well-known
MIT and BSD licenses are simple and short to implement. The terms under these licenses
often consists of a broad copyright license with notice preservation requirement and liability
disclaimer. 37
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In a word, the permissive license places less restrictions to the distribution of modified
software. Meanwhile, the permissive license is not equivalent to works under public domain
which can be shared and distributed without any regulation. Permissive license contains
minimal level of requirement that the original author should be credited (attributed). 38
B. Creative commons licenses
The creative commons licenses refer to free sharing and use of creative contents or
knowledge through licensing agreement between copyright holders and ordinary users.
Unlike the open-source software, the creative commons licenses cover a wide range of
creative contents such as literary works, music, videos, scientific materials, etc.

39

In

general, the creative commons license provides a variety of standardized licens ing
agreements, which enables copyright holders to flexibly modify the terms of protection over
their works. 40 According to the founders of creative commons organization, such type of
licenses provides
…a set of license and relevant tools that enable copyright holders to change their works form
the framework of ‘all rights reserved’ to ‘some rights reserved’ in order to restrike the balance
between copyright holders and users…which makes creative contents more compatible to
the full potential of the internet… 41
To a large extent, the emergence of Internet and advanced digital technology make the idea
of CC licenses feasible. Widespread and convenient access to creative works through online
network demands a customized and flexible licensing mechanism.
Generally, access or use of a copyrighted work should obtain permission from copyright
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holders. However, the process of obtaining a valid licensing is usually time-consuming and
costly. Both sides may not reach a satisfactory agreement in the end, which slow down the
effective distribution of valuable works.
Under the circumstances, ordinary users should be able to access creative works under a
flexible licensing mechanism to facilitate the distribution of copyrighted works.
1. The Background of Creative Commons
The establishment of CC licenses were largely due to the concern on copyright creation. A
common perception in terms of copyright creation is that copyright creativity lies in the
sufficient access to preexisting works, which means derivative creation should build upon
preexisting works. 42
As aforementioned, the advanced digital technology reshapes the framework of online
creation: the use of online works always require a copy of original work on the Internet.
Because of the large quantities of online users and the anonymity, copyright holders find it
difficult to control the distribution on unauthorized derivative works.
Copyright holders wish to negotiate with users to obtain valid licensing. However, the reality
of acquiring valid licenses from copyright holders may not be an easy and inexpens ive
process. First of all, a user needs to secure the valid authorship on a work to obtain a valid
license, which is easier said than done because many copyrighted works online do not cover
explicit authorship acknowledgment. This makes it difficult for users to trace and arrange
negotiation process. Obviously, the costs with respect to secure a valid license are substantia l
to online users due to the architecture of Internet.

42
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Furthermore, copyright covers a bundle of exclusive rights over creative contents. 43 Each
exclusive right may belong to separate copyright holder so that users have to contact each
one to approach a valid license if they need more than one exclusive licensing.
For example, a film can be divided into the script, the background music, graphic works, and
the performances of actors. In offline environment, a user who would like to exploit partial
or the entire film must arrange several negotiations with no final success guaranteed. This
scenario does not change on the Internet. To obtain a license, an online user must figure out
complicated exclusive rights before he proceed a negotiation.
To make matter worse, the US Copyright Act of 1976 remove the formalities to copyright
protection such as registration and copyright notice. A copyright owner does not have strict
obligation to register his work for protection and makes the public aware by attaching the
notice. As a result, the ambiguous ownership of online work plus expensive searching costs
may force a user to access works without authorization.
Copyright overprotection is another push to the establishment of CC licenses. Copyright
protection grant limited monopoly to copyright holder to exercise their property-like
exclusion. Such design originates from the fear of “Tragedy of Commons”. The tragedy of
commons refers to deregulation of certain property because each individual maximize their
own benefits without considering the property itself.

44

As a consequence, the property

would be overused and depleted. 45 To avoid similar tragedy on intellectual products,
copyright protection functions as private ownership to provide individuals with incentives
for creation.

43
44

See generally 17 U.S.C. §106.
Carrett Hardin, The Tragedy of Commons, PERSP ECTIVES ON PROP ERTY LAW 119, 120 (Richard C. Ellickson et. Al. eds., 3d ed.
2002).
45
Id.
161

However, copyright protection becomes overly excessive with the modification of copyright
law. A high profile example is the extension of copyright term in US copyright law. The 1998
amendment to the Copyright Act of 1976, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA), extend the copyright protection to life plus 70 years or 95 years for corporate
works. 46
This extension largely prevents the public from freely using works that are of little or no
commercial value. According to a report by the Congressional Research Service, only two
percent of works between fifty- five and seventy-five years old retain commercial value. 47
Justice Breyer estimated that “…by the year of 2018, the number of protected works with
little or no commercial value will number in million…” 48
From the utilitarian perspective, works without commercial value do not generates suffic ie nt
incentives to trigger creation. Therefore, copyright holders do not have a solid ground to
argue absolute control over such type of works. Because intellectual products heavily rely on
preexisting works, the creators (users) either obtain works from public domain or seek for
license.
The extension of copyright term no doubt restricts the expansion of public domain for a long
period. Creators (users) have to negotiate with copyright holders to obtain licenses of
protected works that may be of little or no commercial value. The substantial transaction
costs of searching and negotiating process eventually prevent users from effectively using
original works. Consequently, the quantity of cultural production decrease and users are
forced to access works without licenses.
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One case in point is the Eldred v. Ashcroft, which pose doubt over the extension of copyright
protection term. In Eldred, petitioners argued that the CTEA that extend the copyright term
1) was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and 2) the extension violated the
Progress Clause because Congress grants exclusive rights to authors and inventors for only
a limited time. 49
Among the group of petitioners, Mr. Eldred’s experience was the high profile example. He
built a digital library which contained literary works from public domain. One of the works
was Robert Frost’s New Hampshire poetry collection, which would fall into public domain
in 1998. With the pass of CTEA, this work was under copyright protection until 2019. 50 The
Court eventually rejected both arguments and held the CETA was constitutional. 51
Under the circumstances, Mr. Eldred could not publish his derivative works based on the
poetry collection before he obtained authorization from copyright owner. His digital library,
which was scheduled to contribute to the progress of literary community, had to cease in case
that he got involved in any liability.
2. Establishment of creative commons
The holdings in Eldred case forced legal community to reconsider the existing copyright law.
As a response, a group of legal scholars hence proposed to establish a private solution to the
problems of online copyright regulation by designing “a layer of reasonable copyright”
alongside with current copyright law. 52 The project primarily designed to allow online users
to obtain license on copyrighted works, and meanwhile facilitate copyright holders to
relinquish partial or entire exclusive rights over their works in order for free licensing. 53 To
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achieve the general goal, the Creative Commons was established in San Francisco as a
nonprofit organization in 2001. 54 The participants in the Inaugural Meeting announced that,
Creative Commons is an organization that values innovation and protection equally, and is
working to offer creators a best-of-both-worlds way to protect their works while encouraging
certain use of them—to declare “some rights reserved”… 55
According to the announcement, the organization released its first set of copyright licenses
for free to the public in December 2002.

56

The license was inspired in part by the Free

Software Foundation’s GNU General Public License with a web application platform to
license works freely for certain uses; or dedicate copyrighted works to the public domain. 57
In the years following the initial release, Creative Commons designs a variety of versions of
licensing agreement beyond the border of the US into several jurisdictions with an
exponential increasing rate, and work with the Microsoft to create a licensing tool for use in
the Office applications. 58
Beginning from 2005, Creative Commons launched the commons-based infrastruc ture
project, also known as “Science Commons”, for science purpose by lowering unnecessary
obstacles for academic research, and develop technology to facilitate the access of academic
data or scientific materials.
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The initial motivation of this project was largely due to the

success of CC license in arts and cultural fields.
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According to the Creative Commons organization, the Science Commons cover several key
projects: 1) making scientific research re-useful via the Scholar’s Copyright Project; 2)
enabling “one-click” access to research tools via the Material Transfer Project; 3) integrating
fragmented information sources via the Neuro-commons Project. 60
Today the Creative Commons contributes to promote the licensing framework within global
network. The CC Affiliate Network consists of over 100 affiliates in more than 70
jurisdictions to support and promote CC licenses and activities around the world. This global
affiliate primarily take charge of various responsibilities such as public outreach, community
building,

translating

information and tools, fielding

inquiries,

conducting

research,

communicating with the public, and maintaining resources for CC users. 61
3. Framework of CC licenses
As aforementioned, the creative commons licenses aims at facilitating the licensing process
of creative contents between the copyright holders and online users. The CC licenses are
forged in a simple and standardized formats for either individual creator or large corporation
to seek for license. Because the CC licenses system is designed as an alternative to copyright
licensing, the licenses apply to all copyrighted works including books, films, videos, music,
etc.
Although CC licenses are usually marked as “Some Rights Reserved”, a licensee (user) still
enjoys exceptions or limitations under copyright law such as fair use. When a licensee obtains
a valid license, he should make attribution to the licensor and keep integrity of the copies. In
a word, the CC licenses do not negate copyright protection on creative contents and merely
create an alternative mechanism to the online licensing process.
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The CC licenses are built on a three-layer design. Each license is consisted of three basic
components.

62

The first layer is the Legal Code layer which is a traditional legal tool written

in language or text format readable to lawyers. 63 The second layer is the Common Deed layer
that the language and texts formats are readable to ordinary licensors. Licensors do not need
legal training to understand the license by reading the human-readable version. 64 Therefore,
the Commons Deed is a readily guidance to both licensors and licensees, directly pointing
out the most important terms and conditions.
The final layer is the machine-readable version of license, which summarizes the key
freedoms and obligations written into a format that software systems, search engines, and
other kinds of technology can understand. 65 This layer primarily designs to locate the
availability of a work under the CC license through software mechanism on the internet. In
other words, this three-layer design ensures that the CC licenses can be readily understand
and operable to licensors and licensees.
Despite each CC license share the same three-layer design, the specific categories of CC
license varies according to their terms and conditions. Currently, there are six types of CC
licenses available on the Creative Commons website. Each license emphasize on differe nt
licensing aspects.
The first type, called Attribution license, enables licensees to distribute, remix, tweak, and
build upon original work, even commercially, as long as the attribution for the original work
are made. 66 Under this license, a licensee can freely copy, distribute, transmit and adapt the
work in commercial or noncommercial method. To avail the privilege, a licensee should
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make attribution to the author or licensor in explicit manner. 67 This license is the most
accommodating and widely adopted one because its simplest requirement encourages the
maximum use and distribution.
The second type is the Attribution-ShareAlike license. This license allows licensees to remix,
tweak, and build upon original work even for commercial purposes, as long as licensee credit
author or licensor, and license their new creations under the identical terms and conditions. 68
Specifically, a licensee enjoy the same privilege as the Attribution license with the obligatio n
to make contribution to author or licensor, and more importantly, distribute the modified
work only after the same or similar license format. 69 This license is often compared to the
“restrictive” license under open-source software. All derivative works based on the origina l
must abide to the same terms and conditions. One notable example is the Wikipedia. The
Wikipedia adopts this type of license to incorporate materials and contents in order to achieve
aggregating effects.
The third type license provides less freedom on the use of works compared to the first two
licenses. This license, also known as Attribution-NoDerivs license, allows for redistributio n
in commercial and non-commercial manner with appropriate attribution to the author or
licensor. However, a licensee cannot alter, transform, or build on original work. 70
The fourth CC license is the Attribution-Noncommercial license. Obviously, this license
contains requirements like the Attribution license that allows a licensee to copy, distribute,
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transmit, and adapt the original work. The difference lies in the prohibition on use of a work
for commercial purpose. 71
The fifth one is the Attribution-Noncommercial-ShareAlike license. The final type is
Attribution-Noncommercial-Nonderivs license. Both licenses allow a licensee to copy,
distribute, and transmit the original work with same requirements for granting a valid license :
1) make attribution to the author or licensor; 2) do not use work for commercial purpose. The
AN-SA license requires any modified work should be distributed under same terms and
conditions, while the AN-ND license denies the adaptation of work. 72
Despite the distinctions among six types of licenses, all terms and conditions of a license can
be waived in case that a copyright holder authorizes a licensee. Meanwhile, works fall into
public domain are not affected by the CC license. Furthermore, all exceptions and limitatio ns
under copyright law, including fair use, are not restricted by the terms and conditions of
license.
C. Open Access Program: the Judicial Practice
Both the open-source software and CC licenses under the open access program are operating
by means of licensing agreement. Operating outside the boundary of copyright law, the open
access program has not undergone thorough sufficient judicial examination. To individ ua ls
and organizations, the major concern is whether such licensing agreement is enforceable. To
answer this question, one should looks into judicial cases to figure out the enforceability of
Open-source software and CC licenses.
1. Open-source software: Case Review
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Although open-source software has been launched for over a decade, cases reach the
litigation stage are far less in quantity compared to the high adoption ratio of the OSS. This
section looks into cases regarding OSS with copyright allegations.
Jacobsen v. Katzer
In general, the major question in the case is whether a copyright holder who contribute certain
works to free public use can enforce an “open source” copyright license to control the future
distribution and modification of that work. 73 The plaintiff held a copyright to computer
programming code and released the code for public download from a website without a
financial fees based on the Artistic License, an “open source” or public license. 74 The
defendant developed commercial software products by downloading and incorporating the
code into one of software package without following the terms and conditions of the Artistic
License. 75 The plaintiff therefore claimed that by modifying the software the defendant had
exceeded the scope of licensing agreement and infringed the copyright. 76
The District Court held that the open source Artistic License created an “intentionally broad”
nonexclusive license which was unlimited in scope and thus did not create liability for
copyright infringement. 77 However, the Appellate Court denied the holding and reasoned
that:
Attribution and modification transparency requirements in open source computer software
license created conditions to protect economic rights in granting of public license, and thus
were enforceable under Copyright Act, since conditions governed rights to modify and
distribute computer programs and files included in downloadable software package and
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directly served to drive traffic to open source incubation page and to inform downstream
users of open source licensing collaboration project, which was significant economic goal of
copyright holder. 78
The court further reasoned that:
Copyright holder stated prima facie case of copyright infringement on allegations… for
certain materials distributed through his Internet website pursuant to open source computer
software license…competitor copied, modified, and distributed portions of software as part
of other software in violation of open source license. 79
Finally, the court concluded that a copyright owner who release his copyrighted works under
nonexclusive licenses waive his right to sue the licenses under copyright law and can sue
only for breach of contract. 80 Only when the license is limited in scope and the licensee acts
outside the scope, a licensor can sue for copyright infringement. 81
The holding in this case clearly demonstrates that the open-source license is enforceable and
can be sued for violation under either contract law or copyright law. The reasoning points
out that the economic benefits to the right holder enable his control over the future
exploitation of works and ensure his enforceability to the licensing agreement.
BusyBox Litigation
During 2007 and 2008, the Software Freedom Law Center (SFLC) launched a series of
lawsuits against various defendants with respect to copyright infringement on behalf of
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BusyBox, a software company. 82 These lawsuits mainly claimed the violations of version 2
of GNU General Public License (GPLv2). 83
In September 2007, SFLC filed the first lawsuits against Monsoon Multimedia and claimed
that Monsoon had violated the GPLv2 by incorporating the BusyBox source code in a line of
Monsoon’s products without releasing BusyBox source code. 84 This case became the first
open source case to the litigation in US. 85 However, this case did not complete the entire
procedure because the two parties settled, and Monsoon agreed to comply with the GPL and
paid a sum of money to the plaintiff. 86
The second round cases filed by SFLC was against two defendants, Xterasys Corporation
and High-Gain Antennas, LLC for the same cause of action. 87 However, both cases settled
and the two defendants agreed to comply the GPL and paid a sum of fees to the plaintiff. 88
Although the line of cases filed by SFLC did not reach the final stage and settled before
judgment, all defendants at issue finally agreed to modify their products to comply with the
GPL by BusyBox. Moreover, all defendants paid a sum of money to BusyBox which
functions like the damages. Under the circumstances, the defendants in the series of cases in
fact accept that idea that the source code released under GPL by BusyBox was enforceable,
and continuing the lawsuit may cause negative results to the defendants.
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2. Creative Commons License: Case Review
Similar to the open-source software, the judicial cases regarding the validity of CC licenses
are limited in quantity. Although the CC licenses apply to a broader range of works than
open-source software, decisive cases are limited in various jurisdictions.
Lichôdmapwa v. L'asbl Festival de Theatre de Spa
This was a Belgian case regarding a theater company liable for violating the CC BY-NC-ND
license on a musical work. The plaintiff, Belgian band Lichôdmapwa, released the song
“Abatchouck” under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 Belgium license in 2004.
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The defendant, a

theater company incorporated 20 seconds of the entire song into an advertisement of this
company. 90 The plaintiff contacted the theater company for negotiation but failed to reach a
deal. 91 Therefore, the plaintiff sued the company for modifying the song for commercia l
advisement without making attribution to the band.
Although the theater company defended that the band was not a member of Belgia n
Collecting Society and has no rights to collect for payments, the Belgian court disagreed the
defense. 92 The court clearly recognized the validity of CC license at issue and further
confirmed that the band release music without joining the collecting society did not affect
the enforceability of the license. Based on the holding, the court awarded 4500 Euros as
damages to the plaintiff. 93
Gerlach vs. DVU
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This was a German case with respect to the enforceability of CC BY-SA 3.0 license in picture.
The plaintiff took a picture of a German politician and published it online under the CC BYSA license.

94

The DVU, a German political party, used the picture on their website without

the plaintiff's name, the license notice or any other requirement of the license. 95
Although the plaintiff sent a notice and takedown letter to the defendant, the DVU did not
react. 96 In the subsequent lawsuit, the District Court of Berlin granted the injunction because
the applicant had successfully established prima-facie evidence of authorship, the licens ing
and the breach of the license. 97
Curry v. Audax
This was a Dutch case on the violation of CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 license of Flickr photos and
was the first lawsuit that test the enforceability of CC licenses. 98 The plaintiff, Adam Curry,
posted photos onto his Flickr account under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 license. 99 The defendant, a
Dutch tabloid, reprinted four of the photos in a commercial magazine and did not include the
attribution to the plaintiff. 100 Therefore, the plaintiff sued the defendant for commercia l
exploitation of photos and lack of attribution, which violates the terms and conditions of the
BY-NC-SA license. 101
Although the defendant argued that the photos could be taken and used because they were
marked as "public" on Flickr, the Dutch court upheld the validity of the license at issue. 102
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The court held the defendant could not use any of the photos from Flickr in the future unless
under the terms of the photos' CC license or with permission from Curry. 103
3. Brief Observation
Both the open-source software and CC licenses are enforceable based on judicial practice.
According to the decisions in a line of cases, the courts in various jurisdictions generally
upheld the validity of these licenses and impose penalty over defendants who violate the
terms and conditions under open-source software or CC licenses. Defendants were either
ordered to pay the damages or cease the violation to comply with the requirement in licenses.
Under the circumstances, people are able to license their works under the framework of open
source or CC license without fearing the uncertainty of the legal status.
Since the launch of open access program, the proponents view it as a prospective model to
replace traditional copyright system. However, such assumption should be carefully
examined and supported by sufficient and reliable empirical data. In other words, the analysis
must looks into the application of open-source software and CC licenses in practice. Next
section looks into the practical application of the open access program.
D. The Road so far: Implementation of Open Access Program
1. Open-source Software
The adoption of open-source software has been more than one decade since its initia l
introduction in 1998. Generally, the licensing framework under open-source software has
been widely accepted by developers in software industry. To figure out the practical effects
of open-source software, this section analyze this issue from two aspects: the general usage
and adoption; the Android Operating System as specific working example.
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a) General usage and adoption
The widely adoption and usage of open-source software have become a major trend and a
notable phenomenon after the launch of this program. As early as 2008, the Gartner—wor ld’s
leading information technology research and advisory company—made a survey in the topic
of “User Survey Analysis: Open-Source Software, Worldwide, 2008” to determine the usage
and adoption of open-source software (OSS). 104
The survey included 274 end-user organizations across various countries and markets in Asia,
Pacific area, Europe and North America.
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According to the survey, 85% of surveyed

companies had used OSS in their business before May 2008 and the remaining 15% to
incorporate OSS into their enterprises in the following twelve months. 106
Open-source software is used as foundation to develop propriety software for commercia l
distribution, which were often protected by copyright law. The “building-block” feature is
one of the major elements that drives the popularity of OSS program. For example, the
Gartner stated that the major adoption of open-source software was to develop and enhance
the existing infrastructure components in area where the usage of OSS were most mature,
especially for software design. 107
On the other hand, open-source software as mature product lowers down the accessing costs
and offer alternative resources to meet users’ demand. According to the Gartner report, the
surveyed companies often use open-source software to replace commercially available
software when these copyrighted software were expensive and difficult to use. 108
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The Gartner survey of 2008 was more like a short introduction to indicate the popularity of
open-source software program. Two years later, the Gartner published another survey
indicated that open-source software gradually receive more positive comments from the
majority users. The survey included 547 IT leaders in organizations among 11 countries and
the goal was to determine current and future OSS adoption and usage habits. 109
According to the survey, the Gartner found that more than half of the surveyed companies
have already incorporated the OSS program into their IT strategy for companies business
rather than merely adoption of the software. 110
The adoption of open-source software does not confined to IT companies, but extend to
various industries. The Open Source Business Conference (OSBC) publishes its 2013 annual
report on the status of open-source software. 111 The 2013 report indicates that the
government takes up the largest usage of 35.1% among all industries which adopt the opensource software. 112 The remaining industries includes medical (15.2%), media (13%),
financial (8.9%), automobile (7.5%), retail (5.9), energy (4.2%), aerospace (2.2%), and other
(8.0%). 113 Needless to say, the widespread adoption among different industries demonstrates
the reliability of open-source software.
b) The Android system as an example
Open-source software has been widely adopted for distinctive purposes such as operating
system, development tools, cloud services, mobile devices, etc. Among all the applicatio ns,
the combination of operating system and mobile devices—the Android system—become the
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most outstanding application based on the OSS framework. The development and popularity
of Android system demonstrate the feasibility of open-source software in the context of
market competition.
To begin with, the Android system is primarily an operating system based on the Linux
kernel.
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Although the entire system also consists of relevant mobile devices as

supplementary hardware, the key component is the operating system which offer the basic
functions and features. 115 The Android system was first launched in 2007 and dedicated to
promoting the open standards for mobile devices. 116
The Android system, as its initial design, was to enable developers to create compelling
mobile devices that takes the advantages of the open standards without additiona l
restrictions.
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Due to this feature, Android attracts a number of mobile devices

manufacturers worldwide and triggers the development of smartphones and tablet computers.
Shortly after the launch of Android system, the first publicly available smartphone running
Android was released by HTC in 2008. 118 As of October 2012, there were approximate ly
700,000 Android apps in smartphones or tablets, which matches up with the proprietary IOS
system owned by Apple. 119 Furthermore, the global market share of Android system in
smartphone has reached 81% in the third quarter of 2013, which is the first time that Android
exceed the 80% market share. 120
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1) The Android system promote the diversity and wealth of products
As aforementioned, the Android system is operating system under the OSS framework.
Specifically, the source code for Android is available under free and OSS licens ing
framework. Although Android is developed in private setting and owned by the Google, it is
distributed with most of the source code under Apache Software License (ASL) version
2.0. 121 According to Google, the source code licensed under ASL can be integrated into
closed-source proprietary products and redistributed under a broad variety of other terms,
significantly distinguishes from the General Public License which impose restrictions on
redistribution of code. 122
Therefore, all companies and manufacturers that adopt the Android system are able to create
customized applications equally because Android does not differentiate between the phone’s
core applications and third-party application developers. 123
Since the threshold of entering Android system is so low that most of the developers are
capable of joining the process of designing new applications without fearing of any
restrictions. Under the circumstances, the total quantity of available applications based on
Android system naturally increase and the categories of applications become diversified. As
of July 2013, there were more than one million applications available for Android in the
Google Play Store. 124
Moreover, the hardware manufactures also benefit from the openness and flexibility of
Android system. Due to the open-source nature, companies like Amazon (Kindle Fire),
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Barnes ＆Nobile (Nook), Ouya, and Baidu create and release mobile devices running their
own customized version of Android. 125 As a consequence, the Android system become the
“default operating system for launching new hardware.” 126 According to data from
OpenSignal in July 2013, there were 11,868 models of Android device, numerous differe nt
screen sizes and eight Android OS versions simultaneously in use. 127
The adoption of Android system gives rise to the diversity and wealth of available apps and
devices, while this result leads to another phenomenon in the entire Android ecosystem—the
fragmentation. Based on a report in the title of “Android Fragmentation Visualized (July
2013)”, There are 11,868 distinct Android devices and 8 Android versions in use in 2013.128
Opponents to the Open-source software frequently refer to fragmentation as the major
problem to criticize the reliability of OSS. As to the Android system, the criticism remain the
same. Generally, the problem to fragmentation is that the different version of Android system
and devices significantly increase the difficulty in developing appropriate application that
can be used to be compatible with all existing Android products. The entire process of design
and modification could be extremely challenge and time-consuming. 129
This argument indeed points out the problem, but overlooks the other side of fragmenta tio n
to both developers and users. The availability of different Android products with the wide
range of prices enable a global penetration of Android system. Under the circumstances,
developers are able to design and improve application based on a wealth of users’ experiences.
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On the other hand, users are able to obtain customized products which meet their demands—
cheap or expensive, big or small, distinctive apps and functions. 130
2) Google does not receive all financial benefits
The popularity of Android system is an undeniable fact based on its usage and statistics.
Despite its adoption promotes the diversity and quantity of available products, skeptics and
opponents still argue that the Android system under the OSS framework is unsuccess ful
because the owner of Android—Google—does not recoup all financial benefits from the
exploitation.
Such argument is not without solid ground. According to Gartner analyst Michael Gartenberg,
“Ironically, in some cases Microsoft may be making more money off Android than Google
because of patent payments.” 131 Moreover, Google former SVP Andy Rubin has been
blamed for failing to establish a lucrative partnership with smartphone makers. The
Manufacturers of Android-based smartphones includes a number of companies such as LG,
HTC, Samsung, etc.
While the major beneficiary of Android-based smartphone is Samsung whose Galaxy brand
has surpassed that of Android in terms of brand recognition since 2011, Google does not
directly earn revenues from the sales of Samsung smartphones. 132
Due to the customization and improvement of Android system, non-Google applications and
services emerges and becomes popular to compete with the Google proprietary products and
services.
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For example, the Amazon Fire Operating system is a folk of Android operating system
designed and owned exclusively by Amazon for its tablet Kindle Fire. 133 The Amazon Fire
OS designs a customized user interface aims at promoting content available through Amazon
services, such as Amazon Appstore, Amazon Instant Video, Amazon MP3, and Kindle
Store. 134 Since the Fire OS is binding to applications and contents provided by Amazon, it
is not compatible with Google owned applications or products. 135 Under the circumstances,
the Amazon become a competitor to Google with respect to Android products and services.
It is true that Google does not leverage all revenues via the development of Android system.
However, the situation is largely due to its open-source nature. Since the Android system
operates under the open-source software framework, the owner of Android must give up
certain control over the system in exchange for the operation of OSS. Compared to
proprietary (closed-source) software, the ability to sidestep vender’s lock-in is one of the
major incentives to the adoption of open-source software.
Moreover, the Google employs the ASL licensing framework which further reduce its control
over Android and broaden the freedom of adopting the system. Therefore, the inability to
leverage revenues is the expenses for the diversity of products and services.
Due to the weak control of Google, the Android system takes up substantial amount of market
share and breeds a number of brands in markets of mobile devices, apps and Oss. As a result,
consumers have sufficient options and benefits from the competence among differe nt
companies. This approach has lowered down the average selling prices of a smartphone to

133
134
135

Fire OS, WIKIP EDIA , available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire_OS (last visited 1/14/2014).
Id.
Id.
181

$377 worldwide in 2013, which decrease 13% from 2012. 136 It is estimated that the average
prices should drop to $265 globally by 2017. 137
As a matter of fact, Google began to sell its Nexus devices—smartphone and tablet—since
2010. 138 Although the sales of Google mobile devices did not have substantial impact over
the smartphone market for the past four years, Google emphasizes that the purpose is to:
Show what an all-Google user experience would like and to inspire Android makers and
developers to make better phones, tablets and Android apps…The Nexus line is a hedge
against indifference, it sends a message to manufacturers that if they can’t develop
competitive Android products, we will on our own. 139
Obviously, Google does not rely on their smartphone and tablet as the major products for
revenue, but to push Android adopters to enhance and refine the system.
2. Creative Commons Licenses: the Case Study
a) Scope of research
Unlike the open-source software program, the creative commons licenses cover a wide range
of works for licensing. Due to the variety of licensed works, the adoption of CC licenses
includes various areas such as education, photography, software design, and scientific
research. Before the analysis of specific cases, the standard of sample should be clarified to
ensure the final quality of analysis.
According to the statistics from the Creative Commons database, there are currently 402
cases with respect to works licensed under the CC licenses. 140 Despite the wealth of specific

136

M att Hamblen, Google’s Nexus Lineup may not sell well, but still challenges Android makers, COMP UERTWORLD , available at:
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9244477/Google_s_Nexus_lineup_may_not_sell_well_but_still_challenges_Android_m
akers_ (last visited 1/14/2014).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Case Studies, CREATIVE COMMONS, available at http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Case_Studies (last visited 1/17/2014).
182

cases in the database, the Creative Commons organization admits that the cases in database
are from different domains and the quality of these cases still need to be evaluated. 141
The cases in databases are divided into five categories based on the quality of each cases
such as A-Class; B-Class; C-Class; Start; and Stub.
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On the basis of the description, cases

under A-Class are:
1) Contains a concise and complete description of the use in well-written prose;
2) Explains the novelty or importance of the use-case;
3) Has complete information;
4) Would be worthy of being featured elsewhere on the web. 143
So far, only 21 of the total 38 A-Class cases are of high importance. The description of high
importance cases shows:
1) The Case Study represents a highly successful and novel use case which illustrates the
power of CC licensing;
2) Is a Case Study of a very recognizable brand;
3) The site or platform using CC licensing is highly trafficked;
4) For platforms or sites, the Case Study reports a very large volume of work or a community
of users. 144
Therefore, this section concentrates on specific cases under this category (A-Class ＆ High
importance) in order to ensure the quality of analysis. Due to the diversity of sample cases,
the study focuses on cases which are mostly related to copyright creation. In other words, the
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adoption of CC licenses in these cases displays an alternative option to traditional copyright
production and distribution mechanism.
b) Case Study: CC licenses in music industry
The Beatpick
The Beatpick is a “fairplay” music that feature a wide range of music worldwide and release
these music under a CC BY-NC-SA license (Attribution-Noncommercial-ShareAlike). 145
As of October 2007, Beatpick represents around 120 artists with over 3,000 music tracks.146
The Beatpick labels itself as “fairplay” music in three aspects. First of all, the public are able
to try the music before purchase and can download high quality music in low prices. 147
Secondly, the Beatpick provides quick and easy access to licensing contract and a flexib le
licensing mechanism to specific requirement. 148 Lastly, the Beatpick offers nonexclusive
agreement to musicians that can be terminated anytime and split the revenues in 50/50 with
signed musicians. 149
According to the founder of Beatpick, the reason to choose CC license is:
It balances the need to make a living with the need for advertisement. It helps to get your
music noticed via sharing, remixing, and use in non-commercial projects without losing the
possibility to earn money from people that are willing to pay for your music. 150
Nine Inch Nails
In addition to the online music platform, individual band also employ CC licenses as a
strategy to promote their music to the public. The American band Nine Inch Nails (NIN)
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released “The Slip”, a ten-track album, to its fans for free under a CC BY-NC-SA license. 151
NIN actively encourages its fans redistribute and remix the ten soundtrack with DRM-free
files in the album. 152
The releasing of “The Slip” under the CC license gives rise active feedback from the public,
or at least the fans group. It is reported that the “Ghosts I-IV”, another album made by Nine
Inch Nail, was sold out in just two days for the $300 deluxe version. 153 The majority of
buyers were the fans and the band actually earned $750,000 in a couple of days with the total
2,500 copies. 154
Jonathan Coulton
Jonathan Coulton is an unsigned single musician who employ the CC licenses as instrume nt
to release his music in order to figure out whether he could make a living as an independent
musician. 155 He adopt the CC BY-NC license (Attribution-Noncommercial) to release all
his music for free downloading as well as for streaming. 156 Because of the nature of this
license, his fans are able to remix and add content to music on the website. 157
Although most songs on the website are free to download and stream, people are still able to
purchase a single sound track in either MP3 version or FLAC format for $1 or an entire album
from $3-$10. 158 In addition to MP3 version or full quality FLAC format, consumers are also
able to choose the open OGG format, CDs, Ringtones, and Karate version when they
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purchase music from the website. 159 To broaden the revenue channel, Jonathan also sell Tshirts, visual books, and card games along with music. 160
The driving force underlying Jonathan’s strategy, based on his own words, are “I give away
music because I want to make music, and I can’t make music unless I make money, and I
won’t make any money unless I get heard, and I won’t get heard unless I give away music. ” 161
In other words, the revenue of music is as important as the creation of music to Jonathan
Coulton. Therefore, his business model fails if he are unable to sustain his music creation
with sufficient revenues.
According to an interview in 2008 via email, Jonathan stated that 45% of his income in 2007
came from the paid digital downloads. 162 If his statement is reliable, the result indicated that
his approach of managing personal music online is accepted by consumers and music
creation by CC licenses is sustainable. Furthermore, the Planet Money team at NPR reported
that he made half a million dollars in 2010. 163 Considering he manages his music without
relying on record labels, the revenues he earned have substantial impact on the traditio na l
music production and distribution.
c) The Observation
The three notable cases for the adoption of CC licenses are all in the area of music creation
and licensing. Hence, the study of these cases is inspiring in terms of online music
management.
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In general, the music production and distribution largely rely on big record labels. The
majority of music online are proprietary works to the record labels and under the protection
of copyright law. Under the circumstances, the adoption of CC licenses in fact establishes an
alternative route for musicians to manage their online music licensing under a flexib le
mechanism.
A flexible licensing mechanism is the critical component to a successful online licens ing.
The flexibility not only requires a convenient accessing system, but also sufficient works
with flexible pricing mechanism. Basically, copyright holders who license their works under
copyright system are generally unable to establish the flexibility because of the exclusive
rights on specific works.
The open access program, to the contrary, is more appropriate to individual creators who
does not work closely with the music industry. Specifically, the adoption of CC licenses in
music indeed create several successful examples regarding the independent management of
music.
Both the Nine Inch Nails and Jonathan Coulton employ the CC licenses to license their music
and meanwhile still make a living through the process. By releasing music for free, they
successfully attract the public attention because of the unique strategy in area of music
licensing. For one, giving away proprietary musical work by famous band like Nine Inch
Nails receive positive feedback from fans. As the payoff, their fans contribute the sales of
paid music made by the band.
For another, independent musician like Jonathan Coulton become well-known to music fans
on the internet and establish his own fans group by increasingly offering free music. As a
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result, his fans forge the stable revenue channel and are willing to pay for the music and other
peripherals.
Despite the prospective landscape, CC licenses in music area does not amount to ultimate
success. Compared to the mainstream music industry, the two successful examples are more
like the exception. Major record labels usually invest a lot in production, distributio n,
marketing, and advertisement of music. Therefore, the management of music under CC
licenses is far from a substitution to the mainstream music industry, but simply provides an
alternative route to supplement the creation and licensing of online music.
E. Concluding remark
The cooperative model via open access program enables the cooperation between copyright
holders and online users. Unlike the righter-holder-centric model which creates tension
between the two parties, the open access program explores an alternative path for flexib le
licensing mechanism and copyright creation.
The open access program provides substantial benefits to online users by free access to works
under less restricted licensing agreements. Because of the feature, online users are willing to
embrace the program and support the cooperative model.
On the other hand, copyright holders still enjoy benefits even though they release works for
free and employ weak control with respect to the distribution. The licensing framework
outside copyright regulation enables them to create, distribute, and improve creative works
with less difficulty in negotiation and accessing to proprietary works. The “building block”
for copyright creation are much easier to acquire and the costs of creation are significa ntly
reduced.
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Moreover, individual creators are able to explore a new route to promote their professiona l
career with more freedom by sidestepping the content industry. In other words, the program
establishes a supplementary mechanism to copyright creation and distribution without
relying on copyright industry. Under the circumstances, copyright holders are able to employ
flexible business models to attract consumers and increase the diversity and quantity of
creative works.
The open access program indeed establishes an alternative option to copyright creation and
licensing in online environment. The strengths of this program are self-evident and the
proponents view it as a prospective model to eventually replace traditional licens ing
mechanism under righter-holder-centric model.
However, the limited quantity of successful examples under open access program are more
like the exception compared to the mainstream of copyright creation and licensing. The lack
of sufficient empirical data weakens the reliability of this program. Compared to mainstrea m
copyright creation and licensing, the open access program is a supplementary strategy to
copyright holders. Therefore, the open access program cannot replace the right-holder-centr ic
model.
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Chapter VI Analysis of Two Models
The advance of digital technology brings about both benefits and challenges to
the development of copyright system. On the one hand, digital technology
facilitates the production and distribution of copyrighted works. On the other hand,
online piracy has become the major threat to copyright enforcement in the digita l
age.
By the same token, the revolutionary online environment breeds two models of
copyright enforcement and management: the right-holder-centric model and the
cooperative model. Simply put, each model includes two working examples
which reflects the interaction between copyright holders and other copyright
participants such as the ISPs and online users. On the other hand, both models are
the products largely due to the digital technology and display the general features
of current online copyright enforcement and management.
To begin with, the right-holder-centric model is generally the mainstream model
under the copyright system. The term “right- holder-centric” points out the fact
that this model concentrates on the copyright holders and takes their interests as
priority considerations.
Because of the strong preference to the copyright holders, this model also builds
upon solid grounds under the copyright system. Both natural rights theory and
utilitarian rationales confirm the importance of copyright holders in copyright
realm.

1

1

Furthermore,

the copyright legislative

See generally Part One Section A, 1.
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history demonstrates that

copyright holders have been the major consideration under the copyright system
for a long period. 2 Under the circumstances, the right-holder-centric model
essentially echoes the fundamental elements of copyright system and should be
the most appropriate enforcement option to copyright holders.
The reality, to the contrary, is opposing to the expectation of copyright holders.
The implementation of right-holder-centric model, however, indicates the model
contains certain side effects with respect to copyright

enforcement

and

management. In other words, although this model seems to perfectly comply with
the mainstream copyright system, it is not flawless with respect to its online
practice.
For example, suppose you are a musician who has made several popular songs.
To increase your fame and popularity, you determine to license your works
through the Internet so as to make yourself widely known. Shortly after your
decision, music fans are able to access your musical works through online
licensing and your reputation successfully raise up due to the widespread access.
On the other hand, unauthorized distribution of your musical works substantia lly
bother you and become the major threat to your legitimate licensing. To cure the
undesirable result, you have basically two options. For one, you employ digita l
technology to prevent unauthorized access to your music by means of encryption.
For another, you rely on copyright law enforcement to pursue illegal websites that
distribute your music as well as individual online infringers. Unfortunate ly,

2

See generally Part One Section A, 2: the US copyright legislative history.
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neither the digital encryption nor the law enforcement fully satisfy your objective
regarding copyright enforcement and protection against piracy.
As a matter of fact, practical experiences indicate side effects in the course of
implementation of the right-holder-centric model. The private implementa tio n
through digital technology does not entirely prevent copyright infringement and
piracy because of the technology weakness. Furthermore, users’ experience are
adversely affected by the digital encryption.
To make matter worse, copyright law enforcement has the tendency to be
employed by copyright holders on inappropriate targets with disproportiona l
punishment. This is especially obvious when copyright holders bring massive
actions against individual infringers with statutory damages as remedy. As a
consequence, the undesirable experiences of the right-holder-centric model
becomes the first driving force to the emergence of the cooperative model.
Accordingly,

copyright

holders seek to alternative

option for copyright

enforcement that better adapt to the online environment. By working closely with
Internet service providers, copyright holders establish the graduated responses
system which requires the cooperation between copyright holders and ISPs for
copyright enforcement.
The second driving force, on the other hand, comes from the opposition to the
property-like control on copyrighted works. One representative scholar, Lawrence
Lessig, argues the importance of free culture and commons in the copyright world
and criticizes the inappropriate expansion of property rational in copyright
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system. 3 The unconventional argument by Lessig directly supports the opensource software program and promotes the foundation of creative commons
license project, which consists of the open access program as the second type of
cooperative model.
Since the cooperative model operates in two different tracks, this model in fact
contributes to two directions. The first direction concentrates on copyright
enforcement through the cooperation between copyright holders and the ISPs
under the graduated responses system. This is aiming at a more efficie nt
enforcement strategy than those under the right-holder-centric model. By
implementing a flexible and user-friendly strategy, and meanwhile broaden the
stakeholders group, the cooperative model designs to avoid the side effects from
right-holder-centric model.
The second direction, by contrast, focuses on an alternative licensing scheme
compared to traditional copyright licensing. Specifically, the open access program
as a cooperative model requires copyright holders to license their copyrighted
works outside copyright system with less restriction, and enable ordinary users to
access the works at low costs. Because the alternative licensing scheme provides
flexible mechanism to both copyright holders and ordinary users, it serves as
supplementary choice in terms of the creation and licensing of copyright works.
In a word, the cooperative model establishes a cooperative partnership between
copyright holders and other participants such as ISPs or ordinary users. Under the
3

LAWRENCE LESSIG , FREE CULTURE : HOW BIG M EDIA USES T ECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
268-271, Penguin Press (2004).
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AND CONTROL CREATIVITY,

circumstance,
centralized

the decentralized

feature is greatly distinguished

from the

right-holder-centric model. Rather than concentrating on only

copyright holders, the cooperative model essentially indicates a general trend of
copyright enforcement and management: establishing cooperation to benefit
multiple participants in order to increase the efficiency of copyright enforceme nt
and management.
Despite the two models share different features and build upon different grounds,
the focal point lies in the effects of each models in online environment.
Specifically, three questions are critical as to the operation of each model:
1) whether this model improves the copyright enforcement, especially curtailing
online piracy
2) whether this model is appropriate to manage copyrighted works, especially on
the licensing of copyrighted works and the sustainability of copyright creation;
3) The third question bases on the first two: whether there is one optimal model
that can substitute the other, or how should one model interacts with the other.
The above questions constitute a deep level of analysis and the answers to the
questions generally determines the conclusion of two models. By referring to
empirical data and evidence from practical experiences, this chapter seeks to
conclude general features of each model and rejects the temptation of a simple
and straightforward conclusion.
In summary, both the right-holder-centric model and the cooperative model are
existing models to copyright enforcement and management. At present, two
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models represents two sets of perceptions and strategies. Therefore, the
coexistence of both models currently should be an appropriate choice to all
copyright participants as well as the entire copyright system.
Part One General Observation of two Models
A. Right-holder-centric Model Accords with Mainstream Copyright Theory
and Legislative History
Generally, the right-holder-centric model complies with the mainstream aspects
of copyright system and is the major enforcement choice to copyright holders.
Simply put, the reason of its popularity lies in its strong correlation to both
copyright theory as well as the copyright legislative history, which primar ily
serves the interest of copyright holders and give them prior consideration. In other
words, the two aspects constitute the solid background underlying the rightholder-centric model. This section briefly describes the two aspects.
1. Right-holder-centric Model Accords With Major Copyright Conceptions :
A Brief Revisit
John Locke’s Labor Theory: Copyright holder is entitled to Reward
As far as copyright theories are concerned, the theory under natural rights
perspective is highly influential to the development of the copyright system.
Among different theories, the labor theory by John Locke are mostly relevant to
the construction of modern copyright system. By emphasizing the necessity to
reward an author who create intellectual work, the labor theory essentially justifies
the existence of right-holder-centric model.
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Although Locke’s labor theory primarily focuses on physical property such as the
land, it does not follow that intangible intellectual products like copyrighted works
fail to fit into the doctrinal structure. The discrepancy between tangible assets and
intangible intellectual products does not deny an author’s right to “reap the fruits
of their creations” and “to obtain rewards for their contributions to society”. 4
Locke reasoned that a person has natural right to his body and owning of body
extents to the labor of one’s body, which eventually cover the fruits of his labor. 5
For instance, imagine Steve plans to cultivate corns in his backyard and uses a
hoe to cover the seeds with soil. Based on the Labor Theory, Steve has natural
right in the hoe because the hoe is his body extension. When Steve successfully
cultivate the corns in his backyard, he is entitled to receive the corns because these
are the fruits of his labor. Under the circumstances, Steve is able to determine the
use of the corns at his will without intervention from their parties.
By the same token, an author is able to control his copyrighted works as long as
the work is his fruit of intellectual labor. Incorporating the Locke’s argument into
copyright, a copyright holder who create a given work should have the right to
control the use of that work. Moreover, since the copyright holder makes
contribution to society by creation, he should be entitled to obtain a reward
equivalent to the value of his contribution. 6
The labor theory under natural rights conception emphasizes the rewards and

4
5
6

CRAIG JOYCE ET AL ., COP YRIGHT LAW, §1.06 (9th ed. 2013).
See J. LOCKE , SECOND T REATISE OF GOVERNMENT, Ch.5 (1690).
See Joyce supra note 4, at 58.
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compensation to labor by an individual. In the context of copyright creation,
Locke’s argument in tangible assets implies the importance of compensation to
the contribution made by authors.
In other words, so long as an author has the valid copyright and his work is under
distribution, he is entitled to obtain the reward through the use of copyrighted
works. In reality, such assumption is generally accepted and upheld by almost
every copyright holders. ,
Because copyright holders are willing to employ enforcement strategy that best
satisfy their demands of sufficient rewards, the right-holder-centric model become
their prior option with respect to copyright enforcement. Concentrating on the
interests of copyright holders and requiring compensation to them, this model
accords with the basic principle of labor theory. Under the circumstances, the
right-holder-centric model is supported by solid theory.
To be sure, the Locke’s labor theory does not end on this argument and actually
includes the discussion of the boundaries of labor and entitlement which limits the
extension of individual’s rights. For example, the Locke’s three provisos
respectively explains the restriction on the personal property claims to the public
commons. 7 However, this does not contradict the correlation between the rightholder-centric model and the labor theory. To copyright holders, the labor theory
justifies the operation of this model and enable them to maximize their interests
in the course of copyright enforcement.
7

For a detailed analysis of Locke’s provisos, see ROBERT P. M ERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROP ERTY, 49-67,
Harvard University Press (2011).
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As a matter of fact, the labor theory merely establishes partial foundation to the
right-holder-centric model in theoretical aspect. The second important conceptual
foundation, the utilitarian conception, reinforces the justification of the rightholder-centric model.
Utilitarian Rationale: the incentive analysis
Unlike the labor theory from natural rights perspective, the utilitarian rationale
premises on economic analysis, especially the incentive analysis. This kind of
conception is extraordinarily popular and dominant in the US jurisdiction where
the judicial opinion by US Supreme Court held that:
“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author ’s
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic
creativity for the public good.”8
The incentive analysis lies in the recognition of intellectual property as “public
goods” and the fear of incapability that a copyright holder cannot recoup the
reward through transaction. 9 Specially, a copyrighted work cannot be used up and
can be equally used by a large number of people. 10 Lacking of appropriate
incentive mechanism, there is a risk that copyrighted works would be produced
and distributed below optimal level. 11
To solve the problem, one solution is to grant market power to copyright holders
so than they can sidestep the undesirable result of public goods. The U.S.

8

Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
See generally RAJSHREE CHANDRA , KNOWLEDGE AS PROP ERTY, Oxford University Press 93-95 (2010).
10 See Joyce supra note 4, at 55.
11 Id.
198
9

copyright law thus employ this solution by granting a limited monopoly power to
copyright holders in order to ensure they have sufficient incentives for creation.

12

The power of monopoly and the granting of exclusionary rights enable copyright
holders to control their works more effectively and enhance their capability to
obtain revenues from their copyrighted works. Under the monopoly setting, a
copyright holder is the only person who hold the right to a given work. All the
exploitation of that work by other persons should be permitted by the copyright
holder. Therefore, the utilitarian conception accords with the right-holder-centr ic
model by underlying the interests of copyright holders.
Although the utilitarian rationale also focuses on other considerations such as the
public welfare, the consideration of incentives alone is sufficient to justify the
establishment of the right-holder-centric model. Specifically,

the incentive

analysis functions as the premise to other specific objectives such as deterring
online piracy, compensating copyright holders, and promoting the distribution of
copyrighted works. All these objectives under the right-holder-centric model
ultimately converge into one focal point—ensuring sufficient incentives to
copyright holders.
By complying with the arguments for copyright holders in both conceptions, the
right-holder-centric model further strengthens the stance of copyright holder
under its framework. As a consequence, the right-holder-centric model is widely
accepted and upheld by copyright holders.
12

This idea is generally expressed and upheld by Art. 1, §8 of US Constitution, available at
http://copyright.gov/title17/92preface.pdf (last visited 7/2/2014).
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To be sure, both the labor theory and utilitarian rational include a wealth of
theoretical discussions and development. The right-holder-centric model merely
echoes the narrow perception of the rewards and the incentive analysis. Despite
the limited theoretical support, the right-holder-centric model is operating with
solid theoretical foundation and justified

under the mainstream copyright

perceptions.
2. Right-Holder-Centric Model accords with copyright legislative history
In addition to theoretical foundation, the right-holder-centric model is supported
by copyright legislative history. Specifically, the legislative history of the U.S.
copyright law implies that the right-holder-centric model echoes the developme nt
of the US copyright legislation.
Copyright law primarily serves to achieve the copyright policy by striking the
balance between copyright holders and the public. The legislative history of the
US copyright law, however, indicates that copyright law gradually favors of
copyright holders than the public by expanding the exclusive rights. One highprofile example is the extension of copyright duration and the change of notice
formality through multiple copyright enactment and modification in the US
legislative history.
The first U.S. copyright law, the 1790 Act, provided that federal copyright law
only last for fourteen years with an optional renewal for another fourteen years. 13
Based on the provision, a copyright holder waives the exclusive control on his

13

See Joyce supra note 4, at 323.
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works after 14 years if he does not renew the copyright, resulting in his work falls
into the public domain. In other words, the public at most need to wait for twentyeight years to freely access to a given work. Under the circumstances, the public
was generally easy to access copyrighted works under the statute.
Following the 1790 Act, the 1831 Copyright Act extended the initial copyright
duration to twenty-eight years and retained the fourteen years renewal. 14 Under
the 1909 Act, the U.S. Congress extended the renewal duration to twenty-eight
years with a total fifty-six years of copyright duration. 15
For over a hundred years from 1790 to 1909, the US copyright law did not display
a significant trend of favoring copyright holders by the expansion of copyright
duration. After all, the copyright duration merely doubled during one century.
However, the U.S. Congress had accelerated the trend of favoring copyright
holders through copyright duration extension for the past decades.
In 1976, the Congress extended all existing copyright by nineteen years. 16
Twenty-two years later in 1998, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
provided that the existing and future copyright duration both extended by another
twenty years. 17 As to the current copyright law, the statute provides a basic
copyright duration of author’s life time plus 70 years to individual author or
authors of joint work. 18 To anonymous and pseudonymous works, the duration is
120 years from the year of creation or 95 years after its first publication.
14
15
16
17
18

Id.
Id.
See Lawrence Lessig supra note 3, at 134.
Id.
17 U.S.C.A §302.
201

In addition to the extension of copyright duration, the change of notice formality
essentially facilitates the expansion of copyright as well. For works published
before March 1. 1989, the lack of notice may leads to the works falls into the
public domain. 19
As to works published on or after March 1. 1989, the lack of notice may allow the
reduction in amount of statutory damages for innocent infringer defense. 20 In
other words, copyright to most contemporary copyright holders is generally
secured and certain, especially those who create and distribute their works through
the Internet. Because copyrighted works now are not easily fall into the public
domain, online users must seek for legitimate licensing from copyright holders.
Accordingly, copyright law essentially favors copyright holders through the
legislative process.
In a word, the right-holder-centric model is a working example to copyright
enforcement which is related to the mainstream copyright system. For one, the
right-holder-centric model focuses on the interests of copyright holders and tends
to omit the demands of other parties under copyright system.
For another, the copyright conceptions and legislative history reinforce the stance
of copyright holder respectively. By according with the mainstream perspectives
of copyright system, the right-holder-centric model is widely accepted by most
copyright holders as the optimal enforcement option.
To be sure, copyright policies do not focus on copyright holders’ benefits at the
19
20

See§§10 19 of 1909 Act; see also§§104A 405(a) of 1976 Act.
See§§401(d) 402(d) of 1976 Act.
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expense of that of the public. Rather, the necessary balance between copyright
holders and the public is the focal point of the copyright theories as well as
copyright law. Accordingly, the right-holder-centric model has an inherent defect
which omits the demands of other copyright participants such as ISPs or online
users. As a consequence, the implementation of this model in practice is highly
possible to the extreme due to the imbalance of structure design.
B. Cooperative Model has Two Tracks
Distinguished from the single-track right-holder-centric model which mainly
designs for copyright enforcement, the cooperative model in fact operates in a
two-track frameworks. In other words, the cooperative model operates under two
distinctive directions.
First and foremost, the first track under the cooperative model accords with rightholder-centric model, which still concentrates on copyright enforcement. The
difference lies in that the cooperative model promote online

copyright

enforcement by establishing a cooperative partnership between copyright holders
and the ISPs. Currently, the graduated responses system is the major enforceme nt
strategy under the cooperative model.
The second track, by contrast, departs from the copyright enforcement but focuses
on copyright management, primarily on the copyright licensing and creation of
works in an unconventional setting. The example under cooperative model is the
open access program, which establishes the cooperation between copyright
holders and ordinary users.
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Distinguished from traditional perception and regulation, the open access program
requires the copyright holders to license copyrighted works with fewer restrictio ns
to ordinary users outside copyright system. Put another way, the new licens ing
mechanism gives away exclusive rights to some extent and weaken the exclusive
control on copyrighted works.
On the other hand, ordinary users are able to access copyrighted works under a
more flexible licensing mechanism, which in turn creates the opportunity for them
to make customized works without regard to copyright industry. So long as they
comply with the licensing agreement, they are able to employ the works as
“building block” of their creation.
1. Cooperative Model on Copyright Enforcement: the feasible cooperation
As aforementioned, the graduated responses system is the example of first track
cooperative model and primarily designs for copyright enforcement. Accordingly,
the focal point of the first cooperative model lies in the cooperation between
copyright holders and ISPs.
To begin with, the cooperative partnership is the premise and indispensab le
component to the cooperative model. To both parties, the cooperation is feasible
and provides substantial benefits. The graduated responses system, as the
exemplary enforcement option, demonstrates the feasibility of cooperation.
a) The Query
To the very beginning, the cooperation through the graduated responses system is
not widely accepted by all parties. To the contrary, civil liberties groups, academic
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commentators and ordinary users’ advocates rejected and cast doubt on the
cooperation under copyright holders and ISPs in online environment. 21
Specifically, the major concern turns to whether ISPs have sufficient incentives to
actively monitor their subscribers and filter illegal contents. The opponents may
argue that ISPs merely provides online services to subscribers and do not enjoy
the monopoly granted by copyright law. Even though an ISP are willing to
participate in the process, the ISP may be overwhelmed by the side effects and
substantial administrative costs. 22
Therefore, it is unwisely to assume that ISPs would invest to the same level as
copyright holders in the course of enforcement.
Moreover, the opponents may argue that such enforcement strategy would not
achieve its objective because the two parties share different incentives which often
are difficult to compromise and converge into a whole. Under the circumstances,
the distinction of their incentives implies that the establishment of a cooperative
system is infeasible.
In addition, ISPs rely on revenues to sustain their online business. To operate their
online services, they must take financial channels into consideration. In general,
revenues to ISPs comes from two channels. The first channel is consisted of the
payment from subscribers. Simply put, the subscription fees provides ISPs with
financial support. Secondly, the revenues from advertising constitute the other
major channel to uphold the management of ISPs. For both perspectives,
21
22

Peter K Yu, the Graduated Responses, 62 FLA . L. REV. 1373, at 1374 (2010).
Id., at 1391.
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opponents cast doubt on the feasibility of ISPs’ cooperation.
As aforementioned, ISPs are a group of network intermediaries which provide
their subscribers or online users with a variety of services. For our analysis, the
ISPs can be divided into two major categories: the network establishing providers
such as AT&T, Comcast, and Verizon which builds the infrastructure of network
framework; the other is the application providers such as Google, YouTube, and
Facebook which provides services on the Internet. 23 The first category usually
pay highly attention to the contents on their network because accessing to creative
contents draw a large quantity of users to subscribe their services which basically
equals to revenues. 24 As a matter of fact, the diversity of live streaming movies,
TV series and music attract subscribers to pay for high-speed broadband services.
On the other hand, the application ISPs receive revenues through advertiseme nt
posted on their web space. To achieve such purpose they need high volume of
creative contents on their websites in order to attract a great number of viewing
by online users. Therefore, both types of ISPs share the same feature which
demands large volume of contents accessible on their websites.
Under the circumstances, opponents may argue that both types of ISPs would not
automatically take copyright issues into consideration. Because ISPs rely on
subscription and the advertising to obtain revenues, employing enforceme nt
system that requires actively monitors the subscribers may adversely their online

23

Int’l Fed’n Phonographic Indus, Digital Music Report 2009: New Business Models for a Changing

Environment 4, at 19-24 (2009).
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business. 25 Due to the unfriendly experiences, online users may reject the
subscription or use on a given ISP, which eventually affects the revenue channels.
To make matter worse, the inherent technology under graduated responses system
may raise the concern to privacy of ordinary users. For example, the deep packet
inspection (DPI) allows ISPs to monitor and even control the information flow
through their networks with greater precision. 26 Concerning the danger of
personal privacy, subscribers have to unsubscribe from ISPs and switch to other
platforms. Under the circumstances, ISPs burden the losses of losing subscribers.
To be sure, the query and arguments to the cooperation under graduated responses
system are not groundless. Unlike copyright holders who are usually aggressive
on copyright enforcement, ISPs are more concern on their online business. It is
unreasonable to assume that the ISPs weigh the copyright protection heavily over
the revenues. ISPs may choose to opt out the graduated responses system in order
to maintain their subscribers. Therefore, the distinction on priority between ISPs
and copyright holders become the most persuasive counterargument to the
cooperative partnership.
b) Feasibility of Cooperation
Despite the counterarguments from opponents, the graduated responses system
works to establish the cooperation. In general, the joint economic benefits and the
enforcement costs are two primary driving forces to uphold the feasibility of

25

See Peter supra note 21, at 1392.
Ralf Brendrath, the End of the Net as we know it? Deep Packet Inspection and Internet Governance, SSRN,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1653259 (last visited 7/13/2014).
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cooperation.
1) Joint economic benefits
The joint economic benefits comes from the evolving online environment and the
demand for alternative

online

business.

Online business was undergone

development at the early stage of Internet development. Copyright holders did not
realize the lucrative opportunity to license copyrighted works. In other words, the
strengths of online market were not fully realized by copyright holders.
With the emergence of high-speed broadband and wireless access, online business
evolves to new stage. Ordinary users are able to consume digital products cheaper
and more convenient than before. ISPs provide diversified online service and
gradually become indispensable in distributing creative contents. 27 Many ISPs
recognize this lucrative opportunity and seek for licensing from copyright holders.
This approach gradually tie the interests of two parties together.
For example, the Comcast purchased NBC Universal and acquired substantia l
copyrighted works to enhance the value of its service. 28 The Google, as famous
search engine, announced to open up its creative programming on YouTube in
2011. 29 By collaborating with copyright holders, ISPs obtain authorizatio n
without the risk of liability.
Meanwhile, the wealth of creative contents and convenient access make ISPs

27
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more attractive for ordinary users to the subscription. For instances, the Apple
iTunes sold more than 70 million songs during its first year of online music
service. 30 The successful was largely due to its highly flexible and competitive
“pay-per-use” business model.
With the development of online business, both parties bridge the gap of their
competing incentives by discovering aligning ones—the joint economic benefits.
Generally, copyright holders seek to maximize their revenues through distributio n
of copyrighted works, while ISPs strive to attract more users for subscriptio n.
Simply put, distinctive paths of pursuing generate different economic returns.
Based on the assumption, it is true that both parties are less likely to constitute the
cooperation.
Online business, however, combines their incentives into a unified entity. Under
the circumstances, ISPs not only provide access of creative contents to their
subscribers, but become the stakeholders to copyright holders.
To maximize the revenues and minimize the costs, the ISPs must prevent
undesirable free-riding and encourage subscription to their services. ISPs have to
actively monitor their websites to ensure all the works are accessed under
subscription. Therefore, the argument that the cooperation between ISPs and
copyright holders lacks of reliable economic support is neither convincing nor
persuasive.
On the other hand, copyright holders are encouraged to license their works to
30 John M arkoff, Apple Sells 70 Million Songs in First Year of iTunes Service, N.Y. T IMES, Apr. 29th 2004, at C10,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/29/technology/29apple.html (last visited 7/8/2013).
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different ISPs. To defeat other ISPs in online market, ISPs need to obtain licens ing
from copyright holders as many as possible. Such situation gives copyright
holders a relatively advantageous market position in the process of licens ing
negotiation. Copyright holders, especially the content industry, can expect a better
deal from the licensing agreement.
2) enforcement costs
The joint economic benefits are able to account for the cooperation from one
perspective. Given that some copyright holders still insist on traditional licens ing
mechanism, joint economic benefits do not offer them sufficient incentives.
Accordingly, the graduated responses system provides incentives from the second
aspect—the enforcement costs.
Under the copyright system, the costs to copyright holders normally include the
costs of creation and enforcement costs. The costs of creation are ex ante costs
which can be calculated and controlled. With advanced digital technology,
copyright holders are able to lower down the costs of creation in exchange for
revenues through digitization. 31
The enforcement costs, on the other hand, are more complicated to internalize.
Basically, the enforcement costs refer to the costs to discourage and exclude freeriding through identification of infringers and the deterrence to infringement. To
deter piracy, copyright holders have to balance two aspects in their enforcement:
the identification of infringers, and the efficient deterrence.
31 Olivier Bomsel & Heritiana Ravaivoson, Decreasing Copyright Enforcement Costs: The Scope of a Graduated
Response, 6 REV. OF ECON . RES. ON COP YRIGHT Issues 13, 13-6 (2009).
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The sanctions by copyright litigations generate sufficient deterrence to infringe rs.
The rationale lies in that the penalty of litigation is severe enough to infringers so
as to discourage piracy. Such rationale is especially to infringements occurs in the
pre-digital age.
Over the last decade, this option generated heavy burdens to copyright holders.
Every online user is a potential infringer and the costs to identify infringers are
formidably expensive. For example, the French law sets up the costs to identify a
single internet subscriber at €8.5. 32 The TMG, a French mandated technology
company for detection, reports to daily detect over 50,000 infringements in France,
which means copyright owners need to pay €425,000 to obtain the identity. 33
Even though copyright holders are able to afford the costs of detection, the costs
of litigation prevent them from massive lawsuits. The litigation costs to copyright
lawsuits in the US federal courts are expensive for copyright holders to internalize.
According to a 2003 American Intellectual Property Law Association’s economic
survey, a low-stake case costs $101,000 through discovery and $249,000 on trial
and appeal. To a high-stake case, the figure amounts to $501,000 on discovery
and $950,000 through trial and appeal. 34
Obviously, the costs to search and identify online infringement become the first
barriers to copyright holders. However, copyright holders gradually equip with
state of the art technology on identification. The filtering technology incorporates
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digital tags or watermarks into digitized contents. Copyright holders are able to
locate these contents and analyze whether they are being distributed without
authorization. 35 For instances, the Comcast implement automated filtering in
their network to identify infringing works. 36
Filtering technology enables copyright holders to save substantial costs to locate
infringement. The graduated response system, by the same token, shares the
identical technological feature. Such system imposes certain duty on ISPs which
require them to actively monitor the actions of their subscribers, identifying and
filtering illegal file-sharing contents, and sending notice to infringing users.
Therefore, ISPs become stakeholders in the course of copyright enforcement.
ISPs are generally in a better position to supervise their networks because of the
advanced technology. The filtering technology have evolved to a sophistica ted
level and provides the ISPs with the capability to monitor and control personal
data of the subscribers. 37 For example, the Apple iPhone limits a user to install
software or programs purchased from Apple’s online store. These software or
programs are subject to the centralized control and Apple has the capability to
access information of their users through their online network. 38
Under the graduated responses system, copyright holders shift the burden to ISPs
on monitoring infringing actions of their subscribers. By sharing the duty with

35 M ichael Sawyer, Filters, Fair use, and Feedback: Generated Content Principles and the DMCA, 24 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 363, 383 (2009).
36 Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89
OR. L. REV. 81, 112 (2010).
37 Paul Ohm, the Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL . L. REV. 1417, 1432 (2009).
38 Timothy B. Lee, How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love the App Store, A RS T ECHNICA , available at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/10/the-iconstitution-how-to-protect-user-freedom-in-an-app-store-world/
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ISPs, copyright holders bear fewer costs in the course of copyright enforceme nt.
Therefore, copyright holders are willing to embrace the cooperation under the
graduated response system.
2. Cooperative Model on Copyright Management: the underlying incentive
Unlike the cooperative model which focuses on copyright enforcement, the
second track of cooperative model turns to copyright management. Simply put,
the second track designs an alternative licensing mechanism that enable copyright
holders license their works outside the regulation of copyright law. With flexib le
licensing schemes, the open access program opens a new method for licensing of
copyrighted works and provides a different perspective to the tradeoff design
under copyright system.
Copyright policy generally strikes the balance between the incentives to copyright
holders for creation and the necessity of users’ access to copyrighted works.39
The tradeoff design under copyright system usually appears in the form of
limitation or exception to exclusive rights in order to preserve the public with the
adequate access to copyrighted works.
Due to the inherent imbalance between the broad “rights” and the narrow
“exceptions” in copyright law, copyright holders are in a better position under the
copyright system. Under the circumstances, copyright holders are active content
providers and ordinary users are passive content receivers.
The popularity and widespread implementation of open access program, however,
39
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indicate that neither copyright holders nor ordinary users should confine
themselves into traditional licensing framework. Rather, the inherent incentives
under open access program demonstrate that the cooperative model is able to offer
alternative channel for licensing and creation of copyrighted works. In short, the
cooperative model by means of open access program affects copyright holders
and ordinary users with underlying incentives simultaneously.
a) Copyright Holders & Open Access
Under the open access program, copyright holders license their copyrighted works
without charging the licensing fees. At first glance, lacking of financial returns
will lead to insufficient incentives to copyright holders. Such assumptio n,
however, has been challenged by both theory and practical experiences. In
theoretical perspective, behavioral economists have demonstrated that economic
benefits are not the only motivation to spur copyright creation. Noneconomic
incentives are of equivalently importance.
Scholars in this branch propose that people are drove to engage in activity because
they perceive it is interesting and necessary even if the participation in activity
does generate monetary benefits. 40 Swiss economist Bruno S. Frey further
explains that:
Individuals derive utility not only from income (as is implied in much of received
theory) but also from highly valued social relations and from a sense of self-

40
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determination, as well as from capitalizing upon their own competence. Moreover,
individuals derive utility from processes, not just from outcomes. 41
The argument from behavioral economists denotes the existence of noneconomic
motivations in the process of creation. To be sure, the monetary motivatio n
provides efficient incentives to the decision making process. In the context of
copyright creation and licensing, content industry is driven by financial profits to
improve the efficiency

of production,

explore new markets, and create

competitive business model.
However, copyright creation is not solely motivated by financial benefits. In
addition to the economic returns, people are naturally driven to write, paint, invent,
and compose works by noneconomic incentives. 42
In practical field, the open access program gives copyright holders reliable and
flexible channel to license their works and provides them with extra incentives to
spur copyright creation. A case in point is the popularity of the open-source
software program.
The open-source software is generally free to be improved, reconfigured, and
redistributed without charging of licensing fees. 43 Because of its flexible and
diversified

licensing mechanism,

the open-source software is widespread

implemented among software developers community.
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Generally, the most available computer software to the majority software
developers and ordinary users is propriety-owned by either Microsoft or Apple.
However, this conclusion overlooks the open-source software in computer
community. According to a Microsoft’s survey, about 60% of internet servers use
the Linux open-source operating system. 44 In other words, nearly two thirds of
ordinary users have the experience of using open-source software.
Meanwhile, the Granter, world’s leading information technology research and
advisory company, published a survey in 2008 and claimed that 85% of surveyed
companies had used OSS in their business before May 2008 and the remaining
15% to incorporate OSS into their enterprises in the following twelve months. 45
According to the Granter, major adoption of open-source software was to develop
and enhance the existing infrastructure components in area where the usage of
OSS were most mature, especially for software design. 46
Moreover, the popular Android operating system also benefits from its own opensource software project. 47 Simply put, the Android system promote the diversity
and wealth of available software products and accompanied hardware. For
instances, As of July 2013, there were more than one million applicatio ns
available for Android in the Google Play Store. 48

44 James Niccolai, Ballmer Still Searching for an Answer to Google, PC WORLD , available at
http://www.pcworld.com/article/151568/article.html (last visited 7/25/2013).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Android Open Source Project, available at http://source.android.com/ (last visited 7/25/2013).
48 Dan Rowinski, Google play hits 1 million Apps, READ WRITE , available at
http://readwrite.com/2013/07/24/google-play-hits-one-million-android-apps#awesm=~osW8d4DY5RxwRp(last
visited 1/14/2014).
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Due to the open-source nature, companies like Amazon (Kindle Fire), Barnes ＆
Nobile (Nook), Ouya, and Baidu create and release mobile devices running their
own customized version of Android. 49 As a consequence, the Android system
become the “default operating system for launching new hardware.”50
Furthermore, Linux system occupies the high-end searching computing field and
nearly 90% of world’s supercomputers use Linux. 51 Although the total economic
value of open-source software is difficult to estimate, one assumes that it can be
$30.6 billion per year. 52
The popularity of open-source software is largely due to the noneconomic
incentives that motivates software developers. Because the open-source software
program does not charge for licensing fees under its licensing framework,
incentives in economic perspective hardly account for the widespread adoption
and popularity.
A survey from a Boston Consulting Group indicates that 684 open-source
software programmers acknowledged their participation in the projects was
largely because “enjoyment-based intrinsic motivations—namely how creative a
person feels when working on the projects—is the strongest and most pervasive
driver.”53
49

Android, WIKIP EDIA , available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system)#Reception (last
visited 1/14/2014).
50 Jon Brodkin, On its 5th Birthday, 5 things we love about Android, A RS T ECHNICA , available at
http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2012/11/on-androids-5th-birthday-5-things-we-love-about-android/ (last visited
1/14/2014).
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Another report on open-source software pinpoints that the project is resulted from
“the fun…of mastering the challenge of a given software problem and the design
to give a gift to the programmer community…it depends on intrinsic motivatio ns
the same as old business model rely on extrinsic motivations.”54
The open access program not only establishes an alternative licensing scheme that
take noneconomic incentives into consideration, but provides individual authors
with opportunity to promote their professional career. In music creation field, the
strengths of creative commons license are gradually realized and accepted by
individual musician.
For example, Jonathan Coulton, a singer-songwriter and musician, licenses his
musical works through the Internet under CC licensing. 55 All of his musical
works available for streaming or downloading on his website are free so long as
users comply with the terms and conditions of the Attribution-Noncommerc ia l
License. 56
On the other hand, music fans can purchase his songs in either digital format for
$1 or albums for around $5-$10. 57 Moreover, they have the option to make
donations, buy physical CDs or buy exclusive t-shirts on the website. By flexib le
licensing strategy, Coulton made half a million dollars from his music creation in
2010. 58
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Musicians like Jonathan Coulton are usually unknown to the public and not
attractive to the record labels. They do not have sufficient audiences and fans who
are willing to pay for their musical creation before they become renowned. The
CC license provides them with the platform to share their creation inexpensive ly
among the public. As Coulton responded in an interview,
The project brings more exposure, more fans, and more chances for people to pay
me—something that wouldn’t have happened as easily if the music was all locked
up with DRM and the full battery of copyright restrictions… 59
Under the circumstances, the CC licenses explore an alternative channel for music
creation and licensing. Individual musicians or small music groups are able to
obtain attention through the CC licensing. They are able to establish their own
audiences’ group and promote their career inexpensively in the early stage. This
prospective result, on the other hand, will inspire more musicians to participate
into the program and eventually contribute the wealth of music works.
The experiences from open-source software and the CC license demonstrate that
copyright creation and licensing does not entirely rely on economic incentives and
the traditional copyright licensing as prerequisite. Rather, the cooperative model
enables copyright holders to manage the creation and licensing of copyrighted
works through an alternative and prospective method.
Under the circumstances, copyright holders have two options with regard to
copyright creation and licensing. Despite traditional copyright licensing are
59 Case Studies, CREATIVE COMMONS, available at
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Case_Studies/Jonathan_Coulton (last visited 7/25/2013).
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mature and primarily implemented by copyright holders, especially the content
industry, to manage the creation and licensing of copyrighted works, the open
access program provides a second choice of management to copyright holders.
b) Ordinary Users & Open Access
The strengths of open access program not only attract copyright owners, but
receive active feedbacks from ordinary users. In other words, the effective
operation of the open access program relies on the users’ participation. Because
ordinary users are consisted of distinctive groups, each group is driven to
participate the program by different incentives.
The first group contains ordinary online users who seek to enjoy creative contents
with low costs and fewer restrictions. Because online business and licensing is
under development and not as mature as offline one, the content industry still
insist on traditional licensing framework which hardly keep up with the growing
demand from ordinary users.
The content industry usually dominates the traditional market and incorporate the
old business model into online environment. The result of their strategy, however,
frustrates the online users who constitute the main body of consumers’ group. As
a result, users are either refuse to legitimate licensing and switch to user-frie nd ly
service, or give up legitimate licensing and turn to illegal accessing.
The open access program offers a solution to the problem by providing online
users with optional licensing agreements to creative contents. The licens ing
agreements are usually not confined to a single and rigid framework. Instead,
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online users are able to choose the licensing agreement that best fulfills their
specific demands.
For example, the Creative Commons licenses cover six different categories of
licensing agreements. 60 Each kind of agreement includes distinctive restrictio ns
upon the use of certain work. A user is able to choose an agreement where the
terms and conditions are mostly acceptable.
Moreover, the Creative Commons website provides specialized search link for
users to locate available contents which are subject to CC licensing agreement. 61
The search link includes several websites and covers different categories of
contents such as media, image, music, and video. 62 Although the search link does
not guarantee whether a specific work is under CC license or whether it is subject
to other restrictions, such convenient tool save users’ time in searching potential
licensed works. 63
To be sure, ordinary online users prefer to personal enjoyment on creative
contents rather than commercially exploitation. Put another way, ordinary users
rarely consider the use of licensed works for commercial purpose. To the contrary,
their primary concern is the costs to access creative contents. Because works
under CC license are usually free to use, ordinary users bear marginal costs of
access. More importantly, the restrictions of CC licenses agreement will not
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discourage ordinary users because they are usually not the target group of the
restriction. 64
The second group of users consists of copyright holders who are individ ua l
authors. Because copyright creation relies on preexisting works as “build ing
blocks” to create derivative works, individual authors need sufficient access to all
available creative contents. Contrary to ordinary online users, individual authors
concentrate on learning, improving, and recreating new works rather than personal
enjoyment.
Moreover, their creations always add original contents to existing works and thus
increase the value and wealth of works. However, copyright holders exercise
strong control over their works and the accessing costs to the works are often
expensive. Under the circumstances, individual authors find it difficult to continue
their creation under the restrictions.
Generally, copyright holders are entitled to derivative works so long as the work
is built upon the preexisting works. The right of derivative work is often referred
to adaptation right. 65 Therefore, the derivative author who would like to exploit
the works needs negotiation with the copyright holder.
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Therefore, the

transaction costs may impose substantial burden upon both parties. Because
creative works will be eventually distributed in exchange for financial benefits,
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both parties will not readily reach appropriate licensing agreement before they are
able to secure their benefits.
The open access program, to the contrary, provides alternative licens ing
mechanism to solve the negotiation problem. The licensing agreement clearly
designates the restrictions upon using, distribution, and adaption on copyrighted
works. Because of the diversified licensing agreements, individual authors are
able to choose agreements based on individual demand.
For example, the least restrictive licensing agreement is the Attribution CC
License that allows a user to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon licensed
work, even commercially, as long as they credit to the original creation.

67

Individual authors who accept the terms and conditions under such licens ing
agreement have a broad freedom over the exploitation of works than those under
traditional copyright licensing.
Moreover, the licensing process has been greatly simplified and the costs of
negotiation are significantly reduced. For one, the licensing process does not
require person-in-person meeting and both parties can complete the process online.
For another, specific terms and conditions have drafted and both parties can save
the costs of negotiation on drafting. As a consequence, individual authors are able
to license their works in an efficient method without substantial transaction costs.
Both ordinary online users and individual authors benefit from the licens ing
mechanism under open access program. Compared to traditional copyright
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licensing, the open access program provides them with flexible accessing scheme
and fewer restrictions on the exploitation of licensed works.
Furthermore, individual authors who lack of the support from the content industry
obtain the opportunity to promote their professional career and customized the
licensing of copyrighted works. They are able to establish fans group, gather
feedbacks, and commercialize their creative contents without relying on the
intermediary. By joining the open access program, individual authors explore an
alternative channel for copyright licensing and creation.
Part Two the Three Questions
The unique feature of each model implies the general distinction between the
right-holder-centric model and the cooperative model. However, the differe nces
do not explain validity and efficiency of the two models with respect to copyright
enforcement and copyright management.
Specifically, two fundamental questions need to be answered:
1) Whether the model works to copyright enforcement, especially on copyright
piracy, and
2) Whether the model is reliable to sustain the creation and licensing of
copyrighted works.
Based on the answers of the first two questions, the third question further goes
that,
3) Which model is the more optimal than the other, or which model should be the
ultimate one to replace the other with respect to copyright enforcement and
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management.
To answer these questions, a reliable approach is to look into how the right-holdercentric model and the cooperative model operate in practice. Therefore, this
section will look into practical experiences of both models and examines the
effects respectively.
A. Whether the model works to copyright enforcement
Deterring copyright piracy have long been the major objective to copyright
holders in terms of copyright enforcement. Because copyright piracy distorts
normal copyright distribution by free riding and deprive copyright holders of
revenues, copyright holders take copyright

piracy as the prior concern.

Accordingly, whether an enforcement strategy is useful and efficient to copyright
piracy become the determinative standard.
By the same token, the right-holder-centric model and the cooperative model fall
into the identical rationale.
1. Right-holder-centric model
The right-holder-centric model includes two major working examples: the private
implementation through digital technology and the copyright law enforcement. In
general, the copyright law enforcement is more reliable than the private system
regarding the control of online piracy, while both cannot say for sure to entirely
deter online piracy. In practice, both strategies give rise to undesirable side effects
in the course of copyright enforcement.
a) Private Implementation
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To begin with, the private implementation through digital technology once was
highly accepted and upheld by copyright holders because of its technologic a l
advance.
There is no doubt that copyright holders are able to exercise more powerful
control to copyrighted works in online environment via the digital technology.
For instances, digital technology enables copyright holders to limit the users’
access to digital copies, including the restriction on reproduction, adaption, and
distribution. 68 Such attractive feature convince copyright holders that they are
able to prevent the unauthorized access to their works.
Moreover, the legislation which primarily prohibits the circumvention of digita l
technology adds a second layer of protection to copyright holders. Under the
circumstances, the private system seems to be the optimal choice to curtailing
online piracy and meanwhile provides them with twofold protection on
copyrighted works. The reality, however, indicates the quite opposing results.
On the one hand, digital technology fails the expectation from copyright holders
to preclude unauthorized access and deter the copyright piracy. Rather, the
technology become vulnerable to technical attack by hackers group who are good
at breaking down the digital encryption.
For example, the hacker group can employ specialized software to produce a serial
counterfeit number which can be used to unlock the licensed contents. 69 Under
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the circumstances, the specialized software actually breaks the technology
framework and legal mechanism, resulting in the distribution of unprotected
works online. 70
To make matter worse, the “cracked” version of digital works usually are freely
distributed through the Internet and hardly can be retrieved. For example, the wellknown principle in IT community is BORA—“break once run anywhere”. 71
Specifically, a hacker who invests time and efforts to break the digital technology
will choose to distribute the unprotected content with the cracking technology
through the Internet. Under the circumstances, ordinary online users merely need
internet connection and the knowledge of copying to access the unprotected
content. 72
In the industry of computer games, the disastrous “Zero-day” piracy is the highprofile example of how the circumvention of digital encryption significantly threat
the entire industry. As mentioned in Chapter II, the hackers often break down the
digital protection on a given computer game on or before its official launch day.73
As a result, the protection provided by digital technology does not last long as
expectation.
One successful case regarding the “Zero-day” piracy was the 2K Australia
designed a software to prevent the circumvention to the official launch of its
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computer game “Bioshock”. 74 However, the so-called success merely lasted for
thirteen days. 75 Even the 2K Australia officially admitted the failure of their
digital protection on the anti-piracy,
“I don't think we'll do exactly the same thing again, but we'll do something close.
You can't afford to be cracked. As soon as you're gone, you're gone, and your sales
drop astronomically if you've got a day-one crack.”76
The weakness of digital protection and the challenge from hackers group
demonstrate that digital technology cannot provide secure and absolute protection
on copyrighted works. In other words, the private system is uncertain and insecure
with respect to its anti-piracy effect.
b) Copyright law enforcement
Compared to the private system, the copyright law enforcement is far more
reliable with respect to copyright enforcement, especially on deterring online
piracy. Without the aid from digital technology, the copyright law enforceme nt
operates under judicial system.
Because the decisions from courts are generally decisive and influential to
copyright infringement, copyright law enforcement is essentially the last resort
for copyright holders to guard their exclusive rights.
In general, copyright law enforcement provides injunctive relief and damages as
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ultimate measure to deter and control copyright piracy. Put another way, copyright
holders rely on injunction and damages to protect their works after infringe me nt
occurs. Under the circumstances, the judicial practices on injunction and damages
are determinative to the ultimate effects of copyright law enforcement on antipiracy.
According to judicial practices, the copyright law enforcement is effective on
deterring online piracy when targeting on illegal P2P file-sharing network or
unauthorized websites. 77 Because injunctive relief force the shutdown of P2P
platforms or block the access to illegal websites, such kind of remedy in copyright
proves to be effective on ceasing continuous injury.
Due to the powerful injunction, most of the illegal P2P platforms such as Napster,
Grokster, LimeWire, and eDonkey were either forced to shut down or switched to
legitimate online platform for copyrighted works. 78 The result brings about two
substantial benefits.
For one, the shutdown of P2P platforms closes the channel for infringement and
reduces the losses to copyright holders to some extent. For instance, In the case
of Napster, the injunction issued by court successfully ceased mass scope of
piracy because nearly 99% of uploading materials were infringing. 79 When it
comes to Grokster, the shutdown made nearly 70-90% infringing materia ls
unavailable online. 80

77
78
79
80

For a line of judicial cases, see Chapter III§B1.
See Chapter III§D 1.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, at 1021 (2001).
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, at 1158 (2005).
229

As a result, the shutdown of these P2P platforms successfully ceased the ongoing
injury to copyright holders.
For another, the judicial cases in this aspect have deterring effect to other P2P
platforms and force them to legitimate licensing. For example, the Napster
became a legitimate online music store when it was acquired by Rhapsody from
Best Buy in December 2011. 81 The switch from an infringing platform to a legal
online business demonstrates that the force from copyright law enforcement often
is an important consideration in the decision-making process of online business.
However, the copyright law enforcement is not flawless. Recall the inherent defect
of the right-holder-centric model, its imbalance design between copyright holders
and other parties often leads to undesirable result. Consequently, copyright
holders sometimes employ inappropriate strategy in practice, which leads to
counterproductive effects.
One case in point is the awarding of statutory damages to individual online users.
As mentioned in chapter III, the Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum case indicate
copyright law enforcement may be imposed on inappropriate target and cause
disproportional punishment. 82
The debate of the two cases does not end up with the infringement itself. Both
infringers did not dispute their culpable actions. 83 Rather, the focal point
concentrates on the identity of two infringers and the disproportional amount of
81

Ben Sisario, Rhapsody to Acquire Napster in Deal with Best Buy, N.Y. T IMES, Oct 3rd 2011,available at
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/03/rhapsody-to-acquire-napster-in-deal-with-bestbuy/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (last visited 2/1/2014).
82 For cases analysis, See Chapter III§C 2(a)＆(b).
83 Id.
230

statutory

damages.

Both defendants

in cases kept arguing

against

the

inappropriate amount of statutory damages and petitioned for retrial or appeal. 84
As a matter of fact, the strategy implemented by copyright holders, mainly the
content industry, on targeting individual online users in file-sharing cases receives
negative comments from the US judicial system. Judge Gertner expressly stated
that:
There is a huge imbalance in these cases. The record companies are represented
by large law firms with substantial resources. The law is also overwhelmingly on
their side…They bring cases against individuals, individuals who don't have
lawyers and don't have access to lawyers and who don't understand their legal
rights…I can't say this is a situation that is a good situation or a fair situation… The
best that I can do given the state of the law and the unequal resources is to try to
level the playing field… 85
Consequently, the central issue switched from blaming and punishing culpable
infringers to the sympathy on defendants as well as the query to copyright
legislation. The imbalance under the right-holder-centric model demonstrates that
such model sometimes add too much weight on copyright holders, while omit or
even harm the interests of ordinary users.
The danger lies in that copyright holders may abuse their advantageous position
under the right-holder-centric model, breaking down the balance emphasized by
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copyright policy. This kind of danger comes from the inherent design of the model
and lead to undesirable results in judicial practice, such as the Thomas-Rasset and
Tenenbaum case.
Based on all the above analysis, the right-holder-centric model is a reliable option
to copyright enforcement when it focuses on appropriate targets such as
commercially scale infringing entity. Targeting on illegal P2P platforms and
illegal websites under copyright law enforcement are the right examples.
On the other hand, the right-holder-centric model has a tendency to overly favor
of copyright holders and omit the necessary interests of other parties. Copyright
holders are easily to implement overwhelming measures and pursue absolute
copyright enforcement. As a result, side effects and undesirable results emerge as
the byproducts to the inappropriate operation of right-holder-centric model.
Therefore, the adoption of this model should be cautious and avoid inappropriate
use which break the balance emphasized by copyright policy.
2. Cooperative model
Although the cooperative model consists of two tracks, the analysis of its antipiracy effects primarily focuses on the graduated response system. The second
track of cooperative model, namely the open access program, operates outside the
copyright system and departs from the mainstream copyright system. In fact, the
open access program is inclined to build an alternative route for the creation and
licensing of copyrighted works. It barely has direct correlation to the anti-piracy
issue.
232

The graduated responses system has been recently introduced within a short
period and only a few jurisdictions have practical experiences regarding its antipiracy effect. The France is one of the earliest country that introduced the
graduated response system. Despite the early adoption, the practical effects of
HADOPI system are complicated during the three-year period.
The HADOPI claims the efficiency of its system on a variety of objectives,
including the users’ reaction upon receiving notices, the P2P usage during the
implementation of HADOI system, and the subscription rate to legitimate online
business. 86 Based on these statistics, HADOPI announced that this system is
effective to deter and control online piracy and educate online users the
importance of copyright protection. 87
According to the HADOPI surveys and reports after the launched of the system,
72% online users declared they reduced or completely stopped their illegal usage
after receiving the warning notices. 88 Furthermore, four statistical agencies
publish their figures that demonstrate the decrease of usage in P2P network. 89
However, the HADOPI system also receives challenge and query which makes
the system in a pending status. On the one hand, the questions from scholarly
community primarily oppugn the credibility of statistic. 90
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For a detailed analysis, See Chapter IV§E 1(a).
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at 14-5, (last visited 5/7/2013).
88 Hadopi, Cultural property and Internet usage: French internet users’ habits and points of view, RESOURCES,
available at http://www.hadopi.fr/sites/default/files/page/pdf/t1_etude_en.pdf (last visited 1/8/2014).
89 See e.g. 17% decline in audience level(Nielson Report); 29% decline in audience level(NetRatings); 43%
decline of illegal data sharing(Peer M edia technologies); 66% decline of illegal data sharing (ALPA).
90 See generally Rebecca Giblin, Evaluating Graduated Responses, Forthcoming, COLUM. J.L. ＆A RTS, at 36
(2013).
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On the other hand, a report on HADOPI system indicated that the system diverted
online infringement from P2P network to other infringing platforms rather than
legitimate market. 91 More importantly, the report was commissioned by the
French government and the government quickly passed a decree that abolished
the suspension as a possible penalty for a subscriber who negligently infr inge
copyright. 92
To make matter worse, the French Cultural Minister in a subsequent press release
announced that the HADOPI agency would be abolished and its “remaining
responsibilities allocated elsewhere.”93 All these greatly reduce the credibility of
the HADOPI system in terms of its anti-piracy effect.
To be sure, it is still too early to determine the ultimate effect of the graduated
responses system. The practical experiences in France can hardly reach a
conclusion on the cooperative model with respect to copyright enforcement. The
available statistics and evidences are far from sufficient and determinative. After
all, countries like France has not more than three-year practical experiences, not
to mention the newly entrant such as the U.S. which launches its system for less
than one year. Under the circumstances, the cooperative model is a prospective
enforcement option, but far from an ultimate solution to online piracy.
Through the analysis, the answer to the first question is relatively clear and certain.
The right-holder-centric model, especially the copyright law enforcement, is a
91
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more reliable option to copyright holders in terms of copyright enforceme nt.
Because this model emphasizes on the interests of copyright holders and give
them prior consideration, it better adapts to protect the interests of copyright
holders. The problem lies in its inappropriate implementation which tends to break
the balance under the copyright policy and impair other parties’ benefits.
The cooperative model, on the other hand, lacks of sufficient empirical data to
support its reliability and credibility on copyright enforcement. Rather, it provides
with copyright holders and other parties with a prospective landscape: the
cooperative partnership to jointly enforce copyright. By establishing cooperation
and transferring non-stakeholders into stakeholders, the cooperative model can
avoid the side effects under right-holder-centric model.
B. Whether the model is reliable to the management of copyrighted works
A complete circulation of copyright system not only includes the copyright
enforcement, but the management of copyrighted works. In other words, an
appropriate model should take copyright creation and licensing into consideratio n
and facilitates copyright management.
As aforementioned, the graduated responses system under the cooperative model
focuses on the copyright enforcement.

Distinguished

from the graduated

responses system, the open access program contributes to the copyright
management. As the second track of the cooperative model, the open access
program designs an alternative licensing mechanism to copyrighted works and
enable copyright creation outside copyright industry.
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On the other hand, the right-holder-centric model accords with mainstre a m
copyright system. Hence, this model enables copyright holders to manage the
licensing and creation of copyrighted works under a traditional framework.
Accordingly, this section looks into both the right-holder-centric model and the
second track of cooperative model, the open access program, to figure out which
models better adapts to the copyright management.
1. Mainstream perception v. Conceptual shifting
Pursuant to basic copyright perception, copyright law protects copyright holder ’s
exclusive rights in order to preserve sufficient incentives to encourage the creation
of copyrighted works. It follows that inadequate protection eventually lead to
insufficient incentives, which results in insufficient works available to the
public. 94 Under the circumstances, mainstream copyright perception recognizes
the importance of protection to copyright holders so as to sustain the creation of
copyrighted works.
In so far as the mainstream perception,

the right-holder-centric

model

appropriately echoes the requirement by concentrating on the interests of
copyright holders. The private implementation through digital technology
enhances copyright holders’ control on copyrighted works and is upheld by
legislation to punish the circumvention of digital technology. As a consequence,
the twofold protection ensures strong incentives to copyright holders.
Similarly, the copyright law enforcement follows the traditional approach to
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See Joyce supra note 4, at 67.
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protect copyright through the judicial system. The judicial practice demonstrates
this enforcement strategy is more efficient than the private system regarding the
control of online piracy, especially on infringing entity of commercial scale.
According to the rationale, the copyright law enforcement establishes a stable
channel to provide copyright holders with sufficient incentives.
To be sure, the reason that the right-holder-centric model accords with mainstre a m
copyright perception is largely due to its design and objective—serving the
interests of copyright holders. To the contrary, the open access program goes to a
different direction by switching the focal point from the emphasis on copyright
holders to the interaction between copyright holders and the users.
One notable argument against the mainstream copyright perception is that
collective creation substantially contributes to the creation of copyrighted works
and is prospective feature may eventually become the major approach for
copyright creation in digital age. 95 Such argument builds upon the reasoning that
the difference in quality between the original version and copying version is trivia l
and thus enables anyone to add, modify, or adapt to the original work with ease.96
In other words, the advanced digital technology with efficient Internet connection
enables each individual online users to contribute creative efforts toward a final,
large project.
The entire process follows that disparate individuals with distinctive knowledge
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or capability pool their contributions into a single work and maintain the dynamic
creation by editing, reefing, and updating. The open-source software program and
the creative commons license project are the high-profile examples.
Moreover, the proponents of collective creation argue that collective contributio ns
to creation of copyright works had long been a tradition under copyright system.
For example, they argue that many amateur lexicographers who works on the first
edition of Oxford English Dictionary contributed substantial amount of individ ua l
word usage. 97
Their argument further goes that technological progress makes collective creation
popular and common in online environment. For example, ordinary online users
are able to contribute and share stories, commentary, graphic art, and other kinds
of content related to a general type pf copyrighted works through the so-called
“Fansite”. 98
Based on the argument, the open access program as the second track of
cooperative model is established in a shifting concept and distinguished from the
mainstream copyright perception.
2. Copyright Management & two Models
The debate in theoretical perspective is inadequate to figure out which model is
more appropriate to copyright creation and licensing. Rather, the practical
experiences are better to serve as illustration.
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To begin with, the open access program under cooperative model indicates its
usefulness to copyright management,

especially the open-source software

program. The success of Android system demonstrate that the cooperative model
is sustainable to the creation and licensing of copyrighted works. Because the
source code for Android is freely available under Apache Software License (ASL)
version 2.0, other copyright holders in software industry can create new
proprietary software by integrating the source code into their products, and
licenses their products in exchange for revenues.
Since the threshold of entering Android system is so low that most of the software
developers are capable to participate in the process. Under the circumstances, the
quantity and categories of available software increase based on Android system.
Copyright holders are able to license diversified software to meet the demand of
their customers. As of July 2013, there were more than one million applicatio ns
available for Android in the Google Play Store. 99
Since computer software is under copyright law protection, the copyright holders
usually design closed-source proprietary software in order to protect the source
code of software. The free release of source code, by contrast, is not the
mainstream strategy adopted by most copyright holders. However, Google’s
practice implies that open-source strategy constitutes an alternative route to create
and license software for commercial success.
On the one hand, the adoption of Android system give rise to the diversity and
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wealth of available apps and devices. Based on a report in the title of “Android
Fragmentation Visualized (July 2013)”, There are 11,868 distinct Android devices
and eight Android versions in use in 2013. 100
On the other hand, the hardware manufactures also benefit from the openness and
flexibility of Android system. Due to the open-source nature, companies like
Amazon (Kindle Fire), Barnes＆Nobile (Nook), Ouya, and Baidu create and
release mobile devices running their own customized version of Android. 101 As
a consequence, the Android system become the “default operating system for
launching new hardware.”102 According to data from OpenSignal in July 2013,
there were 11,868 models of Android device, numerous different screen sizes and
eight Android OS versions simultaneously in use. 103
Despite the success of Android system, it does not follow that open access
program will replace traditional creation and licensing of copyrighted works. Still,
other big software companies like the Microsoft and the Apple employ closedsource approach to develop their software and rely on the right-holder-centr ic
model to the licensing process.
The dominant position of Microsoft OS in desktop market and the popularity of
Apple IOS in mobile devices implies that Google’s mode is not the only option to
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developing software products. Rather, both the right-holder-centric model and
cooperative model by open access program promotes the development of software
industry.
The coexistence of closed-source software and open-source software in fact
broaden the market and increase the diversity of available software products to
the public. To sum up in a word, both models become indispensable components
to sustain the software creation and licensing.
Unfortunately, the software case is a highly limited insofar as the copyright
management. Currently most content industries prefer to the right-holder-centr ic
model rather than the cooperative model in order to ensure the financial returns to
their huge investment and protect their commercial products from uncompensa ted
use. A case in point is the music industry with respect to the investment in music
creation and licensing.
According to the IFPI statistics, in 2011 the major record companies are estimated
to have invested $4.5 billion US dollars worldwide in artists and repertoire (A&R)
with marketing. 104 The investment in this aspect accounts for approximately 26%
of the industry revenues. 105 Compared to other industries, the music industry
invest substantially in the A&R aspect. Based on the statistics by UK Department
of Business Innovation & Skills, the global 16% A&R investment in music
industry ranks at top compared to Pharmaceutical & Biology (15.3%), software
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& computer service (9.6%), Technology & hardware (7.8%), etc. 106
In addition to the huge investment to discover talented musician, the music
industry need to support emerging artists with a variety of investment in order to
promote their professional career. Although the investment by a major record
company in a newly-signed artist varies from countries to countries, the typical
components are generally the same. These are payment of advances, financing of
record costs, production of videos, tour support, marketing and promotion. 107 An
average investment usually amounts to $750,000 to 1.4 million, includ ing
$200,000 of advance, $200,000 to $300,000 of recording, $50,000 to $300,000
for two or three videos, $100,000 for tour support, and $200,000 to $500,000 for
marketing and promotion. 108
Based on the figures and statistics, it is fairly understandable why copyright
holders in music industry regard online music piracy as the major threat to their
copyright management. The substantial amount of investment on discovering and
nurturing musicians demand sufficient financial returns as the funding to next
round of investment.
Online piracy, however, break the channel of revenues and disrupt the circulatio n
of investment. Therefore, copyright holders, especially the music industry, need a
reliable enforcement strategy to sustain the circulation of their creation and
licensing. Under the circumstances, the right-holder-centric model is more
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appropriate and reliable option than the open access program under cooperative
model.
Someone may argue that the creative commons license also includes successful
example such as individual musician, Jonathan Coulton, who promote his
professional career. Moreover, the band Nine Inch Nails successfully employ the
CC license to release one of their albums for free and eventually receive sales
success of another album. Hence, proponents to the CC license argue that this
licensing framework works to substitute traditional licensing mechanism under
copyright system.
There is no doubt Jonathan Coulton and the Nine Inch Nails obtain their success
through the adoption of CC licenses. However, their success does not mean the
failure of traditional copyright licensing mechanism.
Rather, the successful examples in CC licenses constitutes a supplementary option
to the music industry. The Jonathan Coulton is an unsigned musician who cannot
obtain an agreement with the major record companies. To make himself known to
audiences and establish his own fans base, he release his music under the CC
licenses. In other words, the CC licenses provides him with an alternative route to
continue his music profession. Had he accepted by a record company, he would
not refer to the CC licenses to promote his career and to make a living.
As aforementioned, the investment by music companies are exceptional high in
figure and a newly signed artist usually receive substantial benefits through the
investment.
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Under the circumstances, the Jonathan Coulton case merely indicates an
alternative route of creation and licensing copyrighted music. To artists who are
not competitive and cannot obtain support from the content industry, the open
access program open a new gate for them to promote professional career.
In summary, both the right-holder-centric model and the cooperative model
provide benefits to copyright holders in the course of copyright manageme nt.
Each model contributes to copyright management from different perspectives.
The right-holder-centric model accords with mainstream copyright system and
provide copyright holders with a reliable and certain approach to ensure the
rewards to their intellectual contribution as well as financial investment.
On the other hand, the cooperative model establishes an alternative route which
enable copyright holders to manage their creation and licensing with flexibility.
The flexible mechanism better adapt to the evolving online environment and
distinctive demand of online users. As a result, the cooperative model
supplements the incapability of right-holder-centric model in terms of copyright
licensing and creation.
3. Which model is more appropriate and better
Based on the analysis of first two questions, the third question does not lead to a
simple and clear answer. The right-holder-centric model displays more efficie nc y
on deterring copyright piracy than the cooperative model, while the inherent
imbalance in the right-holder-centric model risks the danger of disproportiona l
enforcement and side effects. The imbalance by right-holder-centric is highly
244

possible to cause undesirable results in the course of copyright enforcement.
On the other hand, the cooperative model between copyright holders and ISPs
open a new landscape to online copyright enforcement. The flexible enforceme nt
measures and joint enforcement strategy are more efficient than enforcement by
single party. Since such enforcement system is relatively new and under
development, its ultimate effects still need more time and practices.
With respect to copyright management, two models operates under differe nt
circumstances. For creation and licensing under copyright system, the rightholder-centric provides copyright holders with reliable approach to sustain their
investment with certainty.
The cooperative model, to the contrary, primarily serves as alternative route for
copyright holders to manage the creation and licensing of copyrighted works. The
low threshold for creation and the flexible licensing mechanism provided by open
access program preserve a second option for copyright holders to customize their
creation and licensing.
To sum up, the existence of two models is the result of copyright development and
the interaction between different parties in the digital age. Both models should
work together

to online

copyright

enforcement

and management.

The

supplementary feature of the two models to each other serves to maintain the
integrity and the balance of copyright system.
Part Three Lessons from Two Models
1. Developing Alternatives to Copyright Enforcement and Management is a
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Reasonable Strategy
The existing two models constitute the full landscape of copyright enforceme nt
and management in the digital age. At first glance, the two models goes to two
contrary directions. The right-holder-centric model builds upon mainstre a m
copyright perceptions. Its major concentration lies in the interests of copyright
holders. In terms of specific enforcement strategies, the right-holder-centr ic
usually enhances copyright holders’ control on their works and omit the interest
of other parties. As a result, the right-holder-centric sometimes leads to side
effects and undesirable results in practice by breaking the balance under the
copyright system.
On the other hand, the cooperative model requires cooperation between copyright
holders and other copyright participants such as ISPs or online users. Although
copyright holders still focuses on their interests, the design of cooperative model
forces them to take other parties’ interests into consideration.
In general, copyright holders must share benefits with ISPs or online users in order
to establish the cooperative partnership and recoup benefits of the cooperation.
Under the circumstances, the cooperative model supplements the weakness of the
right-holder-centric model by removing the inherent imbalance between copyright
holders and other parties.
The distinction between two models does not lead to the competing tension and
makes one to replace the other. To the contrary, copyright holders adopt differe nt
models to enforce and manage their copyright. As a matter of fact, the coexistence
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of two models implies that not a single one can take charge of the evolving
copyright system in the digital age.
The cooperative model by means of the graduated responses system builds upon
digital technology and makes the online enforcement more convenient to
copyright holders. The costs of enforcement under this system is basically fewer
than those under right-holder-centric model because the ISPs will bear partial
costs in the process. Under the circumstances, the cooperative model functions as
alternative option to the right-holder-centric model in terms of copyright
enforcement. Therefore, the cooperative model is more like a supplementar y
system rather than a substitution.
Moreover, the creation and licensing of copyrighted works is also promoted by
the coexistence of two models. The prosperity of software industry is founded on
the two-track development of software design. For one, closed-source software
are dominant to the major software companies and the copyright holders of these
software usually prefer to the right-holder-centric model.
For another, open-source software open a new route for software design by
releasing the source code with less restrictions. As a consequence, the differe nce
does note lead to conflict but increase the wealth and diversity of availab le
software which better meets the demands from the users’ group.
2. Transforming Non-stakeholders to Stakeholders is a Prospective Strategy
As aforementioned, the right-holder-centric model accords with the mainstre a m
copyright perceptions because it serves the interests of copyright holders. Such
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feature follows that only the copyright holders’ group under copyright system can
obtain benefits and there are strong incentives to support the operation of the rightholder-centric model.
As to non-stakeholders like online users or ISPs, however, this model is ineffic ie nt
to convince them the importance of online copyright protection because they are
generally indifferent to the beneficial aspect of the model. To make matter worse,
they sometimes have to bear the side effects and undesirable results of the rightholder-centric model, which makes counterproductive effects to the interactio n
between copyright holders and other parties in the course of copyright
enforcement and management.
The cooperative model, by contrast, attempts to transform non-stakeholders to
stakeholders by providing viable benefits to other participants such as ISPs and
online users. Being the stakeholders to copyright holders under the cooperative
model, both ISPs and online users will have solid incentives to join the
cooperation and promote the development of cooperative model. The ultima te
objective of the transforming is to establish a harmony environment to copyright
protection.
Although the cooperation is operating within a short period without certainty of
success, ISPs would actively embrace the cooperative model once the benefits are
secured and exceeds their expectation. By cooperating with copyright holders,
ISPs will switch their stance from indifferent intermediary to active proponents of
copyright protection. By the same token, online users can follow the same route
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to become the stakeholders to copyright holders through the participation of the
open access program.
Therefore, transforming non-stakeholders to stakeholders can facilitate the
process of copyright enforcement and management to a large extent. The
stakeholders can become the partner in the process, or at least learn the importance
of copyright protection during the process. To sum up, such strategy is good to
gradually change their stance and perception: once become the stakeholders, it is
less likely for them to act against own benefits.
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Chapter VII Conclusion
Copyright enforcement and copyright management are indispensable components
in the copyright system. Copyright enforcement ensures the protection of
copyrighted works. Meanwhile, copyright management relies on copyright
enforcement to secure the benefits in the course of creation and licensing of
copyrighted works. Stepping into the digital age, copyright enforcement and
management still are of paramount importance.
Under the circumstances, this dissertation conceptualizes copyright enforceme nt
and copyright management into two models: the right-holder-centric model and
the cooperative model. Each model includes the specific strategies adopted by
copyright holders as well as other parties in the course of copyright enforceme nt
and management.
To begin with, copyright holders rely on the right-holder-centric model as the
major option. This model emphasizes the interests of copyright holders and takes
their benefits as prior consideration.
More importantly, the right-holder-centric model accords with the mainstre a m
copyright perception as well as legislative history under the copyright system.
Simply put, both the labor theory and the utilitarian rationale emphasize the
importance of rewarding creators who contributes to intellectual creation.
Copyright holders thus become the major consideration in both theories. By
echoing this aspect, the right-holder-centric model accords with the mainstre a m
copyright theory and the accordance also justifies its adoption in online
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environment.
By the same token, the legislative history of copyright statutes justifies the rightholder-centric model. The legislative history of U.S. copyright law is just the case
in point. The copyright statutes in U.S. gradually extended the copyright term on
copyrighted works, and further removed the notice requirement of copyrighted
works. 752 As a consequence, copyright holders enjoy more protection and
copyrighted works become more difficult to fall into the public domain, resulting
in the imbalance between copyright holders and the public.
In addition to the accordance with copyright system, the right-holder-centr ic
model also provides specific benefits to copyright holders in terms of copyright
enforcement. Basically, copyright holders have two optional strategies under this
model. One is to rely on private implementation through digital technology to
protect copyrighted works.
The private system employs digital technology to grant copyright holders an
enhanced level of control over their copyrighted works. Moreover, the system is
upheld by the copyright legislation on the issue of circumvention against digita l
technology. Under the circumstances, the private system as optional strategy
provides copyright holders with a twofold protection.
In addition, copyright holders employ the copyright law enforcement as the
second optional strategy. Copyright law enforcement builds upon copyright law
and primarily targets copyright infringement through judicial system. Therefore,
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such strategy is usually decisive and overwhelming in the course of copyright
enforcement. In practice, copyright holders often depend on copyright law
enforcement as the most effective strategy to deter infringement and compensate
their losses.
The right-holder-centric model primarily concentrates on copyright enforceme nt.
In other words, this model functions to protect copyrighted works and deter piracy.
Ideally speaking, the creation and licensing of copyrighted works would not be
adversely affected if the right-holder-centric model works to achieve its objective.
The reality, however, indicates that the right-holder-centric model is not flawless.
In practice, the right-holder-centric model leads to side effects and undesirab le
results.
On the one hand, the private implementation system through digital technology
fails to protect copyrighted works and prevent unauthorized access due to
technological weaknesses. Rather, the enhanced control provided by digita l
technology has gradually been changed to a more user-friendly strategy in the area
of online licensing.
On the other hand, although copyright law enforcement experiences success in the
enforcement against P2P platforms, its inappropriate implementation by copyright
holders leads to undesirable practical results. Simply put, the danger of
disproportional enforcement on inappropriate targets makes copyright law
enforcement a less reliable strategy than expected. Specifically, the awarding of
statutory damages to individual end-users in recent judicial cases demonstrates
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the undesirable practice. 753
The downside of right-holder-centric model calls for new consideration. Build ing
upon digital technology, the cooperative model emerges as the second model to
copyright enforcement and management in the digital age. Since digita l
technology has been changing the landscape of copyrighted system, it establishes
a solid foundation to develop the cooperative model with respect to copyright
enforcement and management.
According to its literal meaning, the cooperative model establish cooperation
between copyright holders and other parties. Unlike the right-holder-centr ic
model, the cooperative model includes two tracks by focusing on copyright
enforcement and management respectively.
The first track concentrates on copyright enforcement by means of the graduated
responses system. The system establishes the cooperative partnership between
copyright holders and ISPs in the course of online copyright enforcement. Under
the system, ISPs need to monitor activities of their subscribers and cooperate with
copyright holders to take actions against infringement.
On the other hand, the second track focuses on copyright management, especially
on the creation and licensing of copyrighted works. The working example in this
aspect is the open access program, which allows copyright holders to distribute
their works to the public under an alternative licensing mechanism with fewer
restrictions and control, such as open-source software project or creative
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commons license.
The cooperation takes advantage of the online platform and technology to enable
widespread participation in the creation and flexible licensing of copyrighted
works. This not only enhances the quality of copyrighted works, but increase the
diversity and wealth of available works. A successful example is the popular
Android system licensed under the open-source software project. 754
In summary, the two-track design cooperative model establishes cooperative
partnership with respect to copyright enforcement and management. Compared to
the right-holder-centric model, ISPs and ordinary users obtain substantial benefits
under the cooperative model. Because of the available benefits, the cooperative
model is able to discover new stakeholders and sustain its operation by means of
cooperation.
To be sure, the cooperative model includes weakness as well. For one, the
graduated response system has existed for a short period with inadequate
empirical data to reach a certain conclusion on its efficiency in terms of online
copyright enforcement.
As a matter of fact, proponents of the graduated responses system argue its
usefulness for controlling online piracy, whereas opponents points out its
ineffectiveness. Therefore, the cooperative model still need more practice and
convincing data to establish its credibility.
Moreover, the open access program constitutes an alternative route in terms of the
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creation and licensing of copyrighted works. It is true that such alternative
approach encourage widespread participation and enable flexible licens ing
process. However, the open access program barely account for the copyright
management at commercial level.
For example, most successful cases and examples in creative commons license
are in the area of music industry in limited quantity and as an exception. 755 In
other words, copyrighted works created and licensed through content industry is
indispensable to sustain the entire circle of copyright system.
Copyright creation and licensing at commercial level demand investme nt,
distribution, and marketing. To create high quality of works, maintain the
commercial circulation, and to ensure substantial revenues, copyright holders
generally rely on right-holder-centric model to sustain the management of their
copyrighted works. Therefore, the cooperative model cannot replace the rightholder-centric model with respect to copyright management
To sum up, both right-holder-centric model and the cooperative model support
copyright enforcement and management. Neither one can replace the other. Rather,
both models mutually supplement the incapability of each one in the course of
copyright enforcement and management.
The coexistence of two models actually provides multiple options to copyright
holders and other parties. Under the circumstances, they are able to weigh the
costs and benefits of two models and choose the most appropriate one based on
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specific circumstances.
Furthermore, the operation of two models generate enlightenment to general
development of copyright system. On the one hand, developing alternative
mechanism is better than relying on a single mechanism. On the other hand,
transforming non-stakeholders to stakeholders constitutes the joint benefits. By
expanding the group of stakeholders, copyright holders are able to convince other
parties the importance of copyright protection, and meanwhile increase the
efficiency of copyright enforcement and management. By working with copyright
holders, ISPs and online users respectively enjoy the benefits that cannot be
expected without the cooperation.
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